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1The s i t u a t i o n  in  the Far East as a w h o le , in  A s ia  
and the o c e a n ic  e xp anses  a d j o i n i n g  i t ,  where we 
are permanent i n h a b i t a n t s  and s e a f a r e r s  of long  
s t a n d in g ,  is  to us of a n a t i o n a l ,  s ta te  i n t e r e s t .
— M ik h a i l  G orbachev  
J u l y  1 986
Introduction
In  Ju ly  1 9 8 6 ,  s ix t e e n  months a f t e r  becoming G eneral  
S e c r e ta r y  of the Communist Party  of the S o v ie t  Union  
(C P SU ) ,  M ik h a il  S e r g e y e v ic h  Gorbachev  made a three-week 
tour of the S o v ie t  Far E a s t .  He v i s i t e d  main c i t i e s  and 
towns, i n d u s t r i a l  c e n t r e s ,  a g r i c u l t u r a l  com m unities , as 
w e ll  as m i l i t a r y  and na v al  i n s t a l l a t i o n s .  Most im portant 
of a l l ,  Gorbachev  d e l i v e r e d  an im portant  speech  at 
V la d iv o s t o k  on J u l y  2 8 . 1 A part  from a leng th y  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of d om estic  p o l i c y  i s s u e s ,  Gorbachev  
d e f i n e d  in  h is  speech  S o v ie t  i n t e r e s t s ,  a t t it u d e s  and 
aims in  A s ia  and the P a c i f i c  in  a f r e s h  l i g h t ,  ta k in g  
A s ia n  c o n v ic t io n s  and v iew s  (as he saw them) in to  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
1. The full text of Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech on July 28, 1986 can be found in Russian 
in all Soviet newspapers of July 29, 1986 and in English in "Vladivostok is awarded the 
Order of Lenin", Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1986, pp.3-40. Hereafter 
cited as Gorbachev: Vladivostok Speech.
2G orbachev  came to power at a time when the So v ie t  Union  
u r g e n t ly  needed  economic r e i n v i g o r a t i o n  at home, yet h is  
p r e d e c e s s o r s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  B r e zh n e v ,  had g iv e n  i n s u f f i c i e n t  
a t t e n t i o n  to d e v e lo p in g  a com prehensive  s t r a t e g y  for  the 
A s ia n - P a c i f ic  r e g io n .  S o v ie t  l e a d e r s ,  as Ross Babbage 
a rg u e d , had f a i l e d  to a p p r e c ia t e  the r e g i o n 's  economic 
dynamism and had tended  to be o v e r ly  pre- occupied  w ith  
s e c u r it y  i s s u e s . ^ T h e ir  d r iv e  to b u i l d  up t h e ir  m i l i t a r y  
power in  the r e g io n  had c r e a te d  s e r io u s  p o l i t i c a l  
o b s t a c le s  in  e x t e r n a l  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  n e ig h b o u r in g  
c o u n t r ie s  as im portant as C h in a ,  Jap an  and the U n ite d  
S t a t e s .  As a r e s u l t ,  the S o v ie t  Union  was r a th e r  i s o l a t e d  
in  the r e g io n .
W ith  th is  i n h e r i t a n c e ,  i t  is  not s u r p r i s i n g  that 
Gorbachev  came to r e a l i s e  the need  to r e p la c e  the S o v ie t  
image of b e in g  "an  enemy" w ith  one of b e in g  "a  f r i e n d "  in  
the r e g io n .  P o l i t i c a l  s o l u t io n s  needed  to be found  
w ith o ut  d e la y  to the "many ta n g le d  k n o ts "  and p o t e n t i a l l y  
d angerous  s e c u r it y  s i t u a t i o n s .  A b e g in n in g  needed  to be 
made w ith  b i l a t e r a l  and m u l t i l a t e r a l  c o o p e r a t io n  among 
r e g io n a l  s t a t e s  to remove the  a c u ten e ss  of m i l i t a r y  
c o n f r o n t a t io n  in  v a r io u s  p a r ts  of A s i a ,  and to overcome 
the problems of d e v e lo p in g  the S o v ie t  Far E a s t .
S in c e  he took o f f i c e  in  March 1 9 8 5 ,  G orbachev  has shown
g r e a t e r  f l e x i b i l i t y  and energy  than h is  p r e d e c e s s o r s  in
2. Ross Babbage, "Soviet Strategic Dileuas in the North Pacific in the 1990s", (A paper for 
the Conference on the Soviets in the Pacific in the 1990s, Canberra, Nay 1988), p.10
3So v ie t  policy- m aking  towards the  A s ia n - P a c i f ic  r e g io n ,  in  
an e f f o r t  to r e v e r s e  the d e c l i n e  of So v ie t  i n f l u e n c e  and 
improve i t s  ad verse  r e g io n a l  s i t u a t i o n .  The q u o t a t io n  by 
G orbachev  at the b e g in n in g  of th is  sub- thesis  r e f l e c t s  
that the S o v ie t s  have r e a l i s e d  the im portance  of 
N o rth e ast  A s ia  and the a d ja c e n t  area  of the P a c i f i c  as an 
area  in  w hich  S o v ie t  i n f l u e n c e  must be s u s t a in e d ,  and 
So v ie t  p o l i c i e s  towards C h in a ,  Japan  and the U n ite d  
States  must be g iv e n  a new im petus and d i r e c t i o n .  
Gorbachev  in tr o d u c e d  in  h is  V l a d iv o s t o k  speech  a s e r ie s  
of f r e s h  i n i t i a t i v e s ,  aimed at p e r s u a d in g  a l l  c o u n t r ie s  
in  the r e g io n  w ith o ut  e x c e p t io n  that  the S o v ie t  Union  
g e n u in e ly  w anted  to improve r e g io n a l  r e l a t i o n s .
What main d e te rm in a n ts  la y  b e h in d  th is  major p o l ic y  
speech  of  G o r b a c h e v 's  in  V l a d iv o s t o k ?  How much can 
Gorbachev  match h is  peace  g e s t u r e s  w ith  d eeds?  The main 
o b je c t  of t h is  sub - th esis  i s  to o f f e r  an a n a l y s is  of the 
fo r e ig n  p o l i c y  a sp e c ts  of G o r b a c h e v 's  V la d iv o s t o k  sp e e ch ,  
so as to e x p lo r e  i t s  i m p l i c a t io n s  for  the power b a la n c e  
in  N o r th e a s t  A s ia  in  the coming d e c a d e .  The sub- thesis  
w i l l  c o n c e n t r a te  on N o r th e a s t  A s i a ,  where most of the 
major powers are  e i t h e r  lo c a t e d  or in v o l v e d :  though 
r e fe r e n c e s  w i l l  be made to o th er  areas  where a p p r o p r ia t e .  
The su b - th e sis  is  d i v i d e d  in to  the f o l l o w in g  four  
c h a p t e r s :
4C hapter  1 :  G o r b a c h e v 's  I n i t i a t i v e s
T h is  c h ap ter  d is c u s s e s  G o r b a c h e v 's  g e o g rap h ic  a s s e r t i o n  
of the S o v ie t  Un ion  as an A s ia n - P a c i f ic  c o u n tr y ;  and then 
examines G o r b a c h e v 's  f r e s h  d ip lo m a t ic  g e s tu r e s  to C h in a ,  
Japan  and the U n it e d  S t a t e s .
Chapter 2 :  M ajor  Determ in ants
T h is  c h ap ter  e x p lo r e s  those  major d e te r m in a n ts ,  such as 
the S o v ie t  s t r a t e g i c  environm ent in  N o rth east  A s i a ,  
s e c u r it y  concerns  about the So v ie t  U n i o n 's  e a s te r n  
f r o n t ie r s  and dom estic  economic developm ent in  S i b e r i a  
and the S o v ie t  Far E a s t .
Chapter 3 :  The Scope of Change Under Gorbachev
This  ch ap ter  exam ines  G o r b a c h e v 's  i n h e r i t a n c e ,  d is c u s s e s  
h is  new s e c u r it y  t h i n k in g  on r e a s o n a b le  s u f f i c i e n c y  for  
d e f e n c e ,  equal  s e c u r it y  and n u c le a r  w ar , and then 
e x p lo re s  the impact on S o v ie t  s e c u r it y  c o n c e r n s .
Chapter  4 :  Im p l ic a t io n s  for  the Power B alance
This  chap ter  d is c u s s e s  the p ro sp e c ts  for  improved 
b i l a t e r a l  S ino - S o viet  and Ja p an e se - So v ie t  r e l a t i o n s  in  
l ig h t  of r e c e n t  d evelop m en ts , as w e ll  as C h in ese  and 
Jap anese  p e r c e p t io n s  of So v ie t  t h r e a ts  to t h e ir  
r e s p e c t iv e  s e c u r it y  env iro n m e n ts .  In  a d d i t i o n ,  as US 
p o l ic y  is  an im portant  fa c t o r  in  the r e g io n a l  b a la n c e  of 
power, Soviet- A m erican  r e l a t i o n s  and t h e ir  impact on
5r e g io n a l  s e c u r i t y  and s t a b i l i t y ,  as w e ll  as the p rosp ects  
fo r  the US r e g io n a l  p o s i t i o n  w i l l  a ls o  be exam ined .
F i n a l l y ,  t h i s  sub - th es is  w i l l  c onclude  w ith  a summary of 
the trends  in  the r e g io n a l  b a la n c e  of power in  the coming 
d e c a d e .
The a n a l y t i c a l  framework of t h is  sub - th esis  is  
e s s e n t i a l l y  that  of b a la n c e  of power, and the " r a t i o n a l  
a c t o r "  model i s  i m p l i c i t l y  fo l l o w e d ,  b a s i c a l l y  b ecause  
a l t e r n a t i v e  models such  as the b u r e a u c r a t ic  or 
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  r e q u ir e  more in fo r m a t io n  than is  r e a d i l y  
a v a i l a b l e ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  where S o v ie t  and C h in e s e  p o l i c i e s  
are  c o n c e r n e d .
6Chapter 1 
Gorbachev's Initiatives
F o llo w in g  a le n g th y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of the need  for  
a c c e l e r a t e d  economic developm ent of the S o v ie t  Far E a s t ,  
G orbach ev  in tr o d u c e d  in  h is  V la d iv o s t o k  speech  a s e r ie s  
of p r o p o s a ls  and i n i t i a t i v e s  for  good and p e a c e fu l  
r e l a t i o n s  w ith  a l l  USSR n e ig h b o u r s .  G orbachev  appeared  to 
have two major m o t iv e s :  o n e , to e s t a b l i s h  the So v ie t  
U n i o n 's  i d e n t i t y  as an A s ia n - P a c i f ic  pow er ; the o t h e r ,  to 
convey h is  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  f l e x i b i l i t y  in  im proving  
r e l a t i o n s  w ith  C h in a ,  e x p a n d in g  economic c o o p e r a t io n  w ith  
J a p a n ,  as w e ll  as r e c o g n i z i n g  the r o le  of the U n ite d  
S t a te s  in  the A s ia n - P a c i f ic  r e g io n .
T h is  c h a p te r  d is c u s s e s  G o r b a c h e v 's  g e o g r a p h ic  a s s e r t i o n  
of the  S o v ie t  U n ion  as an A s ia n - P a c i f ic  c o u n tr y ;  and then 
exam ines  G o r b a c h e v 's  f r e s h  d ip lo m a t ic  g e s tu r e s  to C h in a ,  
Japan  and the U n it e d  S t a t e s .
1 . 1  The  S o v ie t  G e o g r a p h ic  I d e n t i t y
Because  of the s i g n i f i c a n c e  of h i s  s p e e c h ,  the background  
to G o r b a c h e v 's  s e l e c t i o n  of V l a d iv o s t o k  as i t s  venue 
bears  e x a m in a t io n .  V l a d i v o s t o k ,  w hich  means "R u le  the 
E a s t "  in  R u s s ia n ,  is  the l a r g e s t  c i t y  in  the So v ie t  Far 
East  and the p r i n c i p a l  base  for  the n u m e r ic a l ly  la r g e s t
7S o v ie t  f l e e t — the P a c i f i c  F l e e t .  T r a d i t i o n a l l y ,  the 
S o v ie t  Far E a st  is  re g a r d e d  in  Moscow as the c o u n t r y 's  
o u tp o st  on the P a c i f i c — an arena  of c r i t i c a l  im portance  
for  the S o v ie t  U nion  to e s t a b l i s h  i t s e l f  as a P a c i f i c  
p ow er . However, in  the A s ia n - P a c i f ic  r e g io n ,  the S o v ie t s  
have long  had a f e e l i n g  of u n c e r t a in t y  about t h e ir  
c o u n t r y 's  p rop er  i d e n t i t y .  D e s p it e  i t s  a c tu a l  o c c u p at io n  
of l a r g e  A s ia n  t e r r i t o r i e s ,  am ounting  to one- third  of 
A s i a ,  the c o un try  has been g e n e r a l l y  r e g ard e d  in  A s ia  as 
a European  coun try  even though i t  is  d e s c r ib e d  by T ib o r  
Szam uely  as b e in g  " i n  Europe but not of i t " . ^  Yet  the 
S o v ie t s  b e l i e v e  that  they  have im portant  and j u s t i f i a b l e  
i n t e r e s t s  in  the  r e g io n .  G o r b a c h e v 's  t r i p  to t h is  s e a s id e  
c i t y  c l e a r l y  se rv e d  to dem onstrate  the S o v ie t  U n i o n 's  
l in k s  w ith  A s i a  and the P a c i f i c  w h ic h ,  as the So v ie t  
Am bassador to A u s t r a l i a  E vgeni  Sa m o te ik in  put i t ,  are  
" r e g i o n s  of d i r e c t  n a t i o n a l  in t e r e s t  to t h is  c o u n t r y " .
In  h i s  V l a d iv o s t o k  s p e e ch ,  G orbachev  a s s e r t e d  t h a t :
[Because] a g r e a t e r  p art  of our c o u n t r y 's  
t e r r i t o r y  l i e s  e a s t  of the U r a l s ,  in  A s i a — in  
S i b e r i a  and the Far E a s t . . . t h e  S o v ie t  U nion  is  
a ls o  an A s i a n  a n d  P a c i f i c  c o u n t r y .  I t  i s  very  
much aware of the com plex problems f a c i n g  th is  
v a s t  r e g i o n .  They concern  i t  d i r e c t l y ,  [emphasis 
added] ^
1. Tibor Szatuely, The Kussian Tradition, London: Martin Seeker and Warburg, 1974, p.8
2. Evgeni Sasoteikin, "The Goals of Vladivostok", in Raiesh Tbakur and Carlyle L  Thayer 
(eds.}, The Soviet Onion as an Asian Pacific Poier—Iiplications of Gorbachev's 1986 
Vladivostok Initiative, Hestview Press, Inc., 1986, p.12
3. Gorbachev: Vladivostok Speech, pp.22 and 26
8The S o v ie t  Union  is  the w o r l d 's  l a r g e s t  c o u n try ,  w ith  a 
t e r r i t o r y  of 2 2 . 4  m i l l i o n  sq km--about o ne- sixth  of the 
e a r t h 's  land  s u r f a c e .  Located  across  the top of the vast  
E u r a s ia n  c o n t in e n t ,  the country  is  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  d iv id e d  
along  the U ra ls  in to  a European  and an A s ia n  p a r t . ^  (See 
F ig u re  1 . 1 )  Because  of the g e o g r a p h ic a l  f a c t ,  the So v ie t  
Union  is  the only  country  in  the w o r ld ,  excep t  T urkey , 
which  can claim  to be both  a European  and an A s ia n  
c o u n t r y .
S o v ie t  t e r r i t o r y  east  of the U r a ls  com prised  of C e n tra l  
A s i a ,  S i b e r i a  and the Far E a s t ,  covers  an area  of almost 
17 m i l l i o n  sq km— ap p ro xim ately  75 per cent of the So v ie t  
to ta l  t e r r i t o r y .  (See  T a b le  1 . 1 )  T h is  i s  almost tw ice  the 
s i z e  of Canada ( 9 . 9 7 6  m i l l i o n  sq km ), C h in a  ( 9 . 6  m i l l i o n  
sq km ),  the U n ite d  S t a te s  ( 9 . 3 6  m i l l i o n  sq km ), and 
s l i g h t l y  more than tw ice  that  of A u s t r a l i a  ( 7 . 7  m i l l i o n  
sq km ).  In  N o rth e ast  A s i a ,  S i b e r i a  and the S o v ie t  Far 
East bord er  on C h in a ,  M ongolia  and North  K o re a ; i t s  
P a c i f i c  c o a s t l in e  is  c lo s e  to Japan  and K o re a .  And ju s t
4. See USSR'76, lovosti Press Agency Year Book, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 
Moscow, 1976, p.22. The Urals, a mountain chain running from the Kara Sea in the north to 
the steppes of Kazakhstan in the south, are usually considered to be the boundary between 
Europe and Asia. This division between continents, as Geoffrey Jukes argues, is purely 
arbitrary; the Ural Mountains (highest point 1,894 m) constitute only a linor natural 
barrier, with no major differences between the terrain, flora and fauna on the eastern and 
western sides...Politically, the distinction is even lore meaningless, as the continental 
division along the Urals is not accompanied by any distinction of sovereignty or 
statehood: the territory both sides of it forms part of the Russian Soviet Federated 
Socialist Republic, the largest of the fifteen union republics which make up the Soviet 
Union. For a further discussion see Geoffrey Jukes, The Soviet Onion in Asia, Angus and 
Robertson Publishers Pty Ltd, 1973, p.2)
9across  the B e r in g  Sea , the So v ie t  Union  has a near  border  
w ith  the U n ite d  S t a t e s ,  only  seven  k ilo m e tr e s  between the 
So v iet  B ig  Diomede I s l a n d  and the US L i t t l e  Diomede 
I s l a n d .
Although  the m ajor p art  of i t s  t e r r i t o r y  l i e s  in  A s ia  
rath er  than in  Euro p e , the S o v ie t  Union  has t r a d i t i o n a l l y  
been seen by lo c a l  s t a t e s  in  the r e g io n  as not b e in g  one 
of t h e ir  own. T h is  is  not because  "t h e  S o v ie t  Union  has 
chosen to rem ain  E u r o p e a n " , ^ but b ecause  t r a d i t i o n a l  
R u ssian  c u lt u r e  has had l i t t l e  in  common w ith  A s ia n  
c u ltu r e  and c i v i l i z a t i o n — in  the sense  th a t ,  as Malcolm 
M ackintosh  put i t ,  R u s s ia n  c i v i l i z a t i o n ,  c u ltu r e  and 
p a t te r n s  of b e h a v io u r  in  e x t e r n a l  r e l a t i o n s  cannot e a s i l y  
be l in k e d  to the t r a d i t i o n s  of the p eop les  and n a t io n s  of 
A s ia  as they have de v e lo p e d  in  the A s ia n  p h y s ic a l  and
(L
human env iron m ent .
Another  major re aso n  is  that the p re se n t  s i z e  of So v ie t  
t e r r i t o r y  in  A s ia  was the product of a long  p e r io d  of 
R u s s ia n  t e r r i t o r i a l  e x p a n s io n  eastw ards  and south w ard s , 
e it h e r  by conquest  or by t r e a t y .  (See  F ig u r e  1 . 2 )  The 
R u ssian s  annexed  S i b e r i a  towards the end of the s ix t e e n t h  
century  and r e ac h e d  the P a c i f i c  coast  around 1 6 3 8 .  By the 
1689  T re aty  of N e r c h in s k ,  they claim ed  a l l  S i b e r i a  to the 
P a c i f i c  c o a s t .  For a tim e , they even expanded  across  the
5. Gerald Segal, "Introduction", in Gerald Segal (ed.), The Soviet Onion in East Asia, 
Westview Press, Inc., 1983, p.2
6. Hal cola Mackintosh, "Soviet Attitudes towards East Asia", in Gerald Segal (ed.), The 
Soviet Onion in East Asia, iiestview Press, Inc., 1983, p.6
B e r in g  S t r a i t  in to  A l a s k a ,  w hich  rem ained  R u s s ia n  u n t i l  
s o ld  to the U n ite d  S tate s  in  1 8 6 7 .  In  the n in e t e e n t h  
c e n t u r y ,  the R u s s ia n s  annexed  la r g e  t e r r i t o r i e s  from 
C h in a .  At the end of W orld  War I I ,  the S o v ie t s  re covered  
some of t h e ir  post- R ev olution  lo s s e s  and s e i z e d  f r e s h  
t e r r i t o r i e s  from Ja p a n .  As a r e s u l t ,  the S o v ie t  Union  now 
p o s s e s s e s  a la r g e r  area  of A s ia  than any other  A s ia n  
c o u n t r y .
In  re c en t  y e a r s ,  there  is  a grow ing  r e c o g n i t io n  in  Moscow 
that "t h e  A s ia n  and P a c i f i c  p art  of the w orld  w i l l  p lay  
an ever  i n c r e a s in g  r o l e "  in  the developm ent of the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s i t u a t i o n . ' C l e a r l y ,  no n - re co g n it io n  of the 
So v ie t  U n i o n 's  le g it im a c y  and r o le  in  the r e g io n  would  be 
a blow to the y oung er- g en eration  S o v ie t  e l i t e  r e p r e s e n te d  
by Gorbachev  who i n h e r it e d  a coun try  w ith  g lo b a l  
superpower i n t e r e s t s .  Gorbachev  grew up at a time when 
the S o v ie t  U n i o n 's  i n f l u e n c e  and p r e s t ig e  in  A s ia  was 
g r e a t e r  than that  of T s a r i s t  R u s s i a .  The So v ie t  model had 
i n s p ir e d  a whole  g e n e r a t io n  of A s ia n  i n t e l l e c t u a l s ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  in  the 1 9 2 0 s  and 1 9 3 0 s .  The C h in e s e  communists 
c a l l e d  the v i c t o r i e s  of the R u s s ia n  O c to b e r  R e v o lu t io n  
and of the S o v ie t  Union  in  W orld  War I I  a p rologue  to the 
triumph of the p e o p l e 's  r e v o lu t io n  in  C h in a .  In  the age 
o f  post-war d e c o l o n i z a t i o n ,  A s i a 's  ind e p en d en c e  movements 
a g a in s t  European  c o l o n ia l  powers looked  to Moscow for  a id  
and c o un sel  and as a p o s s i b l e  m odel. But the So v ie t
7. Gorbachev: Vladivostok Speech, p.39
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"G o ld e n  A g e "  was over by the 197 0 s  m ainly  b ecause  of 
M o sco w 's  h e a v i l y  m i l i t a r i s e d  fo r e ig n  p o l ic y  and uneasy  
r e l a t i o n s  along  most of i t s  borders  in  A s i a .
There is  no doubt that  Gorbachev  does not w ish  to see the 
So v iet  Union  as "t h e  odd man o u t "  when h is  c o u n t r y 's  
economy u r g e n t ly  needs  r e i n v i g o r a t i o n ; a r e i n v i g o r a t i o n  
which  might be a c c e l e r a t e d  m arkedly  by i n t e g r a t i n g  in to  
the most dynamic r e g io n  of the w orld  economy, the P a c i f i c  
b a s i n .  G o r b a c h e v 's  t r i p  served  to s ig n a l  that  the vast  
So v ie t  t e r r i t o r y  in  A s ia  is  not m erely  a t e r r i t o r i a l  
e x t e n s io n  of the European  USSR b u t ,  in  a r e a l i s t i c  s e n s e ,  
makes the So v ie t  Union  an A s ia n - P a c i f ic  co u n try .  
G o r b a c h e v 's  V la d iv o s t o k  p roposal  for  " b u i l d i n g  to geth er  
new, f a i r  r e l a t i o n s  in  A s ia  and the P a c i f i c "  c l e a r l y  
r e f l e c t e d  h is  i n t e n t i o n  to g a in  for  the So v ie t  Union  
r e c o g n it io n  as an A s ia n - P a c i f ic  country  equal to other  
r e g io n a l  p l a y e r s :  the U n ite d  S t a t e s ,  C h in a ,  Japan  and 
o t h e r s ,  so as to engage  in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s  "a s  an 
A s ia n - P a c i f ic  power as much as a European  p o w e r " . 8
1 . 2  F resh  D ip lo m a t ic  G e s tu r e s
In  g e o s t r a t e g ic  term s, N o rth e ast  A s ia  i s  now the only  
re g io n  in  the w orld  where the n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t s  of the 
So v ie t  Union  are i n t e r r e l a t e d  w it h ,  i n t e r a c t  d i r e c t l y  on
8. Raaesh Thakur and Carlyle L  Thayer, "Introduction", in kaaesh Thakur and Carlyle h. 
Thayer (ed.), The Soviet Dnion as an Asian Pacific Power: Iiplications of Gorbachev's 1986 
Vladivostok Initiative, Hestview Press, Macmillan Australia, 1987, p.2
12
and o v e rla p  c r i t i c a l l y  w ith  those both  of C h ina  and 
Ja p a n — the two im portant r e g io n a l  powers w ith  r i s i n g  
p o t e n t ia l  in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  as w e ll  as the 
U n ite d  S t a t e s — the r i v a l  superpow er . C l e a r l y ,  i t  is  a 
r e g io n  of d ir e c t  p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and s e c u r it y  
concerns  to the S o v ie t  Union  as i t  is  to i t s  p o t e n t i a l  
a d v e r s a r i e s — C h in a ,  J a p a n ,  and the U n ite d  S t a t e s .  
M oreover , i t  is  a lso  a r e g io n  of s t r a t e g i c  s i g n i f i c a n c e  
to So v ie t  s t r a t e g y ,  w hether  for  the fu r t h e r  e xp a n s io n  of 
S o v ie t  i n f l u e n c e  in  A s ia  and for  the c o n t in u in g  growth of 
So v ie t  g lo b a l  power in  the w o r ld ,  as o u t s id e  powers 
tended  to see i t  in  the p a s t ,  or an area  v u l n e r a b le  to 
h o s t i l e  p e n e t r a t io n  in  a two-front w ar , as So v ie t
q
s tr a te g y  has tended  to v ie w  i t  ever  s in c e  1 9 4 1 .
In  h is  V la d iv o s t o k  s p e e ch ,  Gorbachev  s i g n i f i e d  h is  
fo r e ig n  p o l ic y  f l e x i b i l i t y  and in t e n t  to i n v ig o r a t e  good 
and p e a c e fu l  b i l a t e r a l  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  the S o v ie t  U n i o n 's  
a d v e r s a r i a l  n e ig h b o u r s — C h in a ,  J a p a n ,  as w ell  as the 
U n ite d  S t a t e s .  However, w h ile  h is  speech  was seen  as 
d e s ig n e d  p r i n c i p a l l y  to woo C hin a  and Ja p a n ,  and i t  a lso  
c o n t a in e d  s ig n a l s  to the U n ite d  S tate s  to accept  the 
S o v ie t  U n ion  as a P a c i f i c  power.
9. For exaaple, Marshal Nikolai Orgarkov, in louunist, July 1981, and in Aried Forces 
Couunist, No.14, 1980, p.26
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C h ina
The most im portant  s in g l e  ta rge t  of G o r b a c h e v 's  
V la d iv o s t o k  speech  was C h in a .  The p r i o r i t y  g iv e n  to C hina  
i n d ic a t e d  h is  r e c o g n i t io n  of the need  for  a new approach 
to C h i n a 's  p o s i t i o n  and r o le  in  N o rth e ast  A s ia  as w e ll  as 
in  the w o r ld .  In  the f i r s t  p l a c e ,  Gorbachev  r e i t e r a t e d  
M o sco w 's  w i l l i n g n e s s  to improve S ino - Soviet  r e l a t i o n s ,  by 
s a y i n g :
. . . t h e  So v ie t  Un ion  is  p r e p a r e d — at any time and 
at any l e v e l — to enter  in to  d i s c u s s i o n  w ith  China  
on a d d i t io n a l  m easures for  e s t a b l i s h i n g  an 
atmosphere of g o o d - n e ig h b o u r l in e s s .  We hope that 
the border  d i v i d i n g  us ( I  would  p r e f e r  to say 
l i n k i n g )  w i l l  become in  the near  fu tu r e  a l i n e  of 
peace  and f r i e n d s h i p .  ®
At the same tim e , G orbachev  a ls o  a s s e r t e d :
H is t o r y  has e n tr u s te d  the So v ie t  and C h in ese  
p eop les  w ith  an extrem ely  r e s p o n s ib l e  m is s io n .
Much in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  developm ent depends  upon 
these  two m ajor s o c i a l i s t  n a t i o n s .
T h is  could  be in t e r p r e t e d  as a new elem ent in  So v ie t  
t h in k in g  about C h in a .  I t  was a ls o  c le a r  that  C hina  was 
r e g ard ed  in  Moscow as a c r i t i c a l  fa c t o r  in  sh ap in g  the 
s t r a t e g i c  b a la n c e  betw een  the So v ie t  U nion  and the U n ite d  
S t a t e s .  S in c e  1 9 4 9 ,  C h i n a 's  r o le  in  the g lo b a l  power 
b a la n c e  dom inated  by the two c o n te n d in g  superpow ers  has
10. Gorbachev: Vladivostok Speech, p.29
11. Ibid.
evolv ed  through s e v e r a l  s t a g e s :  from a c lo s e  p a r t n e r s h ip  
w ith  the S o v ie t  Union  d u r in g  the t ig h t  b ip o l a r  s tr u c tu r e  
of the co ld  w ar , through  a p e r io d  of h o s t i l e  i s o l a t i o n  in  
the loose  s tr u c tu re  of the 1 9 6 0 s ,  to a s t r a t e g i c  l e a n in g  
towards the U n ite d  S ta te s  as a c o u n te rw e ig h t  to the 
So v ie t  Union  in  the l a t e  1 9 7 0 s  and e a r ly  1 9 8 0 s . 12 Now 
C h in a ,  s a id  C h in ese  Prem ier  L i  Peng in  March 1 9 8 8 ,  " w i l l  
pursue  an ind ep en d en t  fo r e ig n  p o l i c y "  and " w i l l  never 
a ttac h  i t s e l f  to any b ig  powers or a l i g n  i t s e l f  w ith  or 
e s t a b l i s h  any s t r a t e g i c  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w ith  t h e m . " 13 Yet 
seen  from Moscow, C hin a  in  1986  was show ing  g r e a t e r  
in t e r e s t  in  b e t t e r  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  the U n ite d  S t a te s  than 
w ith  the So v ie t  U n io n .  In  the event of a US- Soviet 
c o n f l i c t ,  C h in a  would  p ro b ab ly  r e p r e s e n t  a th re a t  to the 
So v ie t  U n io n ,  not to the U n ite d  S t a t e s .
There  was l i t t l e  doubt that  the S o v ie t s  w ish ed  to draw 
China  away from any d e  f a c t o  a l l i a n c e  w ith  the U n ite d  
State s  and Ja p a n ,  so as to reduce  the p e r c e iv e d  r i s k  of 
the three  c o u n t r ie s  l i n k i n g  up a g a in s t  them, thereby  
c a u s in g  the g lo b a l  " c o r r e l a t i o n  of f o r c e s "  to turn
14
12. This point is argued in Charles D. Lorejoy, Jr., "China and Its Military Modernization: 
The Problei of Perspectives", in Charles D. Lovejoy, Jr., and Bruce If. ffaston (eds.), 
China's Military Kefons: International and Doiestic Iiplications, Westview Press Inc., 
1986, (Preface)
13. Li Peng, "Goverment Working Report", People's Daily, April 15, 1988. The report was 
delivered by Li Peng in the capacity of the Acting Preiier of the State Council of China 
at the first session of the 7th National People's Congress (NPC) on March 25, 1988.
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a d v e r s e ly  for  the S o v i e t s . 14 E a r l i e r  in  F ebruary  1 9 8 6 ,  at 
the 27th  Party  C o n g r e s s ,  G orbachev  had s a id  that "t h e  
d i s t i n c t i o n s  in  a t t i t u d e s ,  in  p a r t i c u l a r  to a number of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  problem s , rem ain  [between  the S o v ie t  Union  
and C h i n a ] . But we a ls o  note  som ething  e l s e — that  in  many 
cases  we can work j o i n t l y ,  co o p e rate  on an equal and 
p r i n c i p l e d  b a s i s . . . I n  t h in k in g  of the  f u t u r e ,  i t  may be 
s a id  that  the p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  for  c o o p e r a t io n  betw een  the 
USSR and China  are e n o r m o u s " . ^  T h is  marked a change from 
the S o v ie t  U n i o n 's  stance  in  1 9 7 6 ,  and a f u r t h e r  step  in  
the attempt at rapprochem ent in t e n d e d  by B rezh n ev  in  
March 1 9 8 2 . 16
F u r t h e r ,  the S o v ie t s  would  a ls o  l i k e  to ease  t e n s io n  w ith  
C h in a ,  so as to c re a te  a p e a c e f u l  environm ent  alo ng  the 
border  and thereby  be a b le  to r e d i r e c t  re s o u r c e s  for  
a c c e l e r a t i o n  of socio- econom ic developm ent  in  S i b e r i a  and 
the Far E a s t .  C l e a r l y ,  reduced  t e n s io n  betw een  the two 
g ia n t  c o u n tr ie s  would  be m utually  b e n e f i c i a l ,  as would  be 
g r e a te r  economic c o o p e r a t io n .  Both s id e s  now needed  a 
p e a c e fu l  environm ent to r e v i t a l i s e  t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e
14. The "correlation of forces" is the ter» used in the Soviet Union to describe the power 
relationship between socialisi and capitalism. It is a broader concept than the Western 
termsr "balance of power", or "balance of forces', for it embraces not only military, but 
also political, economic, moral elements, etc. For a discussion, see David Hollouay, The 
Soviet Onion and the Arts lace, Yale University Press, New Uaven and London, 1983, p.82. 
However, it is worth noting that in his speeches and writings Gorbachev hardly ever uses 
this term, in contrast to his predecessors such as Khrushchev and Brezhnev.
15. Kikhail Gorbachev, "The Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party 
Congress", in Robert Naxvell (ed.), K.S. Gorbachev: Speeches and Writings, Oxford: 
Pergamon Press, 1986, pp.80-81
16. "Brezhnev's Speech in Tashkent, March 24, 1982", Pravda, March 25, 1982
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n a t io n a l  econom ies , and seemed w i l l i n g  to fu r t h e r  expand 
economic and c u l t u r a l  l in k s  and b order  t r a d e .
In d e e d ,  G o r b a c h e v 's  V la d iv o s t o k  speech  c o n t a in e d  a number 
of c o n c i l i a t o r y  s h i f t s  in  M oscow 's  u n d e r ly in g  a t t i t u d e  
towards the d is p u t e s  w ith  C h in a .  The most s i g n i f i c a n t  
o v erture  was h is  announcement of in t e n t io n  to w ithdraw  
s i x  reg im ents  of S o v ie t  troops from A f g h a n i s t a n  and a 
s u b s t a n t i a l  number of S o v ie t  troops from M o n g o lia .  Now 
fo r  the f i r s t  tim e , a So v ie t  le a d e r  made a c le a r  and 
p u b l ic  g e s tu r e  to C h ina  by d i r e c t l y  a d d r e s s in g  the 
sub sta n c e  of the "t h r e e  major o b s t a c l e s " 1 ^ w h ic h ,  in  the 
C h in e se  v ie w , had impeded any s e r io u s  improvement in  
S ino - Soviet  r e l a t i o n s .  T h is  i n d ic a t e d  that  Gorbachev  
might be p rep ared  to make a move on a l l  of them alth oug h  
he d id  not d e s c r ib e  the "o b s t a c l e s "  as such or l in k  h is  
p r o p o s a ls  on them s p e c i f i c a l l y  to So v iet- C h inese  
r e l a t i o n s .
In  V l a d iv o s t o k ,  Gorbachev  a lso  o f f e r e d  to compromise on 
the S ino - Soviet  border  is s u e  along  the H e ilo n g  R iver  
(Amur R i v e r ) , over w hich  h is  p r e d e c e s s o r s  had never  
showed any f l e x i b i l i t y .  He accep ted  that  "t h e  o f f i c i a l  
S ino - S o viet  border  could  pass  alo ng  the main s h ip
17. In 1982, China claimed that the major obstacles to a full normalization of relations 
between China and the Soviet Union were: 1. withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Sino- 
Soviet border area and Mongolia; 2. withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; 3. 
ending of Soviet support for Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea. For a discussion, see Yao 
Henbin, "Soviet Military Deployments in the Asian-Pacific Region: Implications for China's 
Security", in Soloaon and Kosaka (ed.), The Soviet Far East Military Buildup, Sydney: 
Croom Hell Ltd., 1986, p.103
i o
c h a n n e l " ,  as r e q u e s te d  by C h in a ,  not on the C h in ese  
r i v e r  bank as p r e v io u s l y  c laim ed  by the S o v ie t  U n io n .  
M oreover , Gorbachev  h i g h l i g h t e d  a d d i t io n a l  areas  for  
expanded  co ntac ts  and c o o p e r a t io n ,  such as j o i n t  
developm ent of Amur R iver  r e s o u rc e s  and space 
e x p l o r a t i o n .
Gorbachev  d id  not in  h is  V la d iv o s t o k  speech  make any 
s p e c i f i c  o f f e r  to term inate  support fo r  V ie t n a m 's  
o c c u p a t io n  of Kampuchea, w hich  B e i j i n g  at that  time 
re g ard e d  as a m ajor o b s t a c le  to improved S ino - Soviet  
r e l a t i o n s .  He d i d ,  how ever , s ta te  that  a s o l u t io n  to the 
Kampuchean is s u e  "d ep end s  much on the n o r m a l iz a t io n  of 
S ino- Vietnam ese  r e l a t i o n s " ,  and that  " i t  is  a s o v e r e ig n  
m atter  of the governm ents and the l e a d e r s h ip  of both  
c o u n t r ie s "  T h is  co u ld  be taken  as a h in t  to both
B e i j i n g  and Hanoi that  So v ie t  support  for  Vietnam  in  i t s  
d is p u t e  w ith  China  was not u n c o n d i t i o n a l .  T h is  h in t  was 
r e in f o r c e d  by a p assa g e  e lsew h ere  in  h is  speech  to the 
e f f e c t  that  " i f  the U n it e d  S t a te s  gave up i t s  m i l i t a r y  
p r e s e n c e ,  say ,  in  the P h i l i p p i n e s ,  we would  not leave  
t h is  s tep  u n a n s w e r e d " ,2 ® the most obvious  "a n s w e r "  b e in g  
S o v ie t  w ith d raw al  from the bases  in  V ietnam . T h is  
w ith d r a w a l  w ould , of c o u r s e ,  n u l l i f y  what had been  the 
most s i g n i f i c a n t  S o v ie t  s t r a t e g i c  g a in  in  A s ia  in  recen t  
y e a r s ,  but would  have been more than ad e q u a te ly
18. This is known under international law as the "Thalweg" principle.
19. Gorbachev: Vladivostok Speech, p.30
20. Gorbachev: Vladivostok Speech, p.36
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com pensated by removal of the much l a r g e r  US p r e s e n c e .  I t  
seems p ro b ab le  that  the r e f e r e n c e  was aimed not so much 
at the US and P h i l i p p i n e s  governm ents  as at those  of 
Vietnam  and C h in a ,  by i n d i c a t i n g  th a t  the b a s e s ,  and the 
support for  V ietnam  w hich  the  S o v ie t  p re se n c e  im p l ie d ,  
were l in k e d  to superpower r a t h e r  than  r e g io n a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  
not meant as " e n c i r c l e m e n t "  of C h in a ,  and not e n v is a g e d  
as a perm anence . That  t h is  was the purpose  b e h in d  the 
h in t s  in  the speech  was c o n fir m e d  by l a t e r  e v e n t s ;  Sino- 
S o v ie t  r e l a t i o n s  were "n o r m a l is e d "  in  May 1 9 8 9 ,  by which  
time Vietnam  had agreed  to w ith d r a w  i t s  fo r c e s  from 
Kampuchea, a p rocess  com pleted  by the end of 1 9 8 9 ;  and in  
January  1 9 9 0 ,  i t  was r e p o r te d  in  the W estern  p r e s s ,  for  
example in  the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  H e r a l d  T r ib u n e  of January  16 
1 9 9 0 ,  that  a l l  S o v ie t  s t r i k e  a i r c r a f t ,  m ajor s u r fa c e  
w arsh ip s  and subm arines  had been  w ith d raw n  from Da Nang 
and Cam Ranh Bay d u r in g  the  p r e c e d i n g  few w eeks . T h is  
w ith d r aw al  was p ro b ab ly  p art  of  the d e t e n t e  w ith  C h in a ,  
and for  cost  r e d u c t io n ,  r a t h e r  than  l in k e d  to US 
a c t i v i t i e s  in  the P h i l i p p i n e s .
Ja p an
In  h is  V la d iv o s t o k  s p e e c h ,  G orb ach ev  e x p r e s s e d  M oscow 's  
r e s p e c t  for  and r e c o g n i t i o n  of J a p a n 's  economic 
s u c c e s s e s ,  by s a y in g :
Japan  has turned  in t o  a p o w e r  o f  fo r e m o s t
im p o r t a n c e .  The c o u n t r y . . .  has  t r a v e r s e d  a g re at
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p ath  w i t h i n  a b r i e f  p e r io d ,  and has ac h ie v e d  
o u t s t a n d in g  s u c c e s s e s  in  i n d u s t r y ,  tr a d e ,  
e d u c a t io n ,  s c ie n c e  and t e c h n o l o g y . . .  [emphasis 
added] 21
Then in  1 9 8 6 ,  i t  was g e n e r a l l y  b e l ie v e d  that  Japan  was a 
country  w ith  the  t h i r d  l a r g e s t  economy in  the w o r ld ,  only  
sm a lle r  than  those  of the U n ite d  S ta te s  and the So v ie t  
U n i o n ; 22 though some sources  su g g e ste d  that  the So v ie t  
economy might a lr e a d y  been o vertaken  by Ja p a n .  
G o r b a c h e v 's  remark c l e a r l y  u n d e rsc o re d  the need  of the 
S o v ie t s  to le a r n  from the Ja p an e se  p e o p l e 's  un iq ue  
c a p a b i l i t y  to c r e a t i v e l y  m aster te c h n o lo g y . A ls o  i m p l i c i t  
in  h is  remark was M o sco w 's  r e c o g n i t io n  that  J a p a n 's  
economic c a p a c it y  and i n d u s t r i a l  tech no log y  could  g iv e  a 
s tro n g  im petus to the economic r e v i t a l i z a t i o n  and 
developm ent of  S i b e r i a  and the S o v ie t  Far East  to a le v e l  
fa r  beyond th at  w hich  the S o v ie t s  could  a c h ie v e  on t h e ir  
own. J a p a n 's  c o o p e r a t io n  could  have a d ram atic  impact for  
the fu tu r e  of the e n t i r e  S o v ie t  economy. M oreover , a 
t r a n s fo r m a t io n  in  S o v iet- Jap an ese  economic r e l a t i o n s ,  as 
Ross Babbage n o t e d ,  could  d eal  the S o v ie t  U nion  in to  the 
economic dynamo of N o r th e as t  A s ia  to an e x t e n t  that  would
21. Gorbachev: Vladivostok Speech, p.26
22. According to The Military Balance 1918-1989, in 1986, the GNP of the Soviet Union was $US 
1740-2230 bn and the GDP of Japan was $US 2119.6 bn. See The Military Balance 1988-1989, 
IISS, London, 1988, pp.33 and 164. According the saie source, in 1988, the GNP of the 
Soviet Union was $US 1900-2487 bn and the GDP of Japan was $US 2974.60 bn. See The 
Military Balance 1989-1990, IISS, London, 1989, pp.32 and 162
sim ply  not be p o s s i b l e  by other  m e a n s .23
In  h is  s p e e ch ,  G orbachev  c l e a r l y  e xp r e s s e d  M oscow 's  
d e s ir e  to promote economic t i e s  and c o o p e r a t io n .  He 
proposed  e s t a b l i s h i n g  j o i n t  v e n tu r e s  in  a d ja c e n t  and 
nearby  r e g io n s  of the S o v ie t  U nion  and Ja p a n ,  and lo n g ­
term c o o p e r a t io n  in  r e s e a r c h  on and com prehensive  use  of 
the ocean re s o u r c e s  as w e ll  as programs fo r  the p e a c e fu l  
study  and use  of s p a c e .  I t  appeared  that  G o r b a c h e v 's  
motive for  im proving  b i l a t e r a l  S o v ie t  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  
Japan  was l a r g e l y  economic and t e c h n i c a l ,  through  what he 
c a l l e d  "econom ic  d ip lo m ac y "  to se cure  Ja p an e se  a s s i s t a n c e  
for the developm ent of S i b e r i a .
G o r b a c h e v 's  p ro p o sa ls  for  g r e a t e r  Ja p an e se  involvem ent  in  
the economic developm ent of S i b e r i a  were c l e a r l y  a 
g e s tu r e  to Jap an  w h ic h ,  on the other  s i d e ,  a ls o  had some 
i n c e n t i v e s  for  p u r s u in g  good n e ig h b o u r ly  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  
the S o v ie t  U n io n .  However, G o r b a c h e v 's  approach in  
h a n d l in g  b i l a t e r a l  S o v ie t  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  Japan  made i t  
c le a r  that  Moscow was not at that  time p rep ared  to make 
s u b s t a n t i a l  c o n c e s s io n s  over the u n r e s o lv e d  i s s u e  of the 
"N o rth e rn  T e r r i t o r i e s "  w hich  the So v ie t  U nion  s e i z e d  from
20
23. jtoss Babbage, "Soviet Strategic Dileaias in the North Pacific in the 1990s", (A paper for 
the Conference on the Soviets in the Pacific in the 1990s, Canberra, Nay 1988), p.6
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Japan  at the end of W orld  War I I . 24 In  h is  V la d iv o s to k  
sp eech , G orbachev  a s s e r t e d :
The o b j e c t iv e  p o s i t i o n  of our two c o u n t r ie s  in  
the w orld  demands p rofou nd  c o o p e r a t io n  on a sound 
and r e a l i s t i c  b a s i s ,  and i n  a calm  a tm o s p h e r e  
f r e e  from  p r o b le m s  o f  the  p a s t .  [emphasis 
added]
T h is  remark r e f e r r e d  to the S o v ie t  U n i o n 's  p o s s e s s io n —  
and m i l i t a r i s a t i o n — of the four  d is p u t e d  i s l a n d s  o f f  the 
n o r t h e a s t e r n  coast  of H o k k a id o .  D i s c u s s i o n  of th is  i s s u e ,  
w ith  a prom ise  of " t a n g i b l e  r e s u l t s " ,  i s  l i k e l y  to s e t t l e  
what Japan  reg ard s  as the prim ary  o b s t a c le  to improved 
S o v iet- Jap an ese  r e l a t i o n s  a lth o u g h  i t  would  be d i f f i c u l t  
p o l i t i c a l l y  for  e it h e r  Moscow or Tokyo to g iv e  
s i g n i f i c a n t  ground over the N orth ern  T e r r i t o r i e s  i s s u e .  
W ithout  t h is  i s s u e  b e in g  s e t t l e d  to J a p a n 's  s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  
the scope for  S o v iet- Jap an ese  economic t i e s  and 
c o o p e r a t io n  would  n e c e s s a r i l y  be l i m i t e d .  N oth in g  in  
G o r b a c h e v 's  speech  s u g g e ste d  a way of r e s o l v in g  t h is
24. In Japanese terminology, "the northern territorial issue’ refers, in the broader sense, to 
all the territories north and northeast of Japan proper that were under Japanese 
sovereignty before World War II, encompassing southern Sakhalin (Karafuto) south of 50 
northern latitude, the entire Kurile island chain, Shikotan and Habomai off Hokkaido. 
However, in the narrow sense, it refers to the southern Kuriles (comprising Etorofu and 
Kunashiri), Shikotan and Habomai. The official claim of the Japanese government now is 
confined to the second sense, that is, the four northern islands of Habomai, Shikotan, 
Kunashiri and Etorofu. Unless specified otherwise in this sub-thesis, the "northern 
territorial issue", or "Northern Territories" will refer to the four northern islands 
only. For further details about the territorial dispute, see Young C. Kim, "Japanese- 
Soviet Relations: Interaction of Politics, Economics and National Security", The 
Washington Papers, Vol.2, No.21, Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1974, pp.17- 
53, and also Wolf Kendl, "The Soviet Union and Japan", in Gerald Segal (ed.), The Soviet 
Union in East Asia, Westview Press, Inc., 1983, pp.65-67
25. Gorbachev: Vladivostok Speech, p.30
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i s s u e ;  how ever , p o s s i b l e  grounds for  a compromise 
s o l u t i o n  are  d is c u s s e d  in  ch ap ter  fo u r .
F u r t h e r ,  G o r b a c h e v 's  search  for  c lo s e r  economic 
c o o p e r a t io n  w ith  Japan  a ls o  su g g e ste d  M o sco w 's  hope for  
more c o n c i l i a t o r y  r e l a t i o n s .  But he was u n c e r t a in  how to 
d e a l  w it h  J a p a n 's  armaments p o l ic y  or J a p a n 's  involvem ent  
w ith  the  U n it e d  S t a t e s .  Gorbachev  c r i t i c i s e d  J a p a n 's  
armaments p o l i c y ,  but  short  of openly  t h r e a t e n in g  Japan  
in  c o u n t e r p r o d u c t iv e  w ays , as Paul Keal  arg u e d ,  there  is  
not much that  the S o v ie t  Union  can do to change the 
s i t u a t i o n . 26 In  the long  term, Moscow would  c l e a r l y  l i k e  
to lo o s en  J a p a n 's  d e fe n c e  t ie s  w ith  the U n it e d  S t a t e s ,  in  
an e f f o r t  to c oun ter  U . S .  i n f l u e n c e  in  N o rth e ast  A s ia  but 
i t  i s  p r e p are d  to be p a t i e n t ,  i f  only  because  i t  has no 
a l t e r n a t i v e .
The U n it e d  S t a te s
The U n it e d  S t a te s  is  c l e a r l y  the prim ary  r i v a l  of the 
S o v ie t  U n ion  in  both  g lo b a l  and r e g io n a l  term s. "The  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een  the So v ie t  U nion  and the U n ite d  
S t a te s  is  an e xtrem ely  im portant  fa c t o r  in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
p o l i t i c s , "  G orbachev  s a id  s h o r t ly  a f t e r  h is  a c c e s s io n ,  
"how ever  we do not v ie w  the w orld  s o l e l y  through  the 
prism  of th is  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  We u n d e r s ta n d  the im portance
26. Paul Keal, "Implications for Northeast Asia", in Ratesh Thakur and Carlyle L  Thayer 
(eds.), The Soviet Onion as an Asian Pacific Poier—Iiplications of Gorbachev's 1986 
Vladivostok Initiative, Westview Press, Inc., 1986, p.75
of o th er  c o u n t r i e s . T h i s  statem ent h in t e d  that he had 
doubts  about  the b i- p o la r  model of the w o r ld ,  and wanted 
to r e p a i r  the damage to S o v ie t  d iplom acy  in  the Asian- 
P a c i f i c  r e g io n  i n f l i c t e d  by B r e z h n e v 's  b i- p olar  w orld  
o u t lo o k ,  r a t h e r  than  c o n f in e  h im s e lf  to p l a y in g  out 
ad v e r s a ry  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  the U n ite d  S t a t e s .  However, t h is  
d id  not in  i t s e l f  mean that  G o r b a c h e v 's  S o v ie t  Union  
would  not c o n t in u e  to compete w ith  the U n ite d  S t a te s  for  
g lo b a l  power and sp h eres  of i n f l u e n c e .  I t s  c a p a c it y  to do 
so has  been  w eakened  by i t s  economic and p o l i t i c a l  
prob lem s , but i f  G o r b a c h e v ’ s attem pts at reform  are 
s u c c e s s f u l  i t s  c a p a c it y  to compete would be r e s t o r e d .  The 
b a la n c e  he or her  s u c c e s s o r s  would  w ish  to m a in ta in  
betw een  c o m p e t it io n  and c o o p e r a t io n  cannot be fo r e c a s t  at 
th is  t im e . I t  can , how ever , be r e a s o n a b ly  assumed that  
they w ould  w ish  to p revent  the emergence of a d e  f a c t o  
a n t i- S o v ie t  c o a l i t i o n  in c l u d in g  China  in  N o rth e ast  A s i a .  
In  h i s  V l a d iv o s t o k  s p e e c h ,  w h ile  s t r e s s in g  M oscow 's  arms 
c o n tro l  p r o p o s a ls  in  the A s ia n - P a c i f ic  r e g io n ,  Gorbachev  
e x p l i c i t l y  showed M o sc o w 's  in t e n t io n  to p r o je c t  the 
U n it e d  S t a t e s ,  and not the S o v ie t  U n io n ,  as the "o u t s id e  
pow er" t h r e a t e n in g  r e g io n a l  s e c u r i t y .  He s t a t e d  t h a t :
. . . t h e  S o v ie t  U n io n  is  a d e d ic a t e d  advocate  of 
d i s b a n d i n g  the m i l i t a r y  g r o u p in g s ,  r e n o u n c in g  the 
p o s s e s s io n  of m i l i t a r y  bases  in  A s ia  and in  the 
P a c i f i c  Ocean  and w ith d r a w in g  troops from the 
t e r r i t o r i e s  of oth er  c o u n t r i e s . . . we a r e  s t r o n g l y
27. Pravda, April 8, 1985
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o p p o s e d  to the  US a t t e m p t s  to e x t e n d  N A T O 's  
"c o m p e t e n c e " to  the e n t i r e  w o r ld ,  i n c l u d in g  A s i a  
a n d  the  P a c i f i c  O c e a n , [emphasis added] 28
M oreover , G o r b a c h e v 's  p ro p o sa l  for  i n t e g r a t i n g  the Asian-  
P a c i f i c  r e g io n  in to  "t h e  g e n e r a l  p rocess  of e s t a b l i s h i n g  
a com prehensive  system of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y '  a ls o  
r e f l e c t s  t h is  i n t e n t i o n .  T h is  concept  is  a renewed 
v e r s io n  of a p o l i c y  to c re a te  a c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r it y  
system in  A s ia  w hich  the S o v ie t  le a d e r s  have 
i n t e r m i t t e n t l y  been  a d v a n c in g  s in c e  the la t e  1 9 6 0 s .
At the same tim e , G orbachev  u n m is tak ab ly  r e c o g n iz e d  US 
i n t e r e s t s  and r o le  in  the P a c i f i c  r e g io n ,  by s a y in g :
We r e c o g n iz e  c l e a r l y  that  the U n ite d  S t a te s  is  a 
g r e a t  P a c i f i c  p o w e r . . . F urtherm ore , the U n ite d  
S t a t e s ,  u n d o u b te d ly ,  has im portant  and le g it im a t e  
economic and p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  in  the r e g io n .
No d o ub t , w ith out  the U n ite d  S t a te s  and i t s  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  i t  i s  not p o s s i b l e  to r e s o lv e  the 
problem  of s e c u r it y  and c o o p e r a t io n  in  the 
P a c i f i c  Ocean  to the s a t i s f a c t i o n  of a l l  n a t io n s  
in  the r e g io n ,  [emphasis added] 29
G orbachev  thus p u b l i c l y  r e c o g n iz e d  the g lo b a l  as w e ll  as 
A m erican  p e r c e p t io n  that the U n ite d  S tate s  is  the 
s tr o n g e s t  P a c i f i c  pow er . In d e e d ,  the most pow erfu l  US 
m i l i t a r y  fo r c e s  o u t s id e  the c o n t in e n t a l  U n ite d  State s  can 
be found  in  the P a c i f i c ,  i n c l u d in g  the most e x t e n s iv e
28. Gorbachev: Vladivostok Speech, p.33
29. Gorbachev: Vladivostok Speech, p.31
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u n i f i e d  m i l i t a r y  command (P A C O M ), the la r g e s t  US f l e e t  
(the Seventh  F l e e t ) ,  and the l a r g e s t  US bases  on fo r e ig n  
t e r r i t o r y  (the  Subic  n aval  base  and C lark  a i r  base  in  the 
P h i l i p p i n e s )  . A l l  of t h is  s u g g e sts  that  the p e r c e iv e d  
s e c u r it y  in t e r e s t s  of the U n it e d  S t a te s  are  as d e e p ly  
engaged  in  the r e g io n  as they  are  in  Euro pe .
G e o p o l i t i c a l l y  s p e a k in g ,  G o r b a c h e v 's  d e s c r i p t i o n  of the 
U n ite d  S t a te s  as a P a c i f i c  power is  a c c u r a t e .  However, 
i t s  p o l i t i c a l  im p l ic a t io n s  are  s i g n i f i c a n t  g iv e n  h is  
d e s c r i p t i o n  of the S o v ie t  U nion  as an A s ia n - P a c i f ic  
coun try . M o sco w 's  r e c o g n i t io n  of the U n ite d  S ta te s  as a 
P a c i f i c  power does not in  any sense  mean that  the S o v ie ts  
would accept  the U n ite d  S t a t e s 's  power p o s i t i o n  as i t  is  
in  the r e g io n  w ith out  c h a l l e n g e .  "We want Am erica to 
p a r t i c i p a t e , "  s a id  S o v ie t  Deputy  F o r e ig n  M in is t e r  M ik h a il  
K a p its a  in  an i n t e r v ie w  w ith  Far E a s te r n  Economic Review  
in  1 9 8 6 ,  "b u t  the P a c i f i c  b e lo n g s  to e v e r y b o d y . . .  to a l l  
who l i v e  t h e r e .  So when [US Deputy  D e fe n c e  S e c r e ta r y  
R ichard]  A rm itage  says that  the borders  of the US extend
5 , 0 0 0  m ile s  from the Am erican  West C o a s t ,  w e ll  that  is  
r u b b is h — pure im perialism - - and nobody can agree  i f  
America t r i e s  to convert  the P a c i f i c  in to  i t s  in t e r n a l  
l a k e . " 30 There  can be l i t t l e  doubt that  a s p e c ia l  p lac e  
in  So v ie t  f o r e i g n  p o l ic y  p r i o r i t i e s  in  the A s ia n - P a c i f ic  
r e g io n  goes to the r o le  of the U n ite d  S tate s  in  the a r e a .  
The vast  P a c i f i c  Ocean  is  c l e a r l y  v iew ed  in  Moscow as an 
30. Far Eastern Kconoiic Revie», August 14, 1986, p.33
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arena of v i t a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  for  the S o v ie t  Union  to 
e s t a b l i s h  i t s e l f  as a P a c i f i c  power, w ith  an acknow ledged  
ro le  to p lay  in  s o l v in g  s e c u r it y  i s s u e s .  G o r b a c h e v 's  
acknowledgment of the U n ite d  S t a te s  as a P a c i f i c  power 
could  serve  to probe US w i l l i n g n e s s  to acknow ledge  and 
accommodate S o v ie t  in t e r e s t s  in  the r e g io n .
F i n a l l y ,  Gorbachev  a ls o  e x p r e s s e d  S o v ie t  in t e n t io n s  to 
s tr e n g th e n  f r i e n d s h i p  and promote b i l a t e r a l  r e l a t i o n s  
w ith  North  Korea and M o n g o lia .  T h is  may have meant that  
in  1986  he as yet saw no need  for  major changes in  
r e l a t i o n s  w ith  them. However, sub seq uent  e v e n t s —  
w ith d raw al  of a l l  S o v ie t  fo r c e s  from M o ng olia  agreed  by 
both  Moscow and U lan  B a to r ,  and apparent  a c q u ie s c e n c e  in  
moves for  i n t e r n a l  p o l i t i c a l  change th e r e ,  and the 
as s id u o u s  b u i l d u p  of trade  and p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  
South K orea , tends  to sug g est  the o p p o s it e .
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Chapter 2 
Major Determinants
In  g e n e r a l ,  as R. F .  M i l l e r  and T .  H . R igby  a rg u e d ,  for
c e r t a i n  f a i r l y  long  p e r io d s  the fo r m u la t io n  and conduct
of S o v ie t  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  has been r e l a t i v e l y  le s s
dep en d en t  on dom estic  f a c t o r s  than i s  true  of most major 
1
pow ers . An im portant p o in t  worth n o t in g ,  how ever , is  
that  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een  dom estic  and e x t e r n a l  
fa c t o r s  is  a d i a l e c t i c a l  on e . In  h is  V la d iv o s t o k  sp e e ch ,  
Gorbachev  c a l l e d  not only  fo r  a c c e l e r a t e d  economic 
developm ent of the S o v ie t  Far E a s t ,  but  for  good and 
p e a c e fu l  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  a l l  n e ig h b o u r in g  c o u n tr ie s  
w ith o u t  e x c e p t io n .  Gorbachev  seemed more aware than h is  
p r e d e c e s s o r s  that  f o r e ig n  p o l ic y  is  t i g h t l y  l in k e d  w ith  
dom estic  p o l i c y .  A c c o rd in g  to the S o v ie t  Ambassador to 
A u s t r a l i a  Evgeni  S a m o te ik in ,  "we sim ply  w o n 't  be ab le  to 
reach  our g o als  at home in  a h o s t i l e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
e nv iron m ent , sp e n d in g  m a te r ia l  and i n t e l l e c t u a l  re so u rc e s  
of our s o c ie t y  on arms race  and c o n f r o n t a t i o n . " 2 I t  is  
c l e a r  th at  in  the S o v ie t  Union  dom estic  p o l ic y  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  are  e x e r t i n g  a c o n s id e r a b l e  i n f l u e n c e  on 
f o r e i g n  p olicy- m aking .
1. R. F. Hiller and T. B. Rigby, "Domestic Determinants of Soviet Foreign Policy: Prospects 
for Change in the 1990s", (A paper for the Conference on the Soviets in the Pacific in the 
1990s, Canberra, Nay 1988), p.l
2. Evgeni Samoteikin, "The Goals of Vladivostok", in Rastesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer 
(eds.), The Soviet Onion as an Asian Pacific Poier—Implications of Gorbachev's 1986 
Vladivostok Initiative, Westview Press, Inc., 1986, p.11
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What d e te rm ina nts  lay  b e h in d  t h is  m ajor f o r e ig n  p o l ic y  
speech  of G o r b a c h e v 's  in  V la d iv o s t o k ?  I t  seems that i t  
r e f l e c t s  that M o sco w 's  f o r e i g n  p o l i c i e s  towards N o rth east  
A s ia  are  i n f l u e n c e d  by both  the "many ta n g le d  k n o ts "  of 
e x t e r n a l  te n s io n s  and economic " p r e - c r i s i s "  s i t u a t io n s  
l e f t  b e h in d  by h is  p r e d e c e s s o r s .  T h is  c h ap ter  e x p lo re s  
those m ajor d e te r m in a n ts ,  such  as S o v ie t  s t r a t e g i c  
environm ent in  the r e g io n ,  s e c u r it y  concerns  about the 
So v ie t  U n i o n 's  e a s te r n  f r o n t i e r s  and dom estic  economic 
developm ent in  S i b e r i a  and the S o v ie t  Far E a s t .
2 . 1  The S t r a t e g ic  Environm ent
The h is t o r y  of the S o v ie t  U nion  s in c e  the end of W orld  
War I I  has b e en , as G e o f f r e y  Jukes  put i t ,  "one  of slow  
but ste ad y  movement from the p o s i t i o n  of an extrem ely  
strong  r e g io n a l  power to that  of a g e n u in e  g lo b a l  power, 
p o s s e s s in g  weapons systems com parable  to those  of the 
other  superpow er , the U n ite d  S t a t e s " . 3 There  is  l i t t l e  
doubt that  the emergence of the S o v ie t  Union  as a 
superpow er , then  w ith  the second  l a r g e s t  economy in  the 
w o rld , com pletely  changed  i t s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o s i t i o n ,  
a l b e i t  b u t t r e s s e d  m ain ly  by i t s  m i l i t a r y  r a t h e r  than i t s  
economic s t r e n g t h .
D u r in g  the p e r io d s  of G o r b a c h e v 's  re c en t  p r e d e c e s s o r s —
Leo nid  B r e zh n e v ,  Y u r i  Andropov and K o n s t a n t in  Chernenko ,
3. Geoffrey Jukes, "Soviet Strategy", in Desnond Ball (ed.), Strategy and Defence: Australian 
Kssays, George Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1986 (Second Iipression), p.185
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the rem arkable  growth of S o v ie t  m i l i t a r y  power in  the 
A s ia n - P a c i f ic  r e g io n  h ad , ac c o r d in g  to Harry  Gelman, 
"c u m u la t iv e ly  brought  about a fundam ental  change in  force  
p o s tu r e ,  c a r r y in g  w ith  i t  an even more r a d i c a l  
improvement in  the S o v ie t  p o s i t i o n  in  the b a la n c e  of 
fo rc e s  in  the East  t h a n . . . i n  the W e s t " .  However, the 
So v ie t  m i l i t a r y  b u i l d u p ,  as Ross Babbage n o te d ,  had not 
only  f a i l e d  to a c h ie v e  a f a v o u r a b le  r e g io n a l  b a la n c e  of 
power but i t  had a ls o  g e n e r a te d  fe a r s  of So v ie t  
i n t e n t io n s  in  the r e g io n  and underm ined  M o sco w 's  broader  
economic and p o l i t i c a l  o b j e c t i v e s . ^
The S o v ie t  m i l i t a r y  b u i ld u p  in  the P a c i f i c  area  was 
prompted by both  r e g io n a l  and g e n e r a l  f a c t o r s .  
R e g i o n a l l y ,  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  in  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  w ith  China  
was fo l lo w e d  by an in c r e a s e  in  ground and a i r  fo rc e s  
along  the S ino - Soviet  b o r d e r .  However, the p r i n c i p a l  
fa c to r  prom pting  both  num erical  in c r e a s e s  and q u a l i t a t i v e  
improvement was a g e n e r a l  on e — the abandonment by the 
S o v ie t  l e a d e r s h ip  a f t e r  the overthrow  of Khrushchev  of 
h is  b e l i e f  that a fu tu r e  g e n e r a l  war would  i n e v i t a b l y  and 
q u ic k l y  become n u c l e a r .  D u r in g  K h r u s h c h e v 's  ascendancy  
there  had been  a number of s ig n s  that  many of the 
m i l i t a r y  c o n t e st e d  t h is  b e l i e f  and the p r i n c i p a l  
c o n c lu s io n  he drew from i t ,  that  the c e r t a i n t y  of a b i l i t y
4. Harry Gelian, "The Soviet Union, East Asia and the West: The Kremlin's Calculus of 
Opportunities and Risks", IISS: Adelphi Papers, No.217, Spring 1987 , p.3
5. Ross Babbage, "Soviet Strategic Dilemmas in the North Pacific in the 1990s", (A paper for 
the Conference on the Soviets in the Pacific in the 1990s, Canberra, Nay 1988), p.9
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to answer a n u c le a r  a tta c k  w ith  n u c le a r  r e t a l i a t i o n  
a g a in s t  Am erican  c i t i e s  i t s e l f  made d e te r r e n c e  p o s s i b l e ,  
w ith o u t  any need  to match Am erican  numbers of n u c le a r  
weapons or to m a in ta in  c o n v e n t io n a l  fo r c e s  at t h e ir  mid- 
1 9 5 0 s  l e v e l .  A f t e r  h is  overthrow  in  O ctob er  1 9 6 4 ,  So v ie t  
s t r a t e g i c  n u c le a r  fo r c e s  were b u i l t  up r e l a t i v e l y  q u ic k l y  
towards approxim ate  o v e r a l l  p a r i t y  w ith  those  of the 
U n it e d  S t a t e s ,  and from 1 966  onwards the c o n v e n t io n a l  
fo r c e s  were in  a l l  cases  m odern ised  and in  some cases  
i n c r e a s e d  in  numbers as w e l l ,  to meet the re q u irem ents  of 
a new d o c t r i n a l  p o i n t .  T h is  was that  in c r e a s e d  So v ie t  
n u c le a r  c a p a c it y  might prevent  a g e n e r a l  war becoming 
n u c l e a r ,  but e q u a l ly  might not d e te r  i t  from b r e a k in g  
o u t ;  S o v ie t  fo rc e s  th e r e fo r e  had to be a b le  to f i g h t  a 
la r g e - s c a le  c o n v e n t io n a l  cam paign and at l e a s t  not lose  
i t .  And m i l i t a r y  p la n n e r s  had to assume that  the U n ite d  
S t a t e s ,  i f  c o n f in e d  to c o n v e n t io n a l  w a r fa r e  by fe a r  of 
n u c l e a r  d e v a s t a t i o n ,  would  attempt to wage such w a r fa r e  
as b r o a d ly  as p o s s i b l e ,  m aking maximal use  of the very  
e l a b o r a t e  US a l l i a n c e  system . In  the m id - 1960s , t h is  gave 
a w orst- case  s c e n a r io  of c o n v e n t io n a l  w a r fa r e  in v o l v in g  
NATO a lo ng  the S o v ie t  b l o c 's  w estern  b ord ers  and 
t e r r i t o r i a l  w aters  from the no rth  coast  to the B lack  Sea , 
and the  C e n tr a l  T re aty  O r g a n is a t io n  in  the south  along  
the b o r d e r s  w ith  Turkey  and I r a n .  F urth er  e a s t  the worst- 
case  was of a ttac k  by the U n ite d  S tate s  w ith  i t s  de  j u r e
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a l l i e s  of Japan  and South K o re a , a lo ng  w ith  C hin a  as a de  
f a c t o  a l l y .
M easures  taken  to meet th is  s c e n a r io  in  the Far East  
in v o lv e d  s u b s t a n t i a l  in c r e a s e s  in  g round , a i r  and naval  
fo r c e s  from the l a t e  1 9 6 0 s  onw ards . W h ile  these  
un d o u b te d ly  improved S o v ie t  s t r a t e g i c  c a p a b i l i t y  they 
a ls o  in c r e a s e d  the p e r c e p t io n  of a S o v ie t  th r e a t  in  
C h in a ,  J a p a n ,  the U n ite d  S t a te s  and many oth er  c o u n tr ie s  
of the A s ia - P a c i f i c  r e g io n ,  to the d e tr im ent  of S o v ie t  
d ip lo m a t ic  e f f o r t s  to g a in  ac c ep tan ce  in  the r e g io n .
I t  seems that never  in  the decades  s in c e  the end of World  
War I I  had the r e g io n a l  s i t u a t i o n  been so u n fa v o u r a b le  
and u n c o n g e n ia l  for  the S o v ie t s  as in  the f i r s t  h a l f  of 
the 1 9 8 0 s .  Due to antagonism  w ith  i t s  n e ig h b o u rs  —  the 
U n it e d  S t a t e s ,  J a p a n ,  Ch ina  and o t h e r s ,  the S o v ie t  
s t r a t e g i c  s i t u a t i o n  in  N o rth e ast  A s ia  d e t e r io r a t e d  even 
though Sino - Soviet  r e l a t i o n s  appeared  to have improved a 
good d e a l  s in c e  B r e z h n e v 's  1982  speech  in  T a s h k e n t .6 
G o r b a c h e v 's  V la d iv o s t o k  i n i t i a t i v e s  to impart new 
momentum to b i l a t e r a l  S o v ie t  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  a l l  
n e ig h b o u r in g  c o u n t r ie s  w ith o u t  e x c e p t io n  in d ic a t e d  that 
he r e c o g n iz e d  that  the S o v ie t  U nion  was in  a r e l a t i v e l y  
weak p o s i t i o n  in  N o rth e ast  A s i a .
A b r i e f  overview  of the r e g io n a l  s i t u a t i o n  that the 
S o v ie t  Union  c o n fro n te d  b e fo r e  G o r b a c h e v 's  a c c e s s io n  in
6. "Brezhnov's Speech in Tashkent, March 24, 1982*, Pravda, March 25, 1982
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1985  r e v e a ls  that the  b a la n c e  of fo r c e s  was q u it e  
u n fa v o u r a b le  for  the S o v ie t  U n io n ,  sim ply  b ecause  of an 
em erging "a n t i- S o v ie t  f r o n t "  between  the U n ite d  S t a t e s ,  
China  and Ja p a n ;  s t r a i n e d  S ino - Soviet  r e l a t i o n s ;  stron g  
US d e fe n c e  r e l a t i o n s  w it h  i t s  f a s t  grow ing  a l l i e s — Japan  
and South K o re a ; and u n s t a b le  Soviet- N orth  Korean 
r e l a t i o n s .  And a l l  t h i s  must to some d e gre e  be c o n s id e re d  
a major f a i l u r e  of S o v ie t  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y .
An A n t i- S o v ie t  Front
In  June  1 9 8 0 ,  the then  S o v ie t  C h ie f  of the G eneral  S t a f f  
Marshal N i k o l a i  O garkov  s ta te d  in  a speech  to m i l i t a r y  
le ad e r s  t h a t :
A s e r io u s  th r e a t  to peace  is  p r e s e n te d  by 
s t r e n g t h e n in g  m i l i t a r y - p o l i t i c a l  rapprochem ent of 
the U n ite d  S t a t e s ,  C h ina  and J a p a n ,  the attempts 
to form a u n i f i e d  a n t i- S o v ie t  fro n t  in  which  the 
m i l i t a r y  might of the U n ite d  S t a te s  and the 
European  c o u n t r ie s  of NATO in  the West would be 
u n it e d  w ith  the manpower r e so u rc e s  of Ch ina  and 
the i n d u s t r i a l  p o t e n t i a l  of Japan  in  the 
E a s t . . .  In  fa c t  what is  h ap p en in g  is  the c r e a t io n  
of a m i l i t a r y  a l l i a n c e  between  the U n it e d  S t a t e s ,  
C h in a  and Japan  s im i l a r  to the 1 9 3 0 s  Rome-Berlin- 
Tokyo " a x i s "  of sad  m em ory .7
T h is  r e f l e c t e d  S o v ie t  m i l i t a r y  concern  th at  developm ents
in  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een  the U n ite d  S t a t e s ,  China  and
7. Quoted in David Hollonay, The Soviet Onion and the Aris Race, Yale University Press, New 
Haven and London, 1983, p.94. For further details, see If. V. Ogarkov, "In the Interests of 
Raising Coibat Readiness", Coiiunist of the Aned Forces, No.14 , 1980, p.26
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Japan  from 1978  onwards had c r e a te d  a p o t e n t i a l l y  
t h r e a t e n in g  s i t u a t i o n  fo r  S o v ie t  in t e r e s t s  in  N o rth east  
A s i a .  In  the fa c e  of a grow ing  S o v ie t  th re a t  r e s u l t i n g  
from the r a p id  e x p a n s io n  of i t s  m i l i t a r y  s tr e n g th  in  the 
Far East  s in c e  the m id - 1960s , the U n ite d  S t a t e s ,  C hina  
and Japan  appeared  then  to have come to the c o n c lu s io n  
that an em erging  but weak C h in a ,  an e c o n o m ica lly  stron g  
but m i l i t a r i l y  weak Jap an  and a s t i l l  stron g  but at that  
time w eak en ing  US p r e se n c e  would  to geth er  b a la n c e  the 
power of the So v ie t  U nion  in  the e a s t .
In  A ugust 1 9 7 8 ,  C h in a  and Japan  s ig n e d  a T r e a ty  of Peace 
and F r i e n d s h ip .  The t r e a t y ,  w hich  in c lu d e d  a c la u s e  
op p o sing  "hegemony"--a B e i j i n g  codeword for  the S o v ie t  
U n io n — was v iew ed  in  Moscow as a n t i- S o v ie t  in  i t s  
i m p l i c a t i o n s .  In  Decem ber, Ch ina  and the U n ite d  S tate s  
s im u lta n e o u sly  announced  the e s ta b l is h m e n t  of d ip lo m a t ic  
r e l a t i o n s  in  resp o nse  to a T re aty  of F r ie n d s h ip  and 
C o o p e rat io n  Moscow s ig n e d  w ith  H a n o i ,  w hich  was q u ic k l y  
fo l lo w e d  by V ie t n a m 's  i n v a s io n  of Kampuchea in  November. 
However, the U n ite d  S t a t e s ,  Ch ina  and Japan  drew c lo s e r  
to geth er  in  s t r a t e g i c  c o o p e r a t io n  to b u i l d  p o l i t i c a l  
c o u n te r p r e s s u r e s  a g a in s t  m ounting  S o v ie t  c h a l le n g e s  only  
when the S o v ie t s  began  d e p lo y in g  a i r  and n aval  fo r c e s  to
8. In the early 1970s, there were indications of a weakening US couitient to the region. 
This is widely perceived as a result of the "Guam Doctrine' espoused by US President 
Richard Nixon in Guai in 1969, calling for its allies to lake greater contributions 
towards their own security, and to assuie the primary responsibility of providing for 
their own defence. And this is also the result of the US strategic "retreat' froi East 
Asia after the Vietnam Har in 1975.
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Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang in  V ietnam , im m ediately  a f t e r  
Sino- Vietnam ese  r e l a t i o n s  d e t e r io r a t e d  in to  an open 
border  c o n f l i c t  in  F eb ruary  1 9 7 9 .  The S o v ie t  in v a s io n  of 
A f g h a n is t a n  in  l a t e  1 979  gave f u r t h e r  impetus to th is  
c o o p e r a t io n ,  for  these  S o v ie t  moves were v iew ed  by the 
U n ite d  S t a t e s ,  C h in a  and Japan  as f u r t h e r  e v id e n c e  of 
S o v ie t  e xp a n s io n ism  and w i l l i n g n e s s  to use  m i l i t a r y  force  
around the w orld  to f u r t h e r  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  a m b it io n s .
The v iew  that the S o v ie t  Union  was b e in g  th r e a te n e d  by a 
new e n c irc le m en t  was a g a in  e xp r e s s e d  by the then So v ie t  
D efe n c e  M i n i s t e r  U s t in o v  in  June 1 9 8 1 :
The W ash ing ton - B eijin g - T ok yo  t r i a n g l e  has 
r e c e n t ly  a c q u ir e d  i n c r e a s i n g l y  c le a r  o u t l in e  as 
an a g g r e s s iv e  a l l i a n c e  in  the Far E a s t . 9
S o v ie t  w o r r ie s  about the form ation  of a Washington-  
Bei jing- Tokyo  a l l i a n c e  r e s u l t e d  in  a m irrored  response  
from the other  s i d e .  N o t w it h s t a n d in g  t h e ir  common 
i n t e r e s t  in  o p p o sing  S o v ie t  e x p a n s io n ,  how ever , no 
W ashington- Beijing- Tokyo  a l l i a n c e  has emerged because  of 
C h i n a 's  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  of e q u i d i s t a n c e  betw een  the two 
su p erp ow ers . Y e t ,  the U n it e d  S t a t e s ,  Ch ina  and Japan  drew 
c lo s e r  to geth er  as a r e s u l t  of the growth of So v ie t  
m i l i t a r y  power and the a s s e r t i v e n e s s  of S o v ie t  fo r e ig n  
p o l i c y .
9. Quoted in F. David Anstrong, "The Soviet Union and the United States", in Gerald Segal 
led.) The Soviet Onion in Bast Asia, Westview Press, Inc., Boulder, Colorado, 1983, p.44. 
For further details, see "Peace in Asia is a Couon Concern of the Continent", Far Eastern 
Affairs, Moscow, No.l, 1982, p.43
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S t r a i n e d  S ino - S o viet  R e l a t io n s
G e n e r a l l y  s p e a k in g ,  b i l a t e r a l  S ino - Soviet  r e l a t i o n s  have
long  fo llo w e d  an h i s t o r i c a l  p a t t e r n  of c o n f l i c t  and
h o s t i l i t y  alth oug h  there  was a b r i e f  "honeym oon" p e r io d
of S ino - Soviet  c o o p e r a t io n  in  the 1 9 5 0 s .  The S in o - S o v ie t
honeymoon, as C h r i s t i n a  Holmes put i t ,  was an a b e r r a t io n
in  h i s t o r y ,  not the n o r m .10 I t  r e f l e c t e d  C h in e s e  econom ic
and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  w eakness  at the t im e , co u p le d  w it h  a
b e l i e f  in  the S o v ie t  model of d evelop m en t . But a f t e r  the
d eath  of S t a l i n ,  B e i j i n g  and Moscow began  to d r i f t  a p a r t .
W ith  the coming to power of K hrush ch ev , d i f f e r e n c e s
between the Communist Party  of C h ina  (CCP) and the
Communist Party  of the S o v ie t  Union  (CPSU) over i s s u e s  of
g lo b a l  and n u c le a r  s t r a t e g i e s ,  i d e o l o g i c a l  t h e o r i e s ,  and
touchy s ta te  i n t e r e s t s ,  compounded w ith  h i s t o r i c a l
m emories, were d r a m a t ic a l l y  transform ed  in t o  an open
p o le m ic al  d is p u t e  in  1 9 6 3 .  D u r in g  the B rezh n ev  p e r i o d ,
the d is p u t e  e s c a l a t e d  fo r  a time to a p o in t  of h o s t i l i t y -
-a s e r ie s  of armed c la s h e s  on the border  in  1 9 6 9 .  T h ere
is  l i t t l e  doubt that  the b order  c la s h e s  reop ened  con c e rn s
in  both  B e i j i n g  and Moscow about the th r e a t  each  p osed  to
the s e c u r it y  of the  o th er  m ainly  along  the S in o - S o v ie t
b o r d e r .  M oreover , they  led  to the Sino- Am erican
rapprochem ent in  1 9 7 2 ,  a developm ent the form er US
P r e s id e n t  R ic h a r d  N ixon  c a l l e d  one of the most
10. Christina Holies, "The Soviet Union and China", in Gerald Segal (ed.) The Soviet Onion in 
East Asia, Westview Press, Inc., Boulder, Colorado, 1983, p.26
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s i g n i f i c a n t  g e o p o l i t i c a l  events  s in c e  the Second World  
W a r . 11
I t  may be argued  that  b i l a t e r a l  S ino - Soviet  r e l a t i o n s  
r each ed  a low p o in t  a f t e r  1969  a lth o u g h  s in c e  then there  
has been no major b o rd er  c la s h  betw een  China  and the 
S o v ie t  U n io n .  Many asp e c ts  of S ino - Soviet  state- to- state  
r e l a t i o n s  rem ained  s e v e r e ly  s t r a i n e d .  The S ino- Soviet  
T re aty  of F r i e n d s h i p ,  A l l i a n c e  and Mutual A s s is t a n c e  was 
a llo w e d  to la p s e  in  1 9 8 0 ,  w ith  no new agreement to take 
i t s  p l a c e .  Moscow sought to improve r e l a t i o n s  w ith  C h in a ,  
c la im in g  that  " t h e r e  is  no problem  in  r e l a t i o n s  between 
the USSR and the P e o p l e 's  R e p u b lic  of C h in a  which  could  
not be so lv e d  in  a s p i r i t  of g o o d - n e i g h b o u r l i n e s s " .12 Of 
far  g r e a t e r  im portance  was a m ajor i n i t i a t i v e  by Brezhnev  
in  h is  T ash k en t  speech  on March 24 1 9 8 2 ,  ^  in  which  he 
made a stron g  c a l l  fo r  a r e s t o r a t io n  of f r i e n d s h i p  w ith  
C h i n a :
. . .we remember w e ll  the time when the So v iet  
Union  and P e o p l e 's  C h in a  were u n it e d  by bonds of 
f r i e n d s h i p  and com radely  c o o p e r a t io n .  We have 
never  c o n s id e r e d  as normal the s t a t e  of h o s t i l i t y  
and estrangem ent  betw een  our c o u n t r i e s .  We are 
p re p are d  to come to term s, w ith o ut  any 
p r e l im in a r y  c o n d i t i o n s ,  on m easures  a c c e p ta b le  to 
both  s id e s  to improve So v ie t- C h in e se  r e l a t i o n s  on
11. Richard Nixon, Real Peace, London: Sidgwick k Jackson, 1983, p.72
12. Brezhnev's speech at the CPSU's Central Couittee in October 25, 1976, quoted in Peter 
Jones and Sian Kevill (coipiled), China and the Soviet Onion 1919-84, Longian Group Ltd,
1985, p.129
1 3 .  "Brezhnov's Speech in Tashkent, March 24, 1982", Pravda, March 25, 1982
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the b a s is  of mutual r e s p e c t  for  each  o t h e r 's  
i n t e r e s t s ,  n o n - in te r fe r e n c e  in  each o t h e r 's  
a f f a i r s  and mutual b e n e f i t — and c e r t a i n l y  not to 
the d e tr im e n t  of t h i r d  c o u n t r i e s . ^
S t i l l  r e s e n t f u l  about S o v ie t  treatm ent of C h in a  in  the 
1 9 6 0 s , 15 B e i j i n g  resp onded  to B r e z h n e v 's  i n i t i a t i v e s  w ith  
marked r e s e r v e .  Dem anding a c tu a l  d e e d s ,  B e i j i n g  a s s e r t e d  
that  Moscow must take m easures to remove the t h r e a t s  to 
C h i n a 's  s e c u r it y  p r e s e n te d  by the deploym ent of S o v ie t  
troops on the f r o n t ie r  and in  M o n g o lia ,  S o v ie t  sup p ort  
for  the V ietnam ese  in v a s io n  of Kampuchea and the S o v ie t  
o c c u p a t io n  of  A f g h a n i s t a n . 16
S in c e  coming to power, G orbachev  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  eag er  
to improve r e l a t i o n s  w ith  C h in a .  He must have r e a l i s e d  
that  some p ro g re ss  was made in  S ino - Soviet  r e l a t i o n s  
under B rezh n ev  (d u r in g  h is  l a t e  p e r i o d ) , Andropov  and 
C hernenko . For exam ple , b i l a t e r a l  trade  i n c r e a s e d  
f i v e f o l d  betw een  1981  and 1 9 8 5 ,  r e a c h in g  a t o t a l  v a lu e  of 
over 1 . 6  b i l l i o n  Roubles  that  y e a r . 17 T h i s ,  h ow ever , was 
m inute when r e l a t e d  to the s i z e  of the two econom ies  and 
t h e ir  o v e r a l l  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e ,  and n o th in g  e l s e  had 
been done to reduce  t e n s io n  betw een  the two c o u n t r ie s
14. "Brezhnev's Speech in Tashkent", March 24, 1982, Pravda, March 25 1982
15. Vhat is worth noting here is that besides the 1969 border clashes, the Chinese have not 
forgotten their suffering and hunger during the "three terrible years' following the 
withdrawal of Soviet experts in the early 1960s.
16. Por a discussion, see Hu Yaobang's report to the 12th Congress of the CCP, People's Daily, 
Septeiber 2, 1982
17. Fang Xukuan, "China's Foreign Trade", International Trade Report, Beijing, Winter 1987, 
p.20
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except  for  a marked d e c r e a s e  in  v e r b a l  h o s t i l i t i e s .  There  
had been  no r e a l  b re ak th ro u g h  in  S ino - Soviet  r e l a t i o n s ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  in  party- to- party  r e l a t i o n s .  As he 
acknow ledged  at the 2 7th  Party  Congress  "t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n s  
in  a t t i t u d e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  to a number of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
p roblem s , [ s t i l l ]  re m a in "  betw een  the S o v ie t  Union  and 
C h i n a .
Strong  US R e l a t io n s  w it h  Ja p an  and South  Korea
Japan  and South  Korea are  f ir m ly  a l l i e d  to the U n ite d  
S t a t e s .  They both  have mutual s e c u r it y  t r e a t ie s  w ith  the 
U n ite d  S t a t e s ,  w hich  has troops and n u c le a r  weapon 
d e l iv e r y  v e h i c l e s  forw ard- deployed  in  both  c o u n t r ie s .  In
1 9 8 6 ,  the numbers of US troops s t a t io n e d  in  Japan  and 
South Korea  were estim ate d  to be some 5 0 , 0 0 0  and 4 0 , 0 0 0  
r e s p e c t i v e l y . 1 ^ A stron g  p r e se n c e  of US m i l i t a r y  fo rc e s  
in  N o r th e a s t  A s ia  was v iew ed  by both  Tokyo and Seoul as 
c r i t i c a l  to t h e ir  s e c u r it y  and m a in t a in in g  the r e g io n a l  
m i l i t a r y  b a la n c e  v is- a- vis  the S o v ie t  U n io n .  In  the 
Am erican  v ie w ,  a c c o r d in g  to B onnie  S . G l a s e r ,  Am erican  
forw ard- deployed  fo rc e s  in  the r e g i o n — both  land- based
18. Mikhail Gorbachev, "The Political Report of the CPSU Central Conittee to the 27th Party 
Congress", in Robert Maxnell (ed.), M.S. Gorbachev: Speeches and Writings, Oxford: 
Pergaion Press, 1986, pp.80-81
19. Por further details about US force deploysent in Japan and South Korea, see The Military 
Balance 1986-1987, IISS, London, 1986, pp.28-30
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and sea- based— p la y e d  a r o le  in  US s t r a t e g y  fo r  d e t e r r in g  
g l o b a l  c o n v e n t io n a l  and n u c le a r  w a r . 20
In  the l a t e  1 9 8 0 s ,  the U n it e d  S t a te s  enhanced  i t s  
s e c u r i t y  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  Jap an  and South K orea , l e a d in g  to 
what Gorbachev  d e s c r ib e d  as a de  f a c t o  " m i l i t a r i s e d  
Washington- Tokyo- Seoul t r i a n g l e " .  S in c e  1 9 8 1 ,  the U n ite d  
S t a t e s  and Japan  c a r r i e d  out j o i n t  m i l i t a r y  e x e r c is e s  
a c c o r d in g  to the "G u i d e l i n e s  fo r  US-Japan D efence  
C o o p e r a t io n "  adopted  in  1 9 7 8 .  The US-South Korea s e c u r it y  
a l l i a n c e  was a ls o  s tr e n g th e n e d  by t h e ir  j o i n t  "Team 
S p i r i t "  e x e r c i s e s .  F u r t h e r ,  Japan  and South Korea 
c o o p e rate d  w ith  the U n ite d  S ta te s  more a c t i v e l y  in  
s e c u r it y  a f f a i r s .  Japan  assumed some c osts  for  bases  and 
f a c i l i t i e s  r e q u ir e d  for  the s t a t i o n i n g  of Am erican  fo r c e s  
on Ja p a n e s e  t e r r i t o r y .  A c c o rd in g  to H i r o s h i  K im ura, Japan  
spent  more than one b i l l i o n  US d o l l a r s  a n n u a l l y — a cost  
of  U S $ 2 1 , 0 0 0  per Am erican  s o l d i e r ,  the h ig h e s t  share  of 
the  cost  of US ove rse as  deploym ents  anywhere in  the 
w o r l d . 21 Tokyo a ls o  announced  i t s  d e c i s i o n  to j o i n  at 
l e a s t  the r e s e a r c h  p o r t io n  of the US S t r a t e g ic  D efence  
I n i t i a t i v e  (S D I)  p r o je c t  to g a i n  acc e ss  to some of the 
in n o v a t iv e  tech no log y  that  co u ld  be d e v e l o p e d .22
20. Bonnie S. Glaser, "Soviet, Chinese and Aierican Perspectives on Aris Control in Northeast 
Asia", (A paper for the Conference on Security and Ans Control in the North Pacific, 
Canberra, August 1987), p.32
21. Hiroshi Kiiura, "The Soviet Military Buildup: Its Impact on Japan and Its Aims", in 
Richard H. Solonon and Hasataka Rosaka (eds.), The Soviet Far East Military Buildup, 
Sydney: Crooi Hell Ltd., 1986, p.112
22. Byung-yoon Ahn, "The Role of Japan in Northeast Asia", Journal of Bast and lest Studies, 
Vol.XVI, No.l. Spring-Suner 1987 , p.45
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U n s ta b le  Soviet- N orth  Korea  R e l a t io n s
Since  the e a r ly  1 9 6 0 s ,  S o v ie t  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  North  Korea 
have e x p e r ie n c e d  ups and downs owing  to the constant  
in v e r s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een  Sino-North  Korean and 
Soviet- North  Korean r e l a t i o n s . 2 ^ At any g iv e n  tim e, 
P y o n g y an g 's  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  B e i j i n g  were b e t t e r  than those  
w ith  Moscow or v ic e  v e r s a .  P e rh a p s ,  the most im portant 
reason  for  the poor s t a t e  of r e l a t i o n s  was a b a s ic  
i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y  of  i n t e r e s t s  betw een  Moscow and 
Pyongyang. M oscow 's  f o r e i g n  p o l i c i e s  towards North Korea 
seemed to be a m b iv a le n t .  W h ile  g iv in g  vocal  and p o l i t i c a l  
support to North  K o r e a 's  s t r a t e g y  for  u n i f i c a t i o n ,  the 
So v ie ts  p ro b ab ly  b e l i e v e d  t h a t ,  as Don ald  S . Z a g o r ia  
argued , there  could  be no North  Korean v ic t o r y  w ith out  
M oscow 's  r u n n in g  the r i s k  of a Soviet- Am erican  m i l i t a r y  
c o n f r o n t a t i o n .2 ^ Short of a new Korean w ar , a two-Koreas 
s o l u t io n  seemed to be the most l i k e l y  p r o s p e c t .  There  was 
no ev ide n ce  that  the S o v ie t s  had any d e s ir e  to get 
em broiled  in  a war w ith  the U n ite d  S t a te s  on the Korean 
iss u e  in  i t s  p r e s e n t  form . In d e e d ,  the main fa c to r  in  
th is  very  c o m p lic ate d  Korean i s s u e ,  in  the So v ie t  
v ie w p o in t ,  was the m i l i t a r y  and s t r a t e g i c  one : the 
presence  of US fo r c e s  in  South Korea and the c le a r  
c o n t in u a t io n  of US commitment to d e fe n d  South  K orea . The
23. For further details, see Helen-Louise Hunter, "North Korea and the Myth of Equidistance", 
in Tae-Hvan Kvak (ed.), Tio Koreas in lorld Politics, The Institute for Far Eastern 
Studies, Kyungnam University, 1983, pp.195-210
24. Donald S. Zagoria, "The Strategic Environment in East Asia", in Donald S. Zagoria (ed.), 
Soviet Policy in East Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1982, p.11
41
S o v ie t s  were d e e p ly  concerned  about any m i l i t a r y  
i n i t i a t i v e s  by North  Korea a g a in s t  South K orea , w hich  
were l i k e l y  to s t i r  the pot in  K o re a .  I t  seems that  no 
major power is now a b le  to e x e r c is e  m ea n in g fu l  le v e r a g e  
on N orth  Korea to ind uc e  i t  to accept  a d iv id e d  K orea , 
but th a t  i t  is  in c a p a b le  of f o r c in g  a m i l i t a r y  s o l u t io n  
u n a i d e d .
A l s o ,  Moscow d id  not want i t s  t i e s  w ith  Pyongyang to
s e r i o u s l y  i n h i b i t  i t s  d e v e lo p in g  and p o t e n t i a l l y  v a lu a b le
economic r e l a t i o n s  w ith  South K o r e a .25 Developm ent of
Soviet, r e l a t i o n s  w ith  South  Korea was for  a long  time
in h ib i  ted by S o v ie t  r e lu c t a n c e  to up set  North  Korea and
by So uth  Korean laws w hich  b arre d  d ip lo m a t ic  and economic
r e l a t i o n s  w ith  Communist c o u n t r ie s .  S in c e  1 9 7 3 ,  Moscow
ap p e a re d  to have c a u t io u s l y  opened i t s  door to the South
K o r e a n s .  However, developm ents  in  the l a t e  198 0 s  made
North  Korea more m arg in al  to So v ie t  c o n c e r n s ;  d e te n te
betw een  the So v ie t  U nion  and C hina  in  p a r t i c u l a r  rend ered
North  Korea of le s s  m i l i t a r y  im p ortance , and made i t  a
m atter  of r e l a t i v e  i n d i f f e r e n c e  to Moscow w hether  i t  went
c lo s e r  to C hin a  or n o t ;  and w ith  the em phasis  s w it c h in g
from d e fe n c e  of the S o v ie t  Far East  to i t s  economic
d evelop m en t . The e c o n o m ica lly  dynamic South  Korea c l e a r l y
had fa r  more to c o n t r ib u t e  than the r e l a t i v e l y  le s s
d e v e lo p e d  and in w ard - lo o k in g  North  K o re a .  On the South
25. This point is argued by Ross Babbage, "Soviet Strategic Dilemmas in the North Pacific in 
the 1990s", (A paper for the Conference on the Soviets in the Pacific in the 1990s, 
Canberra, May 1988} p.4
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Korean s i d e ,  i n t e r e s t  in  use of the T r a n s - S ib e r ia n  
R a ilw a y  fo r  tra n s p o r t  of h igh- value  cargoes  to Europe , 
and in  the o p p o r t u n it ie s  for  b u s in e s s  e n t e r p r is e s  in  the 
So v ie t  Far  E a s t ,  brought about a r e l a x a t i o n  of 
r e s t r i c t i o n s  on d e a l i n g s  w ith  Communist c o u n t r ie s .  The 
r a p id  pace  of  change in  E a ste rn  Europe and the So v ie t  
Union  d u r in g  1989  looked  l i k e l y  to a c c e l e r a t e  the s h i f t ,  
i s o l a t i n g  the  North  Korean  d i c t a t o r s h i p  even more from 
i t s  S o v ie t  b lo c  a l l i e s .
2 . 2  S e c u r i t y  Concerns
W h ile  M o sc o w 's  prim ary  s e c u r it y  emphasis rem ains  in
Europe , the im portance  of the e a s te r n  f r o n t i e r s  to the
So v ie t  U n i o n 's  s e c u r it y  is  far  from n e g l i g i b l e .  S in c e  the
m id - 1960s , S o v ie t  m i l i t a r y  fo rc e s  s t a t io n e d  in  the Far
East  T h e a t r e  (TVD) went through two major phases  of
b u i l d u p .  °  The f i r s t  p h a s e ,  ap p ro xim ately  from 1967  to
1 9 7 7 ,  i n v o l v e d  the b u i l d u p  of So v ie t  ground and a ir
fo r c e s  a lo n g  the C h in e s e  b o r d e r .  T h is  phase  of b u i ld u p
co u ld  be e x p l a in e d  in  terms of d e f e n s iv e  req uirem ents
d ir e c t e d  s o l e l y  towards p o t e n t i a l  S ino - Soviet
c o n f r o n t a t io n  b e cause  of the d e t e r i o r a t i o n  of S ino - Soviet
26. According to The Military Balance 1987-1988, the Far Eastern Strategic Theatre (GTVD) 
encompasses Far East TVD, and Pacific and Indian Ocean OTVDs. For purposes of this sub­
thesis, the ten Far East TVD as used hereafter is defined to cover the operational and 
deployment zones of the Far East, Transbaikal (including Soviet troops in Mongolia), 
Siberian and Central Asian (The Central Asian Military District was abolished in 1989, and 
reabsorbed into Turkistan Military District, which is part of the Southern TVD.) Military 
Districts and the Pacific Fleet under the control of the Far East Theatre High Couand. 
The Military Balance 1987-1988, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 
pp.44-45
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r e l a t i o n s  in  the e a r ly  1 9 6 0 s .  The second  p h a s e ,  from 1978
to 1 9 8 5 ,  in v o lv e d  a major r e o r g a n iz a t i o n  of ground  and
a ir  fo r c e s  s t r u c t u r e ,  b u i ld u p  of n aval  f o r c e s ,  and
u p g rad in g  of n u c le a r  f o r c e s .  T h is  phase  seemed to m ain ly
o f f s e t  the worse- case p o s s i b i l i t y  of e v e n tu al  c o a l i t i o n
of W ash in g to n  and Tokyo w ith  B e i j i n g ,  r a th e r  than s o l e l y
towards C h in a .  I t  i n c lu d e d  e s ta b l is h m e n t  of a new th e a tre
command, to c o n tro l  S o v ie t  c o n v e n tio n a l  f o r c e s ,  in c l u d in g
ground , t a c t i c a l  a i r  and a i r  d e fe n c e  fo r c e s  d e p lo ye d  in
the Far  E a s t ,  T r a n s b a ik a l  ( i n c l u d in g  S o v ie t  troops in
M o n g o l i a ) , S i b e r i a n  and C e n tr a l  A s ia n  (u n t i l  i t s
a b o l i t i o n  in  1 9 89 )  M i l i t a r y  D i s t r i c t s ,  and n aval  fo rc e s
in  the P a c i f i c  F le e t  (See  F ig u r e  2 . 1  and A p p e n d i x ) .  By
1 9 8 5 ,  the S o v ie t  ground fo rc e  d i v i s i o n s  had in c r e a s e d
from some 17 in  1 9 6 5  to 53 d i v i s i o n s  of v a r io u s
c a t e g o r i e s ,  (See  T a b le  2 . 1 ) ,  about one- quarter  of the
to ta l  of a l l  S o v ie t  d i v i s i o n s .  So v ie t  a i r  and a i r  d e fe n c e
fo r c e s  a ls o  expanded  in  l i n e  w ith  grow ing  ground fo rc e
r e q u ir e m e n t s .  The number of t a c t i c a l  combat f i x e d  wing
a i r c r a f t  had in c r e a s e d  from 300  in  the m id- 1960s  to
2 , 2 0 0 ,  more than  one- third  of the S o v ie t  t o ta l  t a c t i c a l
a i r c r a f t .  The growth of the S o v ie t  P a c i f i c  F l e e t  was the
most im p r e s s iv e  of a l l  S o v ie t  m i l i t a r y  s e r v ic e s  in  the
t h e a t r e .  The number of p r i n c i p a l  s u r fa c e  com batants had
in c r e a s e d  from about 50 in  the m id- 1960s to 85 in  1 9 8 5 . 27
The S o v ie t  P a c i f i c  F l e e t  c o n t a in e d  25 per cent of a l l
27. For further details of Soviet force deployment in the Far East TVD, see The Military 
Balance 1985-86, IISS, London, 1986, pp.29-30
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Soviet  n a v a l  a s s e ts  in  1 9 6 5 ;  by 1975  the p e r ce n tag e  was
28 , and i t  stood  at around 32 in  1 9 8 5 .
So v iet  n u c l e a r  fo rc e s  b ased  e ast  of the U ra ls  com prise  
s t r a t e g i c  n u c le a r  fo r c e s  and th e a tr e  n u c le a r  f o r c e s .  
S ince  the m id- 1960s , S o v ie t  n u c le a r  d e l i v e r y  systems 
aimed a g a in s t  p o t e n t ia l  ta r g e ts  in  the A s ia n - P a c i f ic  
r e g io n ,  p r im a r i l y  the w e ste rn  p arts  of the U n ite d  S t a t e s ,  
had a ls o  undergone  a q u a n t i t a t i v e  and q u a l i t a t i v e  
in c r e a s e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  w ith  the in t r o d u c t io n  of  D e lt a  I I I-  
c la s s  SSBN s , Tu-22M B a c k f ir e  bombers and SS-20 
in te rm e d iate - ran g e  b a l l i s t i c  m is s i l e  (IRBM) in to  
o p e r a t io n .  (See  Table  2 . 2 )
In d e e d ,  the  So v ie t  U n ion  was m i l i t a r i l y  s tro n g er  than 
ever  b e f o r e .  The growth of S o v ie t  m i l i t a r y  s tr e n g th  
r e i n f o r c e d  the r a t io n a l e  for  c h a r a c t e r i z i n g  the So v ie t  
U n ion  as an A s ia n - P a c i f ic  pow er . Yet t h is  d id  not at a l l  
make the S o v ie t  le a d e r s  f e e l  more s e c u r e .  M o sco w 's  o ld  
concerns  about a two-front war c h a l l e n g e  and the 
g e o g r a p h ic  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  of the S o v ie t  U n i o n 's  e a s te r n  
f r o n t i e r s  s t i l l  rem ained .
28. The Soviet Pacific Fleet was numerically the largest of the four Soviet fleets. This was 
aainly because it had large nuibers of siall warships to defend its very long coastlines, 
but in firepower it ranked below the Northern Fleet. The figures were quoted froi Alvin H. 
Bernstein, "The Soviets in Caa Ranh Bay", The lational Interest, Spring 1986, p.19
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Two-Front War C h a lle n g e
M o sco w 's  concerns  about a two-front war c h a l le n g e  seems 
w e ll  b ase d  in  v iew  of R u s s ia n  h is t o r y  from the conquest  
of R u s s ia  by the Mongol Khans in  the e a r ly  t h ir t e e n t h  
century  thro ugh  to the th re a t  of a ttac k  by Japan  in  the 
east  to r e i n f o r c e  the German in v a s io n  d u r in g  W orld War
I I .
The e s t a b l is h m e n t  of the P e o p l e 's  R e p u b lic  of Ch ina  in  
1949  seemed to r e s o lv e  M oscow 's  two fr o n t  s e c u r it y  
problem . The S ino - Soviet  a l l i a n c e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  of the 
1 9 5 0 s  c r e a t e d  a f r i e n d l y  " b u f f e r "  s ta te  fo r  the So v ie t  
U n ion  in  the e a s t .  The d e t e r i o r a t i o n  of S ino - Soviet  
r e l a t i o n s  in  the e a r ly  1 9 6 0 s ,  and p a r t i c u l a r l y  the 
m i l i t a r y  c l a s h e s  a lo ng  the d is p u t e d  S ino - Soviet  border  in  
1 9 6 9 ,  re o p e n e d  M o sco w 's  s e c u r it y  concerns  about i t s  
e a s t e r n  f r o n t i e r .  A f t e r  C h i n a 's  rapprochem ent w ith  the 
U n it e d  S t a t e s  and Japan  in  the 1 9 7 0 s ,  S o v ie t  p o l it ic o -  
m i l i t a r y  d ecis io n- m akers  in  Moscow began  to show an ever 
g ro w ing  i n t e r e s t  in  the long-term s e c u r it y  of S i b e r i a ,  
the S o v ie t  Far  East  and the a d ja c e n t  o c e a n ic  e x p a n s e s .  
T h ese  i n t e r e s t s  in c l u d e d  the peace-time p r o j e c t i o n  of a 
fo r m id a b le  m i l i t a r y  p r e se n c e  to remind major n e ig h b o u r in g  
c o u n t r i e s ,  such  as C h in a  and J a p a n ,  of the r e a l i t y  of 
S o v ie t  p o w e r . A g a in s t  the c o n t in g e n cy  of w ar , the S o v ie ts  
had to d e v e lo p  a m i l i t a r y  c a p a b i l i t y  in  the th e a tr e  to 
f i g h t  the  o th er  sup erp o w er— the U n ite d  S ta te s  and i t s
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a l l i e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  J a p a n ,  and h an d le  the p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
c o n f l i c t  w ith  C h i n a . T h e  e s ta b l is h m e n t  of a s e p ar ate  
th e a tre  command at C h it a  in  e a r ly  1978  was c l e a r l y  an 
im portant s t r a t e g i c  step  in te n d e d  to s tr e n g th e n  i t s  
m i l i t a r y  p o s tu r e  in  the East  and improve i t s  c a p a b i l i t i e s  
to f i g h t  a two-front w a r . ^
U n l ik e  in  E u ro p e ,  the S o v ie t  U nion  lac k s  a b u f f e r  of 
c l o s e l y  a l l i e d  s t a t e s  betw een  i t s e l f  and i t s  a d v e r s a r i e s ,  
w ith  the e x c e p t io n  of the b a r r i e r  M o ngolia  p r o v id e s  alo ng  
a p o r t io n  of the S o v ie t  border  w ith  C h in a .  M o ngolia  i s  a 
So v ie t  a l l y .  I t s  prim ary  v a lu e  was l im it e d  as a Soviet-  
manned m i l i t a r y  b u f f e r  a g a in s t  C h in a ;  but i t  had been 
turned  in t o  a forw ard  m i l i t a r y  base  for  the S o v ie t s  to 
s t a t io n  troops  a g a in s t  China  a f t e r  1 9 6 6 .  Seen from 
Moscow, N orth  Korea was p ro b ab ly  only  a p a r t i a l  a l l y ,  as 
i t  had to compete for  i n f l u e n c e  w ith  B e i j i n g .  As a 
r e s u l t ,  the  S o v ie t  U nion  was surrounded  by s tr o n g ,  
u n f r i e n d l y  n e i g h b o u r s — China  and Ja p a n ,  as w e ll  as the 
U n ite d  S t a te s  j u s t  ac ross  the B e r in g  S t r a i t .
From the S o v ie t  p e r s p e c t iv e ,  in  any fu tu r e  major European  
w ar , the S o v ie t  U nion  could  be a tta c k e d  in  g e o g r a p h ic a l  
e s c a l a t i o n  from the e ast  where i t  is  the w e a k e s t .  So v ie t
29. This point is argued by Paul Dibb, "The Soviet Union as a Pacific Military Power", 
(Working Paper No.81, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 
University, Canberra, 1984) p.l
30. Por a discussion, see Yao Venbin, "Soviet Military Deployients in the Asian-Pacific 
Region: Implications for China's Security", in Richard H. Solomon and Hasataka losaka 
(eds.), The Soviet Far Kast Military Buildup, Sydney: Croon Hell Ltd., 1986, pp.100-101 
and Xie Venqing, "The Soviet Strategy in the Asian-Pacific Region and Its Prospects", 
International Strategic Studies, No.l, March 1987 , p.20
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m il it a r y  p la n n e r s  fe a r e d  that  the U n ite d  S t a te s  and i t s  
a l l i e s  might not only  open a second  fr o n t  in  the Far East  
but p o s s i b l y  attempt to d etach  S i b e r i a  and th r e a te n  the 
So v ie t  hom eland  through  i t s  "b ac k  d o o r " . ' * 1 T h is  a ls o  
r a i s e d  the prosp ect  of a ttac k  from C h in a .  A lth ou gh  the 
S o v ie t s  took s u b s t a n t i a l  steps  to improve t h e ir  
c a p a b i l i t i e s  to f i g h t  a two-front war a f t e r  1965  and 
became c a p a b le  of la r g e - s c a le  o f f e n s i v e  as w e ll  as 
d e f e n s iv e  o p e r a t io n s ,  they  were far  from stron g  enough to 
f i g h t  two wars s im u lta n e o u sly  in  Europe and A s i a ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  p rolon g ed  o n e s .
The V l a d iv o s t o k  speech  c o n t a in e d  a g e n e r a l  r e fe r e n c e  to 
the  need  to p revent  m i l i t a r i s a t i o n  of the P a c i f i c  g o ing  
as fa r  as i t  had in  Europe , and r e f e r e n c e s  to 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s e c u r it y  i s s u e s  grouped  under f i v e  
h e a d i n g s - - f i r s t , r e g io n a l  se ttle m e n ts  in  So uth east  A s i a ,  
the  Koreas  and A f g h a n i s t a n ;  second , n o n - p r o l i f e r a t io n  of 
n u c l e a r  w eapo ns , and p o s s i b l e  c r e a t io n  of n u cle a r- fr e e  
zo n e s  in  the  South P a c i f i c ,  Korean P e n in s u la  and 
S o u t h e a s t  A s i a ;  t h ir d ,  r e d u c t io n  of na v al  fo r c e s  in  the 
P a c i f i c  and e s ta b l is h m e n t  of a "P e a ce  Zo ne "  in  the In d ia n  
O c e a n ;  f o u r t h ,  r e d u c t io n  of armed fo rc e s  and c o n v e n tio n a l  
arm am ents ; f i f t h ,  a c o n fe r e n c e  to d is c u s s  confidence-
31. For a discussion of the concept of disieibering the Soviet Union in a two-front war, see 
Paul Dibb, The Soviet Union: The Incoiplete Superpower, The Haciillan Press Ltd, 1986, 
p.56 and also Ross Babbage, "Soviet Strategic Dileaaas in the North Pacific in the 1990s", 
(A paper for the Conference on the Soviets in the Pacific in the 1990s, Canberra, May 
1988) p.2
b u i l d i n g  m e a s u r e s .32 Steps towards im plem enting  some of 
these  s u b s e q u e n t ly  found  e x p r e s s io n  in  agreed  or 
u n i l a t e r a l  fo r c e  r e d u c t io n s ;  the in t e r m e d ia t e  n u c le a r  
fo rc e s  (IN F ) agreem ent of 1987  r e s u l t e d  in  a b o l i t i o n  of 
the SS-20 m i s s i l e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  those  d i r e c t e d  at A s ia n  
t a r g e t s ,  as G orbachev  had in d ic a t e d  i t  would  in  the 
V l a d iv o s t o k  s p e e c h 33 and s u b s t a n t i a l  u n i l a t e r a l  
r e d u c t io n s  in  S o v ie t  c o n v e n t io n a l  f o r c e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
ground f o r c e s ,  in  M o ngolia  and the Far East  took p la c e  
d u r in g  1 9 8 8 - 1 9 8 9 .  T o g eth er  w ith  the S o v ie t  w ith d raw al  
from A f g h a n i s t a n ,  com pleted  in  February  1 9 8 9 ,  and the 
p r e s s u r e  on V ietnam  to w ith draw  from Kampuchea, which  i t  
d id  by the  end of 1 9 8 9 ,  these  confirm ed  the s h i f t  in  
S o v ie t  p o l i c y  p ro cla im ed  by G orbachev  at V la d iv o s t o k  and 
e ls e w h e r e  away from r e l i a n c e  on s u s t a in in g  or in c r e a s in g  
S o v ie t  i n f l u e n c e  by m i l i t a r y  s tr e n g th  towards a p o l ic y  
b a s e d  more upon d e te n te  and economic c o o p e r a t io n .
G e o g r a p h ic  V u l n e r a b i l i t y
S t i l l  of c o n s id e r a b l e  concern  to Moscow is  the fac t  that 
the P a c i f i c  F l e e t  is  s e p a r a t e d  from the other  three  
f l e e t s ;  the  S o v ie t  P a c i f i c  F l e e t  is  b ased  in  V la d iv o s t o k ,  
S o v e ts k a y a  Gavan along  the Sea of Japan  and P e tro p avlov sk  
on the Kam chatka P e n i n s u l a .  A l l  So v ie t  bases  t h e r e ,  
e x c e p t  P e t r o p a v lo v s k ,  fr o n t  a major g e o g r a p h ic a l  b a r r i e r .
32. Gorbachev: Vladivostok Speech, pp.35-37
33. Gorbachev: Vladivostok Speech, pp.33-34
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There  are  s e v e r a l  choke p o in t s  such as T sush im a , T sug aru  
and Soya S t r a i t s  l e a d i n g  in  and out of the Seas of Japan  
and O k h o ts k ,  w hich  are  of c r u c ia l  im portance  in  the event 
of w ar .  Enemy c o n tro l  of these  choke p o in ts  would 
r e s t r i c t  S o v ie t  p assa g e  from those  w aters  to the open 
s e a ,  a lth o u g h  S o v ie t  c o n tr o l  would r e s t r i c t  enemy n aval  
fo r c e  e n tr y  to e i t h e r  s e a .  The So v ie ts  have attem pted  to 
l e s s e n  t h i s  problem  by d e p lo y in g  some modern nuclear-  
powered b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e - f i r i n g  subm arines  (SSBNs) in  
the Sea of O k h o tsk ,  w hich  is  s h i e l d e d  by the K u r i l e  
i s l a n d s  c h a i n .  W ith  the deploym ent of S o v ie t  long-range 
subm arine- launched  b a l l i s t i c  m is s i l e s  (SS-N-8 and i t s  
s u c c e s s o r s )  i t  became i n c r e a s i n g l y  p o s s i b l e  fo r  S o v ie t  
SSBNs to op erate  at sea in  reach  of t h e ir  a s s ig n e d  
t a r g e t s  w ith o u t  l e a v in g  home w a t e r s .
A nother  concern  to the S o v ie t s  is  the s t r a t e g i c  
v u l n e r a b i l i t y  of S i b e r i a  and the S o v ie t  Far East  b ecause  
of  i t s  g e o g r a p h ic  i s o l a t i o n  (V la d iv o s to k  is  over 9000  km 
away from Moscow) and poor com m unications . D e s p it e  
s tre n u o u s  e f f o r t s  over many d e c a d e s ,  com m unication  
c h an n e ls  of  such e x t r a o r d in a r y  le n g th s  are  s t i l l  the 
A c h i l l e s '  h e e l  of s e c u r in g  the S o v ie t  U n i o n 's  d is t a n t  yet  
s p a r s e l y  p o p u la te d  e a s t e r n  f r o n t i e r s .  The T r a n s - S ib e r ia n  
R a i l w a y — now the most im portant  o v e r la n d  tr a n s p o r t  o p t io n  
in  the  S o v ie t  U n io n — is  v u l n e r a b l e  to i n t e r d i c t i o n  in  
w artim e b e ca u se  of i t s  c lo s e  p r o x im ity  to the C h in ese  
b o r d e r ,  a lth o u g h  the new Baikal-Amur M a in l in e  (BAM)
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Railw ay  can a l l e v i a t e  th is  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  somewhat when i t  
is  com pleted  (See F ig u r e  2 . 2 ) .  A ir  tra n s p o r t  is  e xp e n s iv e  
and too d i f f i c u l t  to be used  e x t e n s iv e l y  due to t e r r a i n  
and oth er  n a t u r a l  c o n s t r a i n t s .  The sea routes  v ia  the 
A r c t ic  and In d ia n  Oceans  are c i r c u i t o u s  and t h e ir  
d i s t a n c e s  are  g r e a t .  For exam ple , the south ern  sea route  
through the In d i a n  Ocean  ranges  from 9 , 0 0 0  m iles  between  
the B lack  Sea and V la d iv o s t o k  v ia  the Suez Canal to 
1 7 , 0 0 0  m ile s  from Murmansk to V l a d iv o s t o k  v ia  the Cape of 
Good H o p e . 3 ^ M oreover , there  are  a number of choke p o in ts  
e n r o u te ,  such  as the Suez C a n a l ,  the M alacca  S t r a i t s  and 
Tsushim a S t r a i t ,  w hich  are a s e r io u s  menace to So v ie t  
naval  s h ip s  t r a v e l l i n g  to V la d iv o s t o k  in  wartim e i f  
c o n t r o l l e d  by the US and i t s  a l l i e s .  The no rth e rn  sea 
route  v ia  the A r c t ic  O c ean , a lth oug h  s h o r t e r ,  is  open for  
only  a few  months in  the y e a r .
The s h i f t s  in  So v ie t  p o l ic y  p ro cla im ed  at V la d iv o s t o k  and
pursued  s in c e  1986  have reduced  the p o l i t i c a l  l i k e l i h o o d
of a war in  the S o v ie t  Far E a s t .  However, they  r a i s e  the
p o s s i b i l i t y  of t e n s io n  a r i s i n g  in  fu tu r e  w ith  the
m i l i t a r y  l e a d e r s h i p ,  whose fu n c t io n  is  to be ab le  to
conduct such  a war s u c c e s s f u l l y  i f  i t  a r i s e s ,  and who are
b e in g  g iv e n  few er  re s o u r c e s  w ith  w hich  to do so . I t  is
perhaps  s i g n i f i c a n t  of the "new  l i n e "  in  S o v ie t  s tr a te g y
that the h o ld e r s  of the two h ig h e s t  m i l i t a r y  p o s t s ,
34. See Donald C. Daniel and Harlan H. Jencks, "Soviet Military Confrontation with China: 
Options for the USSR, the PRC, and the USA", The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol.Ill, 
No.2, Fall/Winter 1983, p.381
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M in is t e r  of D e fence  Yazov  and C h ie f  of G e n e r a l  S t a f f  
M o iseyev , both  commanded the Far  East  M i l i t a r y  D i s t r i c t  
in  the rec en t  p a s t ;  Yazov  was in  command th ere  at the 
time of G o r b a c h e v 's  v i s i t  to V l a d i v o s t o k ,  and M o ise y e v ,  
then h is  d ep uty , f i r s t  su cceed ed  him when he was 
t r a n s f e r r e d  to Moscow a few months l a t e r ,  then fo l lo w e d  
him on appointm ent as C h ie f  of G e n e ral  S t a f f  e a r ly  in  
1 9 8 9 .  The fo rc e s  in  the S o v ie t  Far East  are  the only  
elem ents  of the So v ie t  armed fo r c e s  w hich  could  be 
c e r t a i n  to be outnum bered from the o u ts e t  in  a g e n e r a l  
w ar ; because  of t h is  and t h e ir  rem oteness  from sources  of 
r e in fo r c e m e n t  and r e s u p p ly  the Far East  th e a tr e  is  
e s p e c i a l l y  dem anding  of m i l i t a r y  s k i l l  in  t r a i n i n g  and 
u t i l i s i n g  manpower and w eaponry . The e x p e r ie n c e  g a in e d  
there  by Yazov  and M oiseyev  may t h e r e fo r e  be seen  as 
e s p e c i a l l y  r e le v a n t  to the new d efence- b ased  s t r a t e g y  and 
the red uced  r e so u rc e s  to be made a v a i l a b l e  for  i t .  
W hether th is  is  so or n o t ,  t h e i r  know ledge  of the Far 
East  th e a tr e  is  l i k e l y  to ensure  that  i t s  s p e c ia l  
req u ire m e n ts  are not n e g l e c t e d . 35
2 . 3  Economic Slowdown
I t  is  w id e ly  p e r c e iv e d  that  the c o m p a r a t iv e ly  r a p id
growth of  the So v ie t  economy began  to f a l t e r  in  the la t e
1 9 6 0 s  and by the e a r ly  1 9 8 0 s  had g iv e n  way to s t a g n a t i o n .
35. For a discussion, see Geoffrey Jukes, "Development of Soviet Strategy", in Chapter 3 of 
second edition of Strategy and Defence—Australian Essays, and also Geoffrey Jukes, "The 
Soviet Far East", Canberra Studies in fforld Affairs, both to be published in 1990.
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The declin e  in the growth rate since the 1970s was steady 
and m anifest , whether measured in Soviet national  income 
s t a t is t ic s ,  or in  Western estimates of Soviet GNP. (See 
Table 2 .3 )  Moreover, the slowdown actually  widened the 
gap between the Soviet and the US economies. In 1961 , the 
CPSU, under Khrushchev, adopted a programme which 
proclaimed that the Soviet Union would surpass the United 
States in production  per head of population  before 1970 , 
and b u ild  the m aterial- technical basis  of a communist 
society  by 1 9 8 0 . Some figu res  suggest that the Soviet 
economy was only 53 per cent of the s ize  of the US 
economy in  1980 , compared with 58 per cent in 1975 and 54 
per cent in 1 9 7 0 ' 37 and by 1988 it  had sunk to somewhere 
between 40 and 52 per cent of the US l e v e l . 3 ®
One of the major impediments to economic growth was 
c le ar ly  a large defence investment for b u ild in g  up the 
Soviet  Union as a global m ilitary  power. According to 
Western estimates and subsequent Soviet adm issions, 
during  the Brezhnev years, Soviet defence expenditure 
consumed about 12-14 per cent of the Soviet U n io n 's
I Q
G N P . In  a country where the rate of economic growth 
de c lin e d  s t e a d i ly ,  such a large peacetime demand by the
36. David Hollonay, The Soviet Onion and the iris Race, Yale University Press, New Haven and 
London, 1983, p.168
37. Paul Dibb, The Soviet Onion: The Incoiplete Superpower, The Maciillan Press Ltd, 1986, 
p.72
38. The Military Balance 1989-1990, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 
1989, pp.16 and 32
39. These figures are from Villi as G. Hyland, 'The USSR and Nuclear Mar*, in Barry H. Blechaan 
(ed.), Rethinking the OS Strategic Posture, Ballinger Publishing Coipany, Caibridge, 
Massachusetts, 1982, p.64
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defence establishment seemed out of any reasonable 
proportion, and could not but have a s ig n if ic a n t  impact 
on the Soviet c i v i l ia n  economy. Whether the Western 
analyses overestimated or underestimated the growth rate 
of Soviet m ilitary  outlays and the proportion of GNP 
devoted to defence , Soviet m ilitary  spending, in any 
event, increased  stead ily  from 1965 to 1976 , and 
s t a b i l is e d  after  that year at an excessively  high level 
alongside the slowdown in  economic growth, absorbing a 
comparatively large part of the GNP. ®
Kremlin policy-makers must have worries along the lin es  
of a judgment made by Samuel Huntington, who stated that 
in 50 years ' time the United States would s t i l l  be a 
great power, but questioned whether the Soviet Union 
would b e . ^ 1 I f  its  economy continued to d e c lin e ,  the 
Soviet Union would be unable to compete with the United 
States e f fe c t iv e ly  through its  t ra d itio n a l  means, 
m ilitary  power. Short of a strong economic base , m ilitary  
power alone is  not s u f f i c ie n t  to buttress  national  power 
and in tern atio n al  p re s t ig e .  It  must be backed by a 
growing "economic w ealth , which is convertible  into  
v ir t u a lly  a ll  types of power and in f l u e n c e " .  2 Further, 
i f  it  f e l l  too far behind the United States , the Soviet
53
40. Geoffrey Jukes, "Developient of Soviet Strategy", op cit, pp.64-65
41. Quoted in Christian Schiidt-Hauer, Gorbachev: The Path to Power, (Translated by Ewald 
Osers and Chris Roiberg), London: I.B. Tauris i Co Ltd, 1986, p.16
42. Klaus Knorr, Power and lealth, The Naciillan Press Ltd, 1973, p.75
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Union would run the r isk  of losing  its  newly established  
position  as a superpower.
The Soviet  system is  probably strong enough to withstand 
a lim ited  period  of economic s t a s is ,  but in the long run 
that can only result  in the steady d ecline  of the USSR as 
a world power. Gorbachev in his  1986 Vladivostok  speech 
hinted at the e s s e n t ia l  element of Moscow's fear , by 
s a y in g :
Of course we are aware that the arms race , which 
is  g a in in g  momentum, serves not only the aims of 
making sup erpro fit  and of war preparations , but 
a ls o — and this  is  not of the least  importance—  
other immoral aims, which are e s s e n t ia lly  to 
exhaust the Soviet  Union econom ically , frustrate  
the P a r t y 's  course for achieving  a further r ise  
in the l iv in g  standards of the people, and hamper 
the implementation of our social  p ro g ra m m e .^
These remarks may be read as a r e fle c t io n  of Moscow's 
recognition  that , as Ross Babbage noted, during the 
previous f i f t e e n  years the Soviet Union had overstretched 
its  real  c ap ac itie s  and its  p otential  to compete 
e f f e c t iv e l y  with  the West had peaked, at least  for the 
immediate f u t u r e . ^  In  order to secure its  superpower 
status and global power in the twenty-first century, 
therefo re , Moscow required  a "breathing  space" for 
accelerated  economic development, to strengthen the
43. Gorbachev: Vladivostok Speech, p.21
44. Koss Babbage, "Soviet Strategic Dileaias in the North Pacific in the 1990s", (A paper for 
the Conference on the Soviets in the Pacific in the 1990s, Canberra, May 1988), p.9
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economic basis  of the Soviet m ilitary  power. In the long 
run, development of the Soviet economy probably depends 
more on restructuring  for greater e f f ic ie n c y  than on 
absolute increases in  extraction  of raw m aterials . 
However, in  the short term raw m aterials , esp ec ia lly  o i l ,  
natural gas and timber remain the Soviet U n io n 's  most 
important export earners . Most of these o rig inate  in 
S ib er ia  and the Soviet Far East . Exploited  and 
exp lo itab le  resources in  West S ib er ia  and most of 
T r an sb a ik a lia  are mostly d irected  westwards, but for 
those in  Yakutia  and the Soviet Far East distance  makes 
the nearer P ac if ic  rim the more natural o u tle t .
Seen from Moscow, the Soviet Far East is  "a  territory  of 
vast natural wealth , huge social  and economic 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  and great in tern atio n al  p r o s p e c t s " .^ 5 Its  
economic potential  is indeed immense. S ib er ia  and the 
Soviet  Far East contains almost three-quarters of the 
co u n try 's  m ineral, fuel and energy resources, over h alf  
its  hydro-electric  resources, about half  its  commercial 
timber resources and one- fifth  of its  cu ltiv a b le  l a n d . ^  
(See Figure  2 .3 )  However, as Gorbachev acknowledged in  
h is  V ladivostok  speech, "the  fu ll- scale  development of 
the Far East is not an easy j o b " ,  and "the  r e g io n 's  share 
in  the country 's  production , far from in c re as in g , is
45. Gorbachev: Vladivostok Speech, p.18
46. See Paul Dibb, The Soviet Union: The Incoiplete Superpower, The Naciillan Press Ltd, 1986, 
p.57
d i m i n i s h i n g . " ^  Another point worth noting is that 
Moscow's trade with the Asian- Pacific  region is s t i l l  
small. In  1986 ,  the region  sent less than four per cent 
of its  exports to the Soviet Union and received  less than 
one per cent of its  imports from there .
It  seems certa in  that Moscow has also  re a lise d  the 
c r it ic a l  s ig n i f ic a n c e  of S ib e r ia  and the Soviet Far East 
to the co u n try 's  economic p o te n t ia l .  In l ight  of the 
special  p r io r it y  given  to S ib er ia  and the Soviet Far East 
in the Soviet U n io n 's  "strateg y  of accelerated  social- 
economic development" put forward by the 27th CPSU 
Congress, and the seven urgent developmental tasks 
u nderlined  by Gorbachev in  his  Vladivostok  s p e e c h ,^ 9 the 
Soviet  U n io n 's  economic development could be directed  
towards the P a c i f i c  in the coming decade. The wealth of 
natural resources in S ib e r ia  and the Soviet Far East w ill  
o f fe r  the Soviet  Union the p o s s ib i l it y  of strengthening 
its  p o s it io n  as an A sian- Pacific  power, both economically 
and m i l i t a r i l y ,  provided that the restructuring  of the 
economy is  s u c c e s s fu l .  Unlike  the western and southern 
parts of the Soviet Union , the Soviet Far East is not 
a f fe c t e d  by ethnic  unrest or pressures to secede. Its
47. Gorbachev: Vladivostok Speech, p.10
48. Tiie, Noveiber 24, 1986, p.14
49. The seven urgent developmental tasks are: (1) ocean resources, (2) rich natural resources, 
(3) fuel and power (especially Sakhalin gas), (4) the production infrastructure, 
especially railways and »aritiie transport, (5) adaptation of latest technology, (6) 
further enhanceient of export-oriented Par Eastern econoiy, and (7) aore attention to 
consuier needs, especially iiproveient of agriculture and food-industry sectors. See 
Gorbachev: Vladivostok Speech, pp.12-16
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population  is overwhelmingly Russian , and so is most 
l ik e ly  immigration from other parts of the Soviet Union . 
This means that continued p o l i t ic a l  s t a b i l i t y  is l ik e l y ,  
and may prove important in determining the extent to 
which Moscow w il l  permit it  to strengthen its  economic 
links  with  the P a c if ic  basin  countries  at the expense of 
its  l inks  with  the rest of the Soviet Union.
Soviet economic weaknesses are not new. The Soviet 
economy may no longer be dynamic, but it  is  s t i l l  an 
enormously strong machine, capable of f i l l i n g  most of the 
Soviet U n io n 's  needs, in cluding  defence requirem ents. 
Slow growth rates and d e c lin in g  productiv ity  are not 
phenomena lim ited  only to the Soviet Union. Yet there can 
be no doubt that the poor state  of the Soviet economy 
must be added to the strategic  and m ilitary  factors which 
make up the l i s t  of major determinants when Gorbachev 's  
la te s t  i n i t i a t i v e s  towards Asia  and the P a c if ic  are 
se r io u s ly  analysed . Economic factors  w ill  largely  
determine what the Soviet Union can or cannot do in 
Northeast A sia  in  the years ahead.
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Chapter 3 
The Scope of Change Under Gorbachev
Gorbachev is  the eighth  Soviet leader , fo llowing  after  
Vladimir I ly ic h  Lenin  (1917- 24), Josef S ta lin  (1924- 53), 
Georgy Malenkov (1953 , only for a few d a y s ) ,  N ik ita  
Khrushchev (1953- 64 ) ,  Leonid Brezhnev (1964- 82),  Yuri 
Andropov (1982-84) and Konstantin  Chernenko (1984- 85 ).  
When he succeeded Chernenko as General Secretary of the
CPSU in March 1985 ,  many in the West believed  that "a  new
i . . . .  
style  of leader had emerged", foreshadowing s ig n if ic a n t
changes w ith in  the Soviet Union.
As one Western expert on the Soviet Union sa id , the 
"coming to power of any new top leader in the Soviet 
Union changes, to a greater  or lesser  extent, the 
co rrela tio n  of forces among the various in s t itu t io n a l  
in t e r e s t s ,  opinion  groupings and issue networks which 
e x is t  w ith in  both the domestic and foreign  policy  making 
r e a l m s " .2 During his  f i r s t  five  years in o f f ic e ,  
Gorbachev has proved no exception  to this  r u le .  From the 
day he took o f f i c e ,  Gorbachev seems to have been bent 
upon a r e v i t a l i z a t io n  of the stagnant Soviet economy 
through h is  formula— U s k o r e n i y e  (acceleration ) , g l a s n o s t '
1. Christian Schiidt-Hauer, Gorbachev: The Path to Poier, (Translated by Ewald Osers and 
Chris Romberg), London: I.B. Tauris 4 Co Ltd, 1986, p.6
2. Archie Brovn, "Change in the Soviet Union", Foreign Affairs No.64, Suaaer 1986, p.1060
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(speaking out p u b l i c l y ) , p e r e s t r o i k a  (r e s t r u c t u r in g ) , and 
n o v o y e  m y s h l e n i y e  (new t h i n k i n g ) .3
However, he is  of a d i f fe r e n t  generation  from all  his  
predecessors in the Soviet lead ersh ip . Gorbachev, as R. 
F. M iller  and T . H. Rigby put i t ,  is  the f ir s t  Soviet 
leader for a generation  endowed with the im agination , 
energy, courage and p o l i t ic a l  s k i l l s  to take up and push 
through a program of "r a d ic a l  r e f o r m s " .4 He is also the 
f ir s t  Soviet  leader to have no connections with the 
Soviet m ilitary  through c iv i l  or world war experience .
But to what extent can Gorbachev match his  peace gestures 
with deeds in Northeast Asia?  Could Gorbachev 's  "new 
th in k in g "  be crushed by the in tracta ble  problems to which 
h is  predecessors have never found a solution? This 
chapter discusses  Gorbachev 's  in h eritan ce , examines his 
new thinking  on security , and then explores the 
im p lications  for Soviet security  concerns.
3. Uskoreniye, a ten much used in Gorbachev's early period in office but virtually dropped 
later, is referred particularly to speeding up the taking and implementation of decisions. 
Glasoost' literally is the substantive of the verb glasit', meaning "to say", and as a 
noun it connotes speaking out publicly, making known. Perestroika, meaning 
"restructuring", is less ambiguous in translation but has a more complex connotation in 
Russian. Novoye Myshleniye translates literally as " new thinking", a responsibility to 
abandon the old work style in favour of a new effective style that Gorbachev places on the 
leading party and state cadres. For a discussion, see Hilliai E. Odom, "How Far Can Soviet 
Reform Go?", Probleis of Couunisi, Vol.XXXVI, November-December 1987, p.18
4. R. F. Miller and T. H. Rigby, "Domestic Determinants of Soviet Foreign Policy: Prospects 
for Change in the 1990s", (A paper for the Conference on the Soviets in the Pacific in the 
1990s, Canberra, Nay 1988), p.10
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3 .1  G o rbachev 's  In her itan ce
Gorbachev in h e rited  a Soviet Union with serious  economic 
problems. This  is  largely  because G orbachev 's  immediate 
predecessors were more committed to making their  country 
a great m ilitary  power than making it  a great economic 
power, thereby being  unable or u nw illin g  to press for 
major economic reform s. For most of the post-Khrushchev 
period they were able to combine the growth in  m ilitary  
expenditure with  steady improvements in the standards of 
l iv in g  and a continuing  increase  in the economic and 
s c ie n t if ic - te c h n o lo g ic a l  might of the country. By the 
late 1970s ,  they were no longer able to sustain  this  
pattern . By the mid-1980s when Gorbachev took o f f i c e ,  the 
Soviet Union had been brought to what a Soviet associate  
professor of economics I .  Kulikov described  as "a  
dangerous verge of economic stagnation  and pre- crisis  
state in its  in tern al  developm ent".^
T h is ,  however, is  the negative  side  of the Soviet Union
Gorbachev in h e r it e d .  On the credit  s id e , the Soviet Union
which he came to rule  was already a global m ilitary
power, with  a nuclear  arsenal on a par with the United
States , and massive conventional forces organized ,
equipped and trained  to conduct large-scale theatre
o peratio ns . G o rbachev 's  formative years coincided  with
the r is e  of the Soviet  Union to a superpower, a lb e it
5. See I. Kulikov, "The International Aspect of Defence Policies", Couunist of the Ar»ed 
Forces, No.7, 1989
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mainly through its  m ilitary  achievements, but he came to 
power a fter  the consequences of overemphasis on m ilitary  
expenditure had been apparent for several years in 
sharply d eclin in g  growth rates and growing public  
a l i e n a t i o n .
In this  regard , Gorbachev 's  c a lls  for " p e r e s t r o i k a " or 
"restru c tur in g "  must be seen not only as his  recognition  
of what Seweryn B ia ler  called  "the internal  decline  of 
the Soviet U n ion " ,  but at the same time demonstrate his  
determ ination  to reverse the d e c l in e ,  through " g l a s n o s t " 
or "speaking  out p u b l ic ly "  for " n o v o y e  m y s h l e n i y e "  or 
"new th in kin g "  to push for revolutionary  changes in 
society , so as to get the Soviet Union l i f t e d  out of 
stagnation  in its  s o c ia l is t  development, and to 
"guarantee  a consolidation  of [the Soviet Union 's]  
posit ion  in the internatio nal  arena and permit it  to 
enter the next millenium as a great , f lo u rish in g  s t a t e . " '  
Gorbachev appears to be firm ly committed to making the 
Soviet Union a great economic and technological power. 
Now central to Gorbachev 's  programme for reviving  the 
Soviet Union is the question  of a "r a d ic a l  reform ". The 
essence of his reform is  designed to loosen up the 
constra ints  that currently  hinder economic advance. The 
heavy economic burden of defence , in h is  view , is  no
6. For a discussion, see Seueryn Bialer, The Soviet Paradox, External Expansion, Internal 
Decline, London: I.B. Tauris 4 Co. Ltd., 1986
7. Quoted in Christian Schaidt-Hauer, Gorbachev: The Path to Power, (Translated by Ewald 
Osers and Chris Romberg), London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1986, p.13. This reiark was lade 
by Gorbachev in addressing ideological officials in Moscow on December 10 1984.
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doubt a factor in the past Soviet economic slowdown, but 
it is by no means the only one. It  also  creates one of 
Gorbachev's  major dilemmas in deciding  on his  p r io r it ie s  
for " p e r e s t r o i k a " or "r e s t r u c t u r in g " ,  for , in p ractical  
terms, Soviet m ilitary  power is  the Soviet U n io n 's  only 
claim to superpower statu s . However, he c learly  believes  
that the Soviet U n io n 's  superpower status would not be 
fo rfe ited  by reductions in m ilitary  expenditure , but 
could well be lost i f  economic development continued to 
stagnate. Aware that the past Soviet policy  of matching 
any combination of opposing forces is  economically 
unsustainable  and fu e lled  the arms race , he called  for "a  
new mode of t h in k in g " ,  and "a rad ical  break with 
traditions  of p o l i t ic a l  th inking , and with views on 
problems of war and p e a c e . . . a n d  on international
o
s e c u r i t y " . °
3 .2  New Thinking  on Security
New th inking  on security  has been an important area of 
d iscussion  and revisio n  in recent years in the Soviet 
Union. Without question , Gorbachev has set a bold new 
course for Soviet fo reign , security  and arms control 
p o licy . The Soviet lead ersh ip , as Gorbachev acknowledged 
at the 19th Party Conference in 1988 , has come to r e a lise  
t h a t :
8. Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: le* Thinking for Our Country and the lorld, Political 
Literature Publishing House, Moscow, 1987, p.140, and Gorbachev: Vladivostok Speech, p.18
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while  concentrating enormous funds and attention  
on the m ilitary  aspect of counting im perialism , 
we d id  not always make use of the p o l it ic a l  
opportunities  opened up by the fundamental 
changes in the world in our e ffo rts  to assure the 
security  of our state , to scale  down tensions , 
and promote mutual understanding  between nations .
As a r e s u lt ,  we allowed ourselves to be drawn 
into an arms race , which could not but a ffect  the 
c o un try 's  socio-economic development and its  
intern atio n al  s t a n d i n g .9
In speeches and statements, Gorbachev has never presented
himself as a cold warrior or as a spokesman for increased
armaments. Security , in  his  view , could no longer be
guaranteed by m ilitary  means. The Gorbachev leadership
appeared to have come "to  the conclusions that made us
review something which once seemed axiom atic . Since
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, war has ceased to be a
continuation  of p o l i t ic s  by other m eans", asserting  that
"war cannot be a means of achieving  p o l i t i c a l ,  economic,
id e o lo g ic a l ,  or any other g o a l s " ,  and "the  arms race,
1 o
just  l ik e  nuclear war, is  u n w m n a b l e " .  u
G eoffrey  Jukes has summarised the changes in Soviet 
foreign  and security  p o l ic ie s  by saying that " . . . t h e
9. Mikhail Gorbachev, "On Progress in Iipleaenting the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress 
and the Tasks of Proioting Perestroika, June 28 1988", Docuients and Materials of the 19th 
All-Union Party Conference of the CPSU, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 
1988, p.31
10. "Gorbachev's Speech at the International Conference on Striving for Nuclear-Free World and 
Huian Survival", Pravda, February 17, 1987, and Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: lei 
Thinking for Our Country and the lorld, Political Literature Publishing House, Moscow,
1987, pp.143 and 140
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Party and society  are being told that the Soviet 
re lat io n sh ip  with the outside  world is not solely  nor 
prim arily  a d v e r s a r ia l ;  that while  there is  a danger of 
war, and the United States in particula r  remains h o s t ile ,  
there is  also  scope and need for cooperation with the 
major centres of cap italism , and purely m ilitary  
solutions  for security  problems are no longer p ossible  
for any c o u n t r y " E v i d e n c e  for Gorbachev 's  agreement 
with this  is found in h is  statement at the 27th Party 
Congress in  1986 that :
. . . t h e  o b je c t iv e — I emphasize, o b je c t iv e —  
conditions  have taken shape in which 
confrontation  between capitalism  and socialism  
can proceed o n l y  a n d  e x c l u s i v e l y  i n  f o r m s  o f  
p e a c e f u l  c o m p e t i t i o n  a n d  p e a c e f u l  c o n t e s t .  
[emphasis as origin]  ^
Im p lic it  in  G orbachev 's  remark was the recognition  that 
past Soviet  emphasis on m ilitary  power had not produced 
commensurate p o l i t i c a l  b en efits  and had in fact 
stim ulated  an increased  m ilitary  threat of war. "Assuring  
the security  of s t a t e s " ,  as Gorbachev claimed, "w il l  
s h i f t  in c re as in g ly  from the sphere of a correlation  of 
m il it a r y  p o ten tia ls  to the sphere of p o l i t ic a l  
in te r a c t io n  and the s tr ic t  fu lfilm ent  of international
11. Geoffrey Jukes, "Gorbachev on Foreign Policy and Defence, 1986", (A seainar paper, 
Department of International Relations, Australian National University, Noveaber 20, 1986), 
p.14
12. Mikhail Gorbachev, "The Political Report of the CPSU Central Coaaittee to the 27th Party 
Congress", in Robert Naxvell (ed.), H. S. Gorbachev: Speeches and iritings, Oxford: 
Pergaaon Press, 1986, p.73
commitments". J Gorbachev 's  security  policy  p ersp ec tiv es , 
therefore , represent not merely a s ig n if ic a n t  d i f fe r e n c e  
in the style  and rhetoric  from those of his  predecessors , 
but also  a d iffe re n c e  in  substance . He has urged a 
reversal of the policy  of tension , w ishing  to replace  it  
with one of cooperation and d ia lo gue .
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Reasonable S u f f ic ie n c y
The Gorbachev period has been marked by an in c r e as in g ly  
active  d isc u ss io n  of Soviet m ilitary  d o ctr in e . Much of 
this d isc u ss io n  has centred on the concept of reasonable  
s u f f ic ie n c y  for defence . At the 27th Party Congress in 
1986 , Gorbachev claimed that the Soviet Union favoured 
"l im it in g  the m ilitary  p otential  to reasonable  
suffic iency ".^- 4 In his  1988 United Nations speech, he 
assured the world that:
The Soviet  Union w ill  maintain  its  defence 
c a p a b il it y  at a level of r e a s o n a b l e  a n d  r e l i a b l e  
s u f f i c i e n c y ,  so that no one is  tempted to 
encroach on the security  of the Soviet Union and 
its  a l l i e s ,  [emphasis added]
13. Mikhail Gorbachev, "On Progress in Implementing the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress 
and the Tasks of Promoting Perestroika, June 28 1988", Docuients and Materials of the 19th 
All-Union Party Conference of the CPSU, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 
1988, p.36
14. Mikhail Gorbachev, "The Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party 
Congress", in Robert Naxtell (ed.l, M. S. Gorbachev: Speeches and Iritings, Oxford: 
Pergamon Press, 1986, p.76
15. "Gorbachev's Speech at the United Nations", Pravda, December 8, 1988
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At f i r s t  glance  there appeared to be what Harriet  Fast 
Scott and W illiam  F. Scott called  l i t t l e  i f  any 
d ifferen ce  in  the meaning of "reasonable  s u f f ic ie n c y "  as 
stated by Gorbachev" and " f u l l y  s u f f i c i e n t "  as used by 
Brezhnev. In  March 1966 , Brezhnev stated at the 23rd 
Party Congress that "the armaments of Soviet troops are 
maintained at the level of contemporary requirements and 
their s t r ik in g  power and f ir e  power are fu lly  s u f f ic ie n t  
to crush any aggresso r " .  ^  In his  Tula speech of 1977 , 
Brezhnev stated  that the a lleg atio n s  that the Soviet
Union " i s  going further than is  s u f f ic ie n t  for
1 ft
d e f e n c e . . . i s  absurd and totally  unfounded". ° The current 
Soviet emphasis on reasonable and r e l ia b le  s u ff ic ie n c y  
for d efen ce , therefo re , demands careful study. According 
to the Soviet  Deputy Defence M inister  Army General 
M ikhail Sorokin , "reasonable  s u f f ic ie n c y  means that our 
means w il l  be s u f f i c ie n t  for essen tia l  defence , and that 
we r e fr a in  from r e d is t r ib u tin g  them, which could alarm 
the other s i d e . . .  R e lia b le  s u f f ic ie n c y  means m aintaining 
a c o u n try 's  defence  a b i l i t y  on a level that would 
discourage  anyone from succumbing to the temptation to 
in fr in g e  on the security  of the USSR and its  a l l i e s " .  * 
G o rbachev 's  new thinking  on security  has already prompted
16. Harriet Fast Scott and VilliaE F. Scott, Soviet Military Doctrine, Westview Press, 1988, 
p.260
17. Brezhnev's Keport to the 23rd Party Congress of CPSU, Political Literature Publishing 
House, Moscow, 1966, p.93
18. "Brezhnev's Speech in Tula, January 18, 1977", Pravda, January 19, 1977
19. These reaarks of Aray General Mikhail Sorokin were aade in an interview with Daitriy 
Belskiy, Novosti military coaaentator on the eve of the celebrations of the 71st 
anniversary of the establishment of the Soviet araed forces. See Pravda, February 23 1989
new in i t i a t i v e s  in r e a l is in g  the tran sit io n  from an 
o ffen sive  to a defensive  m ilitary  d o ctr in e . Moscow has 
frequently  announced withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
outside the Soviet Union, reductions in deployed Soviet 
m ilitary  forces and Soviet defence spending . By 1991 , 
Soviet m ilitary  forces, for example, would be reduced by 
500000  men. Its  m ilitary  spending would be reduced by 
1 4 .2  per cent and production  of arms and m ilitary  
equipment by 1 9 .5  per c e n t . ^  In  1990 , its  m ilitary  
spending would be cut by 6 .3 1 8 4  b i l l i o n  rubbles , or 8 .2  
per cent as compared with 1989 , amounting to 7 0 .9 7 5 8  
b i l l i o n  r u b b l e s . ^  There can be l i t t l e  doubt that the 
Soviet m ilitary  doctrine is  undergoing a rad ical  change. 
But they do not amount to an abandonment of the long-term 
Soviet ob jective  of s h i f t in g  "the correlation  of forces" 
in its  favour. The Gorbachev leadership  is  as keenly 
aware as its  predecessors that the Soviet U n io n 's  
superpower status and its  a b i l i t y  to achieve its  
s tra teg ic  objectives  derive  from its  m ilitary  power. The 
"p urely  d e fe n s iv e "  m ilitary  posture of Soviet forces , as 
General Moiseyev pointed out, "does not reduce but , on 
the contrary , makes higher demands for the combat
20. See "Gorbachev's Speech at the United Nations", Pravda, December 8, 1988, and M. Moiseyev, 
"Soviet Military Doctrine—Realization of its Defensive Trust", Pravda, March 13, 1989. In 
his UN speech, Gorbachev also pledged to eliminate 10000 tanks, 8500 artillery pieces and 
800 combat aircraft from Soviet forces now deployed in Eastern Europe, including European 
USSR. General Moiseyev later announced in a Pravda article that the number of combat 
aircraft to be cut is 820. Pravda, March 13, 1989
21. Irasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), Moscow, December 16, 1989. According to The Military 
Balance 1989-1990, the Soviet defence budget in 1989 was 77.3 bn roubles (around $US 120 
bn at prevailing exchange rates). The Military Balance 1989-1990, IISS, London, 1989, p.32
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readiness  of the armed forces and their  a b i l i t y  to 
repulse any aggression and r e l ia b ly  defend the s o c ia l i s t  
h o m e l a n d " T o  compensate, the Soviet m ilitary  w il l  
upgrade the q ua lity  of weapons. In  this  regard , the 
nature of restructuring  in the Soviet armed forces is  to 
ensure the e ffe c t iv e n e ss  of Soviet defence buildup  on the 
basis  p rim arily  of q u a lit a t iv e  in d ic a to rs .  This much was 
stated by Gorbachev at the 19th Party Conference:
. . . t h e  e f f ic ie n c y  of [the Soviet defence 
development] must henceforward be assured 
p rim arily  by q u a l i t a t i v e  p a r a m e t e r s — both in 
terms of technology and m ilitary  sc ience , and in 
terms of the composition of the armed fo rces .
This must guarantee the Soviet state and its  
a l l i e s  r e l ia b le  security , and must be achieved in 
s t r ic t  conformity with our defence do c tr in e , 
[emphasis a d d e d ] ^
C le ar ly , the q u a lita t iv e  ind icators  of the Soviet armed 
forces w il l  be determined largely  by what the Soviet  
Defence M in ister  General Yazov described  as "the need to 
ensure that war is prevented and p ossible  aggression  is  
r e l ia b ly  repulsed  irrespectiv e  of the conditions  in  which 
it  is  l a u n c h e d " .  All this  suggest that the Gorbachev 
lead ersh ip  b e liev es  that the danger of war s t i l l  e x is ts  
although the immediate threat of a world war is scaled
22. Pravda, March 13, 1989
23. Mikhail Gorbachev, "On Progress in Iipleaenting the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress 
and the Tasks of Promoting Perestroika, June 28 1988", Docuients and Materials of the 19th 
All-Onion Party Conference of the CPSU, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow,
1988, p.36
24. Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), March 12, 1989
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down; it  would be premature to assume that the current 
positive  changes in  internatio nal  re latio n s  are 
irrevers ib le  due to the W est 's  pursuit  of its  strategy of 
"nuclear deterrence " and " f l e x i b l e  respo n se " ;  the 
e x isting  p ar ity  in  the correlation  of forces is now s t i l l  
a dec is iv e  factor  in preventing  w a r . ^  It  is  clear  that 
the main element of G orbachev 's  concept of reasonable 
su ff ic ie n c y  is  designed  to s h i ft  from q uantitative  to 
q u a litat iv e  in d icato rs  in  Soviet defence buildup  while 
achieving  p ar ity  at a lower le v e l .
Equal Security
Gorbachev in h is  Vladivostok  speech denounced the 
"e g o t i s t i c a l "  attempt to strengthen the Soviet U n ion 's  
security  at someone e l s e 's  expense, im p lic it ly  denouncing 
Brezhnev 's  overly  m il it a r is e d  foreign  p o lic y . " In  the 
m ilitary  s p h e r e " ,  he said  at the 27th Party Congress, "we 
intend to act in  such a way as to give nobody grounds for 
fe a r s ,  even imagined ones, about their  security . But to 
equal extent we and our a l l ie s  want to be r id  of fee lin g  
that we are t h r e a t e n e d . " ^  This  re fle c te d  a recognition  
in  the Soviet  lead ersh ip  that , as General Moiseyev 
acknowledged, "the  m ilita ry  threat is  the main source of 
d is t r u s t .  While  it  e x i s t s ,  suspicion  w il l  p e r s is t ,  which
25. For a discussion, see Marshal Akhroaeyev, "Our Military Doctrine", Za lubiezho» (Abroad), 
Moscow, No.46, 1989
26. Mikhail Gorbachev, "The Political Report of the CPSU Central Coiaittee to the 27th Party 
Congress", in Robert Maxaell (ed.), M. S. Gorbachev: Speeches and Writings, Oxford: 
Pergaion Press, 1986, p.74
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in turn leads to i n s t a b i l i t y ,  nervousness and the desire  
not to lag beh ind , but to meet the challenge with 
equivalent force or, s t i l l  worse, acquire u n ilate ra l
m ilitary  advantages in the i l lu so ry  hope of in f l i c t i n g  a
0 7
defeat on the adversary while  remaining unscathed ".  
There is  no doubt that security  can only be mutual. It  is  
v ital  that a l l  should feel  equally  secure, for peace to 
be m aintained .
Moscow does not claim to need more security  and 
acknowledges that the Soviet Union can only be secure i f  
its  ad v e rsa r ie s ,  too, feel  secure . "S t r iv in g  for equal 
s e c u r it y " ,  as the Soviet leadership  asserted , "the Soviet 
Union, in  contrast  to the notions which existed  in the 
1950s and 1 960s ,  w il l  not like  to see any sh ifts  in the 
m ilitary  s tra te g ic  balance in its  favour; dim inished 
security  for the other side  w ill  not o ffer  the Soviet 
Union any advantages as it  w il l  inv ite  suspicion  of the 
other s ide  and w il l  increase  i n s t a b i l i t y . " ^  C learly , 
nobody 's  se curity  can be ensured at the expense of 
others . G o rbach ev 's  view suggests that security  can no 
longer be b u ilt  endlessly  on fear  of r e t a l ia t io n ,  or on 
the doctrines  of "containm ent" or "d e te r r e n c e " .  By 
advocating "equal  s e c u r it y " ,  Gorbachev has played down 
the "th rea ts  to Soviet s e c u r it y " .  He wishes to avoid 
in f l a t i n g  Moscow's disputes  with China and Japan, so as
27. Pravda, March 13, 1989
28. Quoted in Gorbachev's Force Reductions and the Restructuring of Soviet Forces, US
Goverment Printing Office, Washington, 1989, p.9
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to gain  time for m odernization . Modernization  i s ,  in 
part, dependent on reduced arms expenditure , and 
reductions in  m ilita ry  costs are themselves only p ossible  
with improved r e lat io n s  with a ll  countries .
The Soviets  have, however, set lim its  to the extent of 
their u n i la t e r a l  arms reductions . "We have to take 
measures in  r e s p o n s e . . . , "  said  Soviet Foreign M inister  
Eduard Shevardnadze at a press conference in Canberra in 
March 1987 ,  "when the p otential  foe is increasing  its
OQ
arsenals  we have to take this into  c o n s i d e r a t i o n . " ^  And 
much later  the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, 
Admiral Chernavin , expressed d isq uiet  at the alleged  
fa ilu r e  of other powers, notably  the United Sates , to 
respond to what he claimed as reductions in the Soviet 
U n i o n .30
Nuclear War
In h is  Vladivostok  speech , Gorbachev renewed the proposal 
for the total a b o lit io n  of nuclear and other weapons of 
mass destructio n  before  the end of this  century, and at 
the same time warned of the harsh r e a l i t i e s  of nuclear 
war by say ing :
. . . a  nuclear  war would not be clash  of only two 
b locs , two confronting  fo rces . It  w il l  lead to a
29. Quoted in Brian Cloughley, "Bring the boys hoie from the Kuriles, too", Far Eastern 
Econoiic Reviei, July 7 1988, p.29
30. See "Restraint must be mutual", Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), December 15, 1988
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global d is a s t e r ,  in which human c i v i l i z a t i o n  w ill  
be threatened with d e s t r u c t io n .
In the context of the new th inking , c le ar ly ,  the Soviets 
have undertaken a rad ical  review  of their  trad itio nal  
views about future war in the nuclear era , and come to 
the conclusion  that "there  would be neither  winners nor 
losers in  a global nuclear c o n f l ic t :  world c iv i l i z a t i o n  
would in e v it a b ly  p er ish . It  is  a s u ic id e ,  rather than a 
war in  the conventional sense of the word. B u t . . .e v e n  a 
non-nuclear war would now be comparable with a nuclear 
war in its  destructive  e f f e c t .  That is why it  is  logical  
to include  in  our category of nuclear wars this  variant 
of an armed clash  between major powers as w e l l " . 3 ^ Now 
the Soviets  have openly recognized  the devastating  
consequences of e ither  a nuclear  or a conventional war, 
a sserting  that such a war cannot be won and should not be 
fought. Continuation  of the nuclear arms race w ill  
in e v itab ly  heighten  this  threat and may bring  no 
p o l i t i c a l  gain  to any country. This change is also 
evident in Gorbachev 's  p o l i t i c a l  report to the 27th Party 
Congress. He s a id :
. . . i t  is  no longer p ossible  to win an arms race, 
or nuclear  w a r . . . T h e  continuation  of this  race on 
earth , let  alone its  spread to outer space, w ill
31. Gorbachev: Vladivostok Speech, p.19
32. Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: lei Thinking for Oar Country and the World, Political 
Literature Publishing House, Moscow, 1987, p.143
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accelerate the already c r it ic a l l y  high rate of 
stockp iling  and p erfectin g  nuclear  w eap o n s .33
In his  book Perestro ika : New Thinking  for Our Country 
and the World, he also s a id :
The only way to security  is through p o l i t i c s :  
decisions  and disarmament. In  our age genuine and 
equal security  can be guaranteed by constantly  
lowering the level of the s trategic  balance from 
which nuclear and other weapons of mass 
destruction  should be completely e l im i n a t e d .3^
It  is  clear  that the consequence of stockpiling  and 
modernization  of nuclear weapons is extremely dangerous. 
Gorbachev in  1986 may also  have thought that, as Malcolm 
Mackintosh argued, the only fundamental threat to the 
Soviet regime and to it s  p o l i t i c a l  system is  total defeat 
and "breakdown" in w a r ,3^ but it  is  equally  l ik e ly  that 
in d e l ib e ra t e ly  downplaying the importance of the 
m ilitary  factor  he was rely ing  on e x is t in g  nuclear 
stockp iles  and the sheer s ize  of the Soviet Union to 
deter in v as io n . As Carl von Clausewitz  warned after  the 
Napoleonic  Wars "R u s s ia . . .  has taught u s . . . t h a t  an Empire 
of great dimensions is  not to be c o n q u e r e d ."3^ In  a 
r e a l i s t i c  a n a ly s is ,  therefore , the forces which are
33. Mikhail Gorbachev, "The Political Report of the CPSU Central Coaiittee to the 27th Party 
Congress", in Robert Naxvell (ed.), I. S. Gorbachev: Speeches and Iritings, Oxford: 
Pergaion Press, 1986, p.73
34. Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: lei Thinking for Onr Country and the lorld, Political 
Literature Publishing House, Moscow, 1987, p.144
35. Malcola Mackintosh, "Gorbachev's First Three Years", (A seainar paper, Department of 
International Relations, Australian National University, April 28, 1988), p.16
36. Anatol Rapoport (ed.), Carl von Clausewitz on Bar, London: Penguia Books, 1976, p.295
capable of i n f l i c t i n g  such a measure of defeat on the 
Soviet Union are only the nuclear forces now 
operationally  availab le  to the United States , or NATO, 
although a substantial  increase  in C h in a 's  nuclear 
c a p a b il it ie s  could a lso , in  the longer term, put its  
forces into this category in Soviet th in kin g . But like  
Khrushchev before him, Gorbachev apparently  believed  
deterrence assured at much lower le v e ls ,  hence his 
proposals for large numerical cuts in nuclear weapons, 
with a declaratory  aim of ultim ately  abo lish in g  them 
a lto g e th e r .
Threat Perceptions
Another s ig n i f ic a n t  aspect of Gorbachev 's  new thinking  on 
security  is  h is  recognition  of the fact that the threat 
to the Soviet  Union today " i s  q u a l it a t iv e ly  d if fe r e n t  
from that which the [Soviet] people encountered in the 
interwar period  or immediately after  the Second World 
W a r " . 3^ Narrow interpretation  of the threat can lead to 
serious errors in foreign  p olicy . There is  evidence which 
may in d ica te  that the younger generation  of the Soviet 
leaders tend to believe  that the competition between the 
East and West is now much broader; it  is  conducted in a 
v ar iety  of spheres in  addition  to the m ilitary  one. The 
West, in  one Soviet view , hopes to atta in  the economic
37. Quoted in Jeffrey Checkel, "New and Old Thinking on Soviet National Security", Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, February 25, 1988, p.2
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exhaustion of the Soviet Union, by a continuing  arms 
race. The US Strategic  Defence In i t i a t i v e  and Ja p an 's  
rearmament program are a ll  seen as part of the W est 's  
strategy of economic e x h a u s t io n .3 ® It  i s ,  however, 
unlikely  that assertions  of a Western campaign to exhaust 
the Soviet Union economically are l i t e r a l l y  meant. Those 
who made them (for example Zhurkin , Karaganov and 
Kortunov in  the a rt ic le  c ited  above) also  argued against 
Soviet involvement in regional  co n flicts  and attempts to 
match Western m ilitary  expenditures , and stated 
unequivocally  that neither  in the United States nor in 
Western Europe were any in f lu e n t ia l  p o l i t ic a l  forces 
which intended to attack the Soviet Union or its  a l l i e s .  
The "economic exhaustion" argument is probably a tactica l  
dev ice , intended to d is c r e d it  Soviet opponents of detente 
and arms reduction by claim ing  that they are really  
fa l l in g  into a trap set by the Soviet U n io n 's  enemies.
This represents  a change from the trad itio n a l  assumptions 
of Gorbachev 's  predecessors who believed  that m ilitary  
power was d ec is iv e  in in tern atio n al  a f f a ir s  and was the 
p rere q u is ite  for advancing Moscow's p o l i t ic a l  goals . This 
is largely  because major turning points in  Soviet 
history--the c iv i l  war and the German in v a s io n — had been 
decided  by m ilitary  means. In  post-war years , according 
to Army General I .  Shavrov, a former Head of the Soviet
38. See K. Zhurkin, S. Karaganov and k. Kortunov, "Threats to Security-Old and New", 
Kouunist, No.l, 1988 , pp.42-50
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General S ta ff  Academy, the Soviet Union achieved two 
major sh ifts  in the co rrelatio n  of f o r c e s . ^  The f ir s t  
was in the late  1950s , when the Soviet Union began to 
acquire a strategic  m iss ile  force that was capable of 
strik ing  Western Europe, and then the United States . The 
second was in the late 1960s  and early  1970s when the 
Soviet-American strategic  balance had reached p a r ity . 
Growing m ilitary  power was not the only reason given for 
these s h i f t s ,  but it  was seen as important in  each case.
There is now a clear awareness among at least  part of the
Soviet politico- m ilitary  leadersh ip  that the West, while
not de-emphasising m ilitary  com petition, has gained
greater politico- strateg ic  mileage out of its  advances in
the economic sphere. This perhaps re fle c ts  the negative
lessons drawn from Moscow's counterproductively
o v erm ilitar ised  foreign  and security  p o l ic ie s  in past
years . Purely m ilitary  solutions  to world security
is s u e s , in  Gorbachev's  view , are im possible in the
nuclear era . Soviet security  begins  at home. The best way
to meet the new challenge from the West is a successful
reform of the Soviet economic mechanism and acceleration
of the coun try 's  socio-economic development. Deeper
p a r t ic ip a t io n  in the World economy is  seen as necessary
for the development without which the internatio nal
in flu en ce  of the Soviet Union can only d e c lin e .  The
39. For a discussion, see Any General I. Shavrov, "Local Wars and Their Place in the Global 
Strategy of Iiperialisi", Military-Historical Journal, March 1975. Note also that 
Gorbachev and those who support hii hardly ever use the "correlation of forces" concept.
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Soviet m ilitary  buildup  of the Brezhnev years was 
publicly  defended as necessary to secure approximately 
parity  with the United States , which was at least 
im p lic itly  seen as ensuring equal se c u r ity . H is t o r ic a l ly ,  
however, parity  is  not necessary for a purely defensive  
doctrine , and Soviet pursuit  of it  in ev itab ly  led to some 
regional su p e r io r it ie s  which caused concern to US A ll ie s  
and China . Gorbachev 's  in s isten ce  on equal security  
rather than p ar ity  in armaments in fact  constitutes  a 
return to the position  held by Khrushchev in respect of 
nuclear weapons, which was that as long as the Soviet 
Union could destroy America once it  d id  not matter that 
the United States could destroy the Soviet Union several 
times o v e r , ^  and who s u b sta n tia lly  reduced Soviet 
conventional forces on the grounds that provided the 
nuclear  weapons were capable of surviv ing  a US f ir s t  
s t r ik e ,  m ilita ry  power did  not depend on the number of 
people "w earing  m ilitary  g r e a t c o a t s " . ^  The reasons for 
the abandonment of this pos it ion  by his  successors are 
beyond the scope of this sub-thesis which notes merely 
that Gorbachev has in e f fe c t  returned to i t .
This  threat perception  is lead ing  to a s h i ft  towards a 
defence- oriented strategy  in the Soviet Union. There can 
be l i t t l e  doubt that, as Jack Snyder argued, defence- 
o rien ted , lower budget, higher technology strategies
40. "Khrushchev's Speech of January 8 1961", Pravda, January 9, 1961
41. "Khrushchev's Speech of January 14 1960", Pravda, January 15, 1960
would be consistent  with G orbachev 's  economic reform at 
home. ^  Gorbachev has gone far  in e xtr ic a t in g  himself 
from the o ffe n s iv e  m ilitary  p o l ic ie s  of h is  predecessors, 
but co nsiderations  of global p restige  and domestic 
p o l it ic s  u ltim ately  set lim its  to process . I n i t i a l l y ,  he 
needed to promote h is  perception of defensive  m ilitary  
strategy  and the need for restructuring  of entrenched 
m ilitary  in t e r e s t s .  However, q u a lit a t iv e  improvements 
made while  force reductions were e ffected  could result  in 
cheaper but equally  or more e f fe c t iv e  fo rces .
3 . 3  The Impact on Soviet Security  Concerns
What e f fe c t  w i l l  Gorbachev's  new security  thinking  have 
on Soviet security  concerns about its  eastern  frontiers?
Strategic  Focus
Moscow's primary strategic  attention  has been
t r a d it io n a l ly  focussed in Europe. Since World War I I ,
Soviet  force deployments have been Europe-lopsided along
the western borders . Russian  h istory  in recent centuries
can help e xp la in  this fa ct .  It  is  from the west that the
country has su ffered  wave a fter  wave of foreign  invasions
threatening  its  very ex iste n c e ; in the seventeenth
century by the Poles , in the eighteenth  century by the
Swedes, in  the n ineteenth  century by Napoleon and his
42. See Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionisi?", 
International Security, Winter 1987/1988, Vol.12, No.3, p.118
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Grand Army, as well as twice in the present century by 
the Germans. During the German invasion  of 1941-45, over 
20 m illion  Soviet c it ize n s  lost their  l iv e s .
Since the end of World War I I ,  the existence  of the 
Soviet Union (as the Soviets see it ) has been made even 
more precarious  by the formation of the NATO security  
a ll ian c e  in Europe headed by the United  States . From the 
Soviet v iew point , the p rinc ip a l  arena of a future world 
war would most probably be on the European continent , in 
Central Europe, as in the past two world wars.
But, i f  "we base our conclusions on the course of events 
since 1 9 4 9 " ,  Geoffrey  Barraclough has pointed out, then 
" i t  would b e . . . e a s y  a n d . . .  p lau sib le  to argue that the 
world was moving not into an A tlan t ic  but into a P a c if ic  
a g e " . ^  Today we have more reason than ever to believe  
that "The P a c i f i c ' ,  as US President Ronald Reagan said  in 
October 1984 , " i s  where the future of the world l i e s " .  
From an economic perspective , the Asian- Pacific  region 
has experienced  more rapid  growth than any other region . 
For example, US trade with  Asia  topped $116 b i l l i o n  in 
1980 , surpassing  for the f i r s t  time the combined value of 
exports and imports to Europe. By the year 2000 , it  is 
expected to account for 25 per cent of the US G N P . ^
43. USSR'76, lovosti Press Agency Year Book, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 
1976, p.27
44. Geoffrey Barraclough, An Introduction to Conteiporary History, Hariondsworth: Penguin, 
1967, p.22
45. "Rivalry in the Pacific", Tiie, Noveiber 24, 1986, p.13
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Further, almost two-thirds of the w o r ld 's  population  is 
estimated to live  on the P a c if ic  rim.
The Soviet leaders now also share the view that the 
A sian- Pacific  region is to play  an ever increasing  role 
in future  international  r e la t io n s .  However, there is no 
reason to believe  that the Soviet Union w ill  s h i ft  its  
primary strategic  focus from Europe to the Asian- Pacific  
reg io n . "On the whole the P a c if ic  region  has not as yet 
been m il i t a r iz e d  to the extent Europe h a s " ,  Gorbachev 
acknowledged in his Vladivostok  speech, though "the 
p o t e n t ia l it ie s  of m il it a r is a t io n  in the P a c if ic  region  
are truly  immense, and the consequences are extremely 
d an gero u s ".  °  Europe is  undoubtedly the primary Soviet 
security  concern. Paul Dibb argues that it  is more 
important than Japan or China in  the Soviet scheme of 
th in g s . Europe has the proxim ity , resources, economic and 
m ilitary  bases , as well as h is to r ic a l  a f f i n i t y ,  in  a way 
that Japan or China do n o t .^ 7 It  may be argued that 
whatever role  the present Soviet lead ersh ip  may seek to 
play in  the Asian- Pacific  reg ion , the Soviet Union w ill  
continue to operate as a European nation  with global 
superpower interests  and with a European-based sense of 
p o l i t i c a l  m ission  rather than as an Asian- Pacific  nation . 
Apart from the strategic  importance of Europe, two
46. Gorbachev: Vladivostok Speech, p.27
47. Paul Dibb, The Soviet Onion: The Incoiplete Superpower, The Maciillan Press Ltd, 1986, 
p. 118. See also Michael HccGvire, "Soviet Naval Doctrine and Strategy" in Derek Leebaert 
(ed.), Soviet Military Thinking, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1981, pp.131-133
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overriding  reasons for continued Soviet orientation
towards Europe are its  acute economic problems and the
desire  to solve them without abandonment of " s o c ia l is m " .
F ir st ,  during the Reagan years the United States , while
remaining the w o rld 's  largest economy, lost growth
r e la t iv e ly  to Western Europe, and it  became clear  by 1989
that the massive aid  necessary to r e v it a l is e  the Soviet
Union and East European economics would come mostly from
Western Europe, not the United Sates . Secondly, in his
major speech at the 27th Party Congress,^®  Gorbachev drew
attention  to the p o s s ib i l it y  that lessons could be
learned from the European (reform ist , not revolutionary)
Social Democrats. The statement constituted  a major
doctrinal  r e tre a t ,  since Social  Democrats had previously
been denounced regularly  as traitors  to socialism . But
by 1988 , European countries with strong Social  Democratic
Parties  (s p ec ia lly  Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland  and
West Germany) had achieved economic levels  measured in
per capita  GNP which were higher than that of the United
States , while  at the same time making much more
comprehensive provision  for health  care , education and
w elfare  than is  the case in the United States (or J a p a n ) ;
and several other European countries  with sim ilar
p o l i t i c a l  trad itio n s  (France and Austria  in p articular )
were close  beh ind . For the So viets , Western Europe o ffers
a model combining the high l iv in g  standards of
48. See Mikhail Gorbachev: "Report of the Central Couittee", at the 27th CPSU Congress, 
February-March 1986
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competitive capitalism  with w elfare  provisions  comparable 
in scope (and often superior in  quality ) to those which 
are regarded as major b en efits  in a ll  s o c ia l is t  
s o c i e t i e s .49 By the end of 1989 Communist Parties  in East 
Germany, Poland and Hungary were seeking reincarnation  as 
Social Democratic P a r t ie s .  At least  towards the end of 
this century, therefore , the Asian- Pacific  region , as 
Ross Babbage noted, "continues  to be less  than a f ir s t  
p rior ity  for the Soviet U n i o n " . ^
C orrelation  of Forces
E s se n t ia l ly ,  Gorbachev has sought to enhance Soviet 
security  in Northeast Asia  by persuading potential  
adversaries  to reduce their  m ilitary  p otential  rather 
than by further  increasing  that of the Soviet Union, and 
has embarked on a foreign  policy  of retrenchment. While 
asserting  Soviet national interests  in Northeast A s ia ,  he 
has groped for a new correlation  of forces at a lower 
level to create a favourable environment for Soviet 
m odernization  at home. This  updated policy  of detente is 
most evident in his  search for an eas ier  re lat io n sh ip  
with China and Japan. Accordingly , Moscow expressed new 
understanding  of C h in a 's  defence ties  with the United
49. Data on per capita incoies extracted froi GNP/GDP/NNP and population figures in The 
Military Balance, IISS, London, 1989, pp.16-72, 84-85 and 88-89.
50. Ross Babbage, "Soviet Strategic Dilemas in the North Pacific in the 1990s", (A paper for 
the Conference on the Soviets in the Pacific in the 1990s, Canberra, Nay 1988), p.l
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States while  emphasising that it  no longer demands that 
Japan break its  security  re lat io n s h ip  with W ashington . ^
In  Moscow, China and Japan are clearly  viewed as the two 
important factors  a f fe c t in g  the regional balance of 
forces . The Soviet Union could not achieve a p osit ive  
s h i ft  without a breakthrough in b i la t e r a l  Soviet-Chinese 
and /or  Soviet-Japanese r e la t io n s .  Due to h is to r ic a l  
c o n flic ts  and r iv a lr y ,  each s t i l l  views the other with 
unease, and as long-term com petitors. Mutual d istru st  and 
suspicion  remained deep-seated and strong. However, a 
strong mutual in terest  in economic m odernisation and 
reduction  of m ilitary  expenditures brought about a 
r e la t iv e ly  speedy rapprochement in Sino-Soviet r e la t io n s , 
which were norm alised at a summit meeting in  B e ij in g  in 
May 1989 . However, prospects for Soviet-Japanese economic 
cooperation  appeared l ik e ly  to remain constrained  by the 
Northern T e r r ito r ie s  issue  and the ample opportunities  
a v a ila b le  for Japanese investment elsewhere in the Asian- 
P a c if ic  reg io n . The new co rrelatio n  of forces Gorbachev 
has attempted to achieve is  not solely  dependent upon 
Moscow's w i l l .  I t  is  also  dependent upon Chinese and 
Japanese perceptions of their  respective  national 
in te re sts  in  l ig h t  of Soviet  intentions  in  Northeast Asia  
and other regions  in the world . Further, their  t ies  with 
the United  States  are c lear ly  important factors in their  
b i l a t e r a l  r e lat io n s  with the Soviet Union.
51. Richard nations, "Moscow's New Tack", Par Eastern Econoiic Review, August 14, 1986, p.33
Troop Withdrawal
By February 15 1989 , the Soviets had withdrawn a ll  their  
forces from A fghanistan . C learly , the Soviets  had come to 
rea lise  that , as Gorbachev said  at the 27th Party 
Congress in 1986 , A fghanistan  was a "b leed in g  wound" for 
the Soviet Union. By Moscow's own estim ate, the eight- 
and-a-half-year war had cost some 13830 Soviet so ldiers  
their l i v e s . ^2 Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan  met one 
of the Chinese and American demands for improved 
re la t io n s , and was seen as a Soviet gesture to forge 
trust and soften  a h o st ile  image in the Asian- Pacific  
r e g io n .
As a concession  on a greater improvement in Sino-Soviet 
r e la t io n s , Gorbachev o ffered  a further withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from Mongolia . During his  v is i t  to China in 
May 1989 , he announced at a public  gathering  in B e ij in g  
that the Soviets  would withdraw three ground force 
d iv is io n s ,  including  two tank d iv is io n s ,  and all  a ir  
force units  from Mongolia during 1 9 8 9 - 1 9 9 0 . By June 22
1989 , the Soviets had withdrawn 22000 troops, 3000 tanks, 
about 600 a r t il le r y  systems and 50 a ircra ft  from 
M o n g o l ia .^ 4 According to the agreement reached between 
the Soviet Union and Mongolia on March 2 1990 , the
52. Pravda, August 17 1989
53. People's Daily, May 18, 1989
54. This Mas disclosed by General Moiseyev in an interview with Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' 
(International Life), International Life, Moscow, No.10, October 1989
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Soviets would withdraw a ll  their  forces from Mongolia by 
1993 , and complete the withdrawal of main combat forces 
by 1 9 9 2 . ^  In  any case, a complete withdrawal from 
Mongolia does not a lter  the m ilitary  balance with China . 
A Soviet o f f i c i a l  conceded that a Soviet m ilitary  
presence in Mongolia is not e s s e n t ia l :  " i f  there is  any 
emergency, we could move forces from the Soviet Union 
into Mongolia very q u i c k l y " . ^
As for the Soviet withdrawal from Vietnam, Gorbachev in 
h is  Vladivostok  speech appeared to have signaled  a 
condition , by saying that " i f  the United States gave up 
its  m ilitary  presence , say, in  the P h i l ip p in e s ,  we would 
not leave this  step u n a n s w e r e d " .^  This statement did  not 
even imply that i f  US withdrew from the P h ilip p in es  the 
Soviet Union would certain ly  withdraw from Vietnam. 
However, a more d e f in it e  undertaking to do so appeared in 
h is  speech at Krasnoyarsk in September 1988 .
Soviet access to m ilitary  bases in Vietnam extended the 
operational reach of the Soviet P a c if ic  Fleet  more than
4 ,0 0 0  km southwards to the South China Sea, and somewhat 
altered  the naval balance in the P a c i f i c .  From the bases 
in  Vietnam, the Soviets could in  p r in c ip le  act more 
f l e x i b l y  against  US naval units  operating in  or passing  
through the South China Sea and counter the US presence
55. Pravda, March 3, 1990
56. Quoted in Tai Ming Cheung, "Reaching for Detente", Far Eastern Econoiic Revie», June 2
1988, p.34
57. Gorbachev: Vladivostok Speech, p.36
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just  across the sea in - the P h i l ip p in e s ;  threaten and 
encircle  China on the south; project their  forces to 
either the In d ia n  Ocean or the P a c if ic  as required , thus 
reducing the need for a permanent Indian  Ocean presence, 
and more re a d ily  gain  access to the Southwest P a c i f i c .
Compared with the United S t a t e s 's  forces in the 
P h i l ip p in e s ,  however, the Soviet naval and a ir  forces in 
Vietnam are far  i n f e r io r .  The Soviet bases in  Vietnam are 
its  only m il ita r y  asset in  the region and thousands of 
kilometres away from Soviet forces while  the US position  
in the P h il ip p in e s  is  backed by several other fa ir ly  
nearby bases and fr ie n d ly  neighbouring co un tr ies . In  the 
event of a US-Soviet c o n f l ic t ,  the Soviet m ilitary  forces 
in Vietnam would be very vulnerable  for lack  of naval or 
a ir  dominance in  the region . Moreover, the Soviets would 
also  find  it  extremely d i f f i c u l t  to re in fo rce  Cam Ranh 
Bay from Vladivostok  due to its  geographic remoteness 
from the Soviet  homeland. Their  l ines  of communication 
through the Sea of Japan, the Taiwan S tra it  and the Bashi 
Channel would be vulnerable  to action  by the United 
States and a l l i e d  forces .^®
Following the detente with China in May 1989 , the
continued presence of Soviet strik e  forces in  Vietnam may
have come to appear m i l i t a r i l y  less necessary and even
p o l i t i c a l l y  em barrassing. In  the last  few weeks of 1989 ,
58. For a discussion, see Tin Huxley and Aiitav Acbarya, Security Perspectives in Southeast 
Asia", International Defence Reviei, 12/1987 , p. 1600
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the Soviets withdrew a ll  forces with o ffensive  
c a p a b il it y — strike  a ir c r a ft ,  major surface  warships and 
submarines— from Vietnam, leaving  there only the 
reconnaissance  a ircra ft  and smaller warships such as 
minehunters and s w e e p e r s .^  Provided that the maintenance 
and supply in frastructures  have been retained  (and the 
continued presence of some Soviet a ir c r a ft  and ships 
suggests that they have) the strike  a ir c r a ft  could return 
to Vietnam w ith in  hours and the warships w ith in  days of a 
decisio n  so to return them. However, their  return would 
imply the existence  of some kind of regional c r is is  and 
perhaps in t e n s ify  i t ,  so the withdrawal does imply some 
readiness  to accept further constraints  on their  actions . 
It  does not , however, imply that the linkage  made by 
Gorbachev between Soviet withdrawal from Vietnam and US 
withdrawal from the P h ilip p in es  has been abandoned— only 
complete removal of the residual  presence , including  
maintenance and supply f a c i l i t i e s ,  could have that 
e f f e c t .
Force Reductions
During  Gorbachev 's  f i r s t  f iv e  years in o f f i c e ,  the Soviet 
Union p a r t ia l l y  reversed the force buildup  in the Far 
East TV D , which was in it ia t e d  during the Brezhnev era . 
Although, according to Soviet M ilita ry  Power 1987 , Soviet 
ground forces d iv is io n s  stationed  in the Far East TVD
59. International Herald Tribune, January 16, 1990
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increased from 53 in 1985 to 57 in  1987 , ava ilab le  
Chinese sources in d ic a te d  that there was l i t t l e  increase 
in the total manpower of Soviet ground forces during this  
period of t i m e . ^  General Yazov d isc lo sed  that " in  recent 
years the Soviet  Union has not increased  its  ground 
forces in the Far E ast . Rather it  has even reduced the 
s ize  of its  ground forces along the Sino-Soviet border. 
In conducting m ilita ry  ex e rc ise s ,  we have showed 
r e s tr a in t ,  w ith  no increase  in force s ize  and scope of 
the e x e r c i s e s . " ^ 1 During his  v is i t  to B e i j in g  in 1989 , 
Gorbachev announced that apart from a cut of Soviet 
forces in Mongolia by 75 per cent, the Soviet Union would 
u n i la t e r a l ly  reduce its  armed forces deployed in its  
eastern part by 200000  men, including  120000  in the 
Soviet Far East during 1989- 1990 , and that 12 ground 
force d iv is io n s  and 11 a ir  force regiments would be 
d isbanded . 16 warships would be withdrawn from the Soviet 
P a c if ic  F l e e t . T h e r e  are evidences that Soviet force 
reductions in  the Far East TVD are now well under way. As 
General Moiseyev d isc lo sed  the headquarters of the 
Central Asian  M il ita r y  D is t r ic t  had been disbanded , so 
had four army headquarters and three army corps in the
60. For a discussion, see Xie Henqing, "The Soviet Strategy in the Asian-Pacific Region and 
Its Prospects", International Strategic Studies, No.l, March 1987, p.20
61. Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), February 23, 1988
62. "Gorbachev's Speech at a Public Gathering in Beijing, May 17 1989", People's Daily, May
18, 1989
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Far East and Turkestan M il it a r y  D is t r ic t s  up to July  1 
1 9 8 9 . 63
These reductions are the f i r s t  Soviet large cutbacks in
more than 20 years since  the mid-1960s when Soviet
m ilitary  forces increased dram atically  in the Far East .
They should be seen as Soviet  i n i t ia t iv e s  to reduce the
level of m ilitary  tension  and impart the req u is ite
dynamics to the process of c u rt a il in g  the arms race in
Northeast A s ia .  But they w il l  not s ig n if ic a n t ly  blunt the
Soviet o f fe n s iv e  c a p a b il it y .  Unlike  the reductions being
undertaken in Eastern Europe, where the emphasis is  on
the withdrawal of major q u a n tit ie s  of o ffen sive  weapons
systems, in c lu d in g  tanks, a r t i l le r y  p iec es , and combat
a ir c r a ft ,  such a pruning of s im ilar  resources has yet to
take place in  the Far E ast . Further, most of the
announced reductions  are being  undertaken along the Sino-
Soviet border, with so far  l i t t l e  change in the line-up
A
against  Japanese and US fo rc e s .  *
63. This was disclosed by General Moiseyev in an interview with Nezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' 
(International Life), International Life, Moscow, No.10, October 1989
64. According to Tai Ming Chueng, in May 1989, the Soviet Defence Minister General Yazov 
disclosed that Soviet forces in the Far East TVD totalled almost 600000 troops, 12600 
tanks and 1290 coibat aircraft—excluding non-coibat support personnel and units of the 
Strategic Rocket Forces based in the area. These forces are distributed between two any 
groups, one facing China, the other facing the US and Japan, and coiprise around 25 per 
cent of the Soviet Union's 3 lillion strong aned forces. The any group deployed against 
China nuibers 271400 troops, 820 aircraft, 8100 tanks, 10200 anoured personnel carriers 
and 9400 artillery pieces, while the any group arrayed against the US and Japan has 
326200 ten, 4500 tanks, 4100 anoured personnel carriers, 7000 artillery pieces and 870 
coibat aircraft—470 in the strike role. Quoted in Tai Ming Cheung, "Opening Gaibit— 
Soviets Relax Guard Along Asian Land Frontier", Far Eastern Econoiic Review, August 31,
1989, p.31
As for nuclear  disarmament, the Soviets are already 
elim inating  th e ir  162 SS-20 IRBMs deployed in Asia  in 
accordance with  the INF Treaty signed between the United 
States and the Soviet Union in  1 9 8 8 . According to 
Krasnaya Zvezda , the Soviets had elim inated  a ll  shorter- 
range m issiles  such as SS-23 up to October 27 1 9 8 9 . 66 The 
Soviets w il l  most probably complete the e lim ination  of 
SS-20 as promised by June 1 1 9 91 .  Given that the Soviet 
Union and the United States currently  hold about 95 per 
cent of the w o r ld 's  nuclear  weapons, any steps towards 
nuclear disarmament such as the s igning  of the INF Treaty 
by Moscow and Washington should be welcomed as more than 
an h isto r ic  agreement. For the f ir s t  time in h isto ry , the 
two superpowers have agreed to destroy an entire  class  of 
m iss ile s ,  and to permanently ban a ll  their  ground- 
launched m is s ile s  with a range of 500-5500 km. It  is 
indeed a p ra c t ic a l  step of lessen ing  the danger of a 
global nuclear  war, at least  in the short run.
Despite  a s e r ie s  of i n i t ia t iv e s  in nuclear disarmament, 
the Soviet stra te g ic  forces currently  deployed in  the Far 
East are estim ated to include  408 intercontinental  
b a l l i s t i c  m iss ile s  ( IC B M ) , 354 submarine-launched
65. The INF Treaty refers to the Treaty Between the United States of Aierica and the Union of 
the Soviet Socialist Republics on the Eliiination of Their Interiediate-Range and Shorter- 
Range Missiles, which was signed on Deceiber 8 1987, and was ratified and went into effect 
on June 1 1988. In tens of the Treaty, INF missiles with a range of 500-1000 kn are 
referred to as shorter-range missiles and those with a range of 1000-5500 ki are called 
intenediate-range missiles.
66. Irasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), October 29, 1989
b a l l is t ic  m iss ile s  (SLBM ), and 215 bom bers .^7 Taking into 
account the changes in Soviet attitudes  towards nuclear 
disarmament, it  can be assumed that the Soviets w ill  lay- 
particular  emphasis on the use of their  strategic  nuclear 
weapons as a deterrent means rather than an operational 
means, but w il l  not renounce their  c ap a b ility  of nuclear 
r e t a l ia t io n .  Given the p rerequisite  for m aintaining  
strategic  p ar ity  with the United States , it  is  u nlikely  
that the Soviets  would conduct u n ila te ra l  and large-scale 
reductions of their  strategic  forces before the START 
(strategic  arms reduction  talks) treaty is  signed between 
Moscow and Washington.
Force Buildup
A vailable  sources concerning Soviet perceptions of the 
threat environment in  Northeast Asia  r e fle c t  Moscow's 
strong concerns about the security  of its  eastern 
frontiers.**® In  the Vladivostok speech, Gorbachev said  
that "one has to state  that m il it a r is a t io n  and the 
escalation  of the war threat in this  part of the world 
are taking place  at a dangerously fast  pace. The P a c if ic  
Ocean is  turning  into an arena of m ilitary  and p o l i t ic a l  
c o n f r o n t a t i o n " . ^  " I n  a more general way", the Soviet 
Ambassador to A ustralia  Evgeni Samoteikin said  in  a
67. The Military Balance 1989-1990, IISS, London, 1989, p.41.
68. For exaiple, Marshal H.V. Ogarkov in Coiiunist of the Aried Forces, 14/1980 and Kouunist, 
July 1981
69. Gorbachev: Vladivostok Speech, p.28
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Canberra conference in 1987 , "we are concerned about the 
[Northeast Asian] region because it  is  p o ten tia lly  an 
area of m ilitary  threat against  us. That m ilitary  threat 
results  from American m ilitary  presence in Japan, in 
South K o r e a . . .a n d  also results  from the policy  of Japan 
i t s e l f  which has recently  stepped over the threshold of 
responsible  moderation in increasing  its  m ilitary  
f o r c e s " . ^  This remark has made it  clear that large 
Soviet forces w ill  s t i l l  be needed to deter the perceived 
th r e a t .
In this context, m odernization  of Soviet forces in the 
Far East is  l ik e ly  to continue . Moscow's p r io r ity  w ill  be 
given to q ua lita t iv e  rather than q uantitative  
improvement. Western defence m inisters  and in te ll ig e n c e  
o rganisatio n , according to Gunther Wagenlehner, confirm 
unanimously that Soviet procurement programmes continue 
to modernise the Soviet armed forces with o ffen sive  
w e a p o n s . E v e n  after  1987 , new p rinc ip a l  surface 
combatants, including  a K i r o v - c l a s s  nuclear-powered 
guided-m issile c ru ise r ,  a S o v r e m e n n y y - c lass  guided- 
m issile  destroyer , and two U d a l o y - c lass guided-m issile 
destroyers , continued to jo in  the Soviet P a c if ic  F leet . 
Soviet a ir  and a ir  defence forces received  their  latest  
Mig-31 F o x h o u n d ,  Su-27 F l a n k e r  f igh ter  a ircra ft  with a
70. Evgeni Saioteikin, "The Goals of Vladivostok", in Ratesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer 
(ed.), The Soviet Union as an Asian Pacific Pover: Iiplications of Gorbachev's 1986 
Vladivostok Initiative, Westview Press, Naciillan Australia, 1987, p.18
71. Gunther Vagenlehner, "Long Road for New Soviet Doctrine", Jane's Defence leekly, November
25, 1989, p.1175
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true look-down/shoot-down cap ab ility  and Su-25 F r o g f o o t  
ground-attack a i r c r a f t .7 ^ Moscow's emphasis seems to be 
placed more on naval and air  forces than on ground 
forces . Moscow's focus on modernization  of the Soviet 
forces is  clearly  aimed at making an e f fe c t iv e ,  
independent, i f  sm aller, f ig h t in g  force against  worst- 
case e v entu alit ies  in the eastern  fr o n t ie rs .
Undoubtedly, during Gorbachev 's  perestroika  years ,
changes in  Soviet thinking  on security  and m ilitary
doctrine are taking p lace . The Soviet armed forces may be
restructured  along the "purely  d e fe n s iv e "  l ines  promised
by Gorbachev. Yet, the period of two years announced by
Gorbachev to re a l ise  the tran sit io n  from an o ffen sive  to
a defensive  m ilitary  doctrine  seems u n r e a lis t ic  as this
tra n sitio n  w ill  require the transformation of the entire
Soviet m ilitary  policy  and rad ical  changes in a ll
train ing  and service  manuals, besides much larger
reductions in Soviet m ilitary  power. The whole process,
as one Soviet  colonel and professor of m ilitary  science
argued, would be p ossible  in  three stages and could be
7
completed by the year 2000 .  J Even m  the wake of
72. See Soviet Military Power 1987, US Governient Printing Office Washington, 1987, p.18 and 
pp.68-69, The Military Balance 1989-1990, IISS, London, 1989, pp.41-42, and Jane's Defence 
leekly, March 3, 1990
73. According to Gunther Uagenlehner, a Soviet colonel and professor of lilitary science 
Vladiiir Nasarenko wrote in a Military bulletin that the transition to a defensive 
lilitary doctrine would take three stages and at least 12 years. During the fist phase 
(1991-1994), the difference and asynetries in tens of force levels and major ans would 
be eradicated. During the second phase (1994-1997), the forces would be reduced by 25 per 
cent and additional weapons systeis have to be reduced against the background of these 
cuts to realise the principle of sufficiency. The final phases (1997-2000) would see the
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unilateral  and possibly  negotiated  reductions , Soviet 
forces in the Far East w ill  remain large for the 
foreseeable future . These forces w ill  continue to provide 
the Soviet Union with impressive c a p a b il it ie s  for h ig h ­
speed "o ffe n s iv e "  actions in  the Far East .
reduction of forces to a defensive character. Jane's Defence leekly, Noveiber 25, 1989, 
p.1175
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Chapter 4 
Implications for the Power Balance
Gorbachev 's  new impetus for improving relatio ns  with 
China and Japan presaged i f  not a change in basic  Soviet 
foreign  p o lic y , at least  a major departure in the style 
of Soviet diplom acy. Faced with severe domestic problems 
and mounting d i f f i c u l t i e s  abroad, the Soviet Union could 
no longer a ffo rd  to d isregard  China and Japan. In 
Northeast A s ia ,  a sh ift  in  the balance of power to the 
Soviet U n io n 's  advantage depended on a breakthrough in 
Sino-Soviet and /or  Japanese-Soviet r e la t io n s .
This chapter d iscusses  the prospects for improved 
b i l a t e r a l  Sino-Soviet and Japanese-Soviet relatio ns  in 
l ight  of recent developments, as well as Chinese and 
Japanese perceptions of Soviet threats to their 
respective  security  environments. In  a d d it io n , as US 
policy  is an important factor  in the regional balance of 
power, Soviet-American re lat io n s  and their  impact on 
regional  security  and s t a b i l i t y ,  as well as the prospects 
for US regional  p osit ion  w i l l  also  be examined.
4 .1  China
After  Gorbachev came to power in 1985 , contacts between 
China and the Soviet Union increased  noticeably  in nearly
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every sphere, p a r t ic u la r ly  trade . A long-term trade 
agreeme.it for the 1986-90 period was signed in Moscow 
during Chinese Vice Premier Yao Y i l i n ' s  v is i t  in July
1986 , providing for a growth of b i la t e r a l  trade to US$ 5- 
6 b i l l io n  by the 1 9 90 s — roughly double the projected 
figure  for 1 9 8 5 . ^ Agreement was also  reached for 
cooperation in  constructing seven new projects  and 
reconstructing  seventeen old Soviet- built in s ta lla t io n s  
in China, mostly in the m etallurgy, coal and chemical 
in d u str ie s .  This  was the f i r s t  Soviet technical 
assistance  to China since  the r i f t  in relatio ns  in the 
early  1960s . Although commercial and economic contacts 
have increased  considerably  over the past few years , 
Sino-Soviet trade s t i l l  accounts for only four per cent 
of C h in a ’ s total trade , and less than two per cent of the 
Soviet U n i o n 's .  Japan is  C h in a 's  largest  trading partner 
with exchanges worth US$ 1 7 .2  b i l l i o n  in 1986 , followed 
by the United States and other Western c o u n t r i e s . ^
Gorbachev's  p olicy  of new p o l it ic a l  thinking  has also 
enabled the Soviets  to abandon the position  of their  
predecessors that problems in Sino-Soviet relations  were 
actually  created  by China . The Soviets have indicated  
that they no longer regard the Soviet model of socialism  
as superior and a model to be copied by a ll  s o c ia l is t  
countries . Moscow's increasing  news reports on Chinese
1. People's Daily, July 10, 1987
2. Fang Xukuan, "China's Foreign Trade", International Trade Report, Beijing, Winter 1987, 
p.20
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economic reform suggest that , as Gorbachev said  in his  
Vladivostok speech, "the  better  our r e la t io n s , the more 
we shall be able  to share our e x p e r ie n c e " ;^  something 
which might be of p o l i t i c a l  advantage to both the Soviet 
Union and China .
Following from Gorbachev 's  Vladivostok  speech in 1986 , 
the Soviets sought to maintain  the momentum towards a 
rapid improvement in Sino-Soviet r e la t io n s .  In the b e l ie f  
that a Sino-Soviet summit would enable the two leaders to 
find  a "mutually acceptable so lutio n "  to their  problems, 
Gorbachev again  proposed a summit with Deng Xiaoping in 
an interview  with  the Chinese journal Liaowang (Outlook) 
in December 19 87 ,  the f i r s t  such opportunity given to a 
Soviet general secretary for almost th irty  y e a r s .4 
B e ijin g  responded with a denial  that a summit was 
imminent, and at the same time re iterated  the need to 
overcome the "three  major obstacles " before there could 
be a s ig n i f ic a n t  improvement in p o l i t ic a l  relations  with 
the Soviet Union , in c lu din g  a resumption of party-to- 
party r e l a t i o n s .^  B e i j i n g 's  cautious response to 
Gorbachev's  i n it ia t iv e s  was clearly  based on its  b e l ie f
3. Gorbachev: Vladivostok Speech, p.30
4. In November 1987, in a meeting with the Zambian leader Kaunda, Gorbachev for the first 
time proposed a Sino-Soviet summit, clearly in response to Deng Xiaoping's remark on 
Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech in an interview with an American television network on 
September 8 1986. In the interview Deng Xiaoping was quoted as saying that "to be frank, I 
am over 82, already advanced in years and determined to make no more trips abroad. 
However, if the [Kampuchea] obstacle is removed, I will break the rule and go to meet 
Gorbachev anywhere in the Soviet Union". For further details, see People's Daily, 
September 8, 1986
5. People's Daily, January 12 1988
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in  the need for "actio ns  not words" on the "three  major 
o b s t a c le s " .  In  the Chinese view, the obstacles  were not 
merely a r e fle c t io n  of C h in a 's  wider d iffe re n c e s  with the 
Soviet Union, but were the main elements of what the 
Chinese saw as a Soviet encirclement through m ilitary  
presence from the north, west and south. These were 
genuinely  serious issues  for C h in a 's  national security , 
not merely a negotiating  ploy.
Despite  this  d e n ia l ,  B e ij in g  also had a growing interest  
in rapprochement with Moscow, even i f  it  appeared to be 
the less keen of the two. Gorbachev's  i n i t i a t i v e s ,  seen 
from B e i j in g ,  indicated  that the Soviets were prepared to 
give ground on the Chinese-claimed "three  major 
o b s t a c le s " ,  by withdrawing all  forces from Afghanistan  
and Mongolia , and pressuring  Vietnam to withdraw from 
Kampuchea before  the end of 1989 . The Soviets also  showed 
w ill in g n e ss  to d iscuss  in the Sino-Soviet "norm alization " 
talks the Kampuchea issu e , which B e i j in g  claimed to be 
the main obstacle  blocking  the norm alization  of relations  
between the two countries . A ll  these led to a Chinese 
perception  of in creas in gly  benign Soviet strategic  
intentions  in  A s ia ,  and gave s u f f ic ie n t  ju s t i f ic a t io n  for 
a summit meeting.
It  was clear  that no s ig n if ic a n t  breakthrough in Sino- 
Soviet re lat io n s  could take place without a summit 
meeting between Gorbachev and the Chinese lead ersh ip . In
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19 87 ,  B e ij in g  and Moscow s t i l l  had fundamentally 
d if fe r e n t  attitu des  towards a summit, Moscow seeing the 
Chinese-claimed obstacles  as issues which should be 
solved at a summit, whereas B e ij in g  saw them as issues 
created by the Soviets , which must be resolved before a 
summit. Ultim ately , the Soviets appeared to have accepted 
the Chinese viewpoints ; the process of u n ilate ra l  
concessions f i r s t  begun in the Vladivostok speech was 
confirmed, and relatio ns  were "form ally  norm alised" at 
the B e ij in g  summit meeting in May 1989 . The summit 
meeting— the f i r s t  in 30 years since Khrushchev 's  last 
v is i t  to B e i j in g  in 1959 , as Deng Xiaoping and Gorbachev 
announced, had "put an end to the unpleasant past and 
opened up a new era in the b ila t e r a l  Sino-Soviet
£
r e l a t io n s " . °
Chinese Perceptions of Soviet  Threat
C h in a 's  primary national o bjective  is internal 
m odernization . As Deng Xiaoping  indicated  e ar lier  in
1988 , this  requires  a peaceful internatio nal  environment 
for at least  50 y e a r s .7 C le ar ly ,  a peaceful environment 
and an easing  of tension  with the Soviet Union are 
conducive to C h in a 's  declared  p r io r ity  of economic
6. People's Daily, May 17, 1989
7. These reiarks were lade on January 20, 1988 when Deng Xiaoping let with Norwegian Priie 
Minister Ms Gro Harlem Brundtland who was on a visit to Beijing. For further details, see 
Ta lung Pao, January 21, 1988, p.3
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m odernization , by reducing the need for heavy m ilitary  
e xp e n d itu re .
In  recent years, the b ila t e r a l  Sino-Soviet re latio n s  have 
r e la x e d , and C h in a 's  northern borders have become more 
stab le  and less l ik e ly  to be disrupted  by the Soviets 
than at any time since the 1960s . Yet because of the 
h is to r ic a l  deep antagonism between China and the Soviet 
Union , nothing in Soviet overtures w ill  a lter  C h in a 's  
basic  perception of the Soviet Union as a potential  
threat to its  security  and s t a b i l i t y .  It  is  most l ik e ly  
that China w ill  continue to regard the Soviet Union as a 
threat even though the Soviets  b e l ie v e , as Gorbachev 
asserted , "a danger and obstacle  on the road of peace and 
progress— misunderstanding and occasional enmity between 
the two big  s o c ia l ist  countries , the Soviet Union and 
China--has been removed".®
However, threat perception  is  not a f ix e d  quantity . The 
a b i l i t y  to pose a threat depends on the perceived 
ca p ab il ity  to do so, but the seriousness  with which it  is 
regarded depends on perceived in te n t io n s . Geographical 
proxim ity , a history of often  h o st ile  re latio n s  including  
past Russian expansion into te r r ito r ie s  h is t o r ic a l ly  
regarded as subject to C h in a , ^ Soviet attempts to assert
8. Pravda, February 23, 1989
9. During the aid-nineteenth century, taking swift advantage of chaos in China as a result of 
the wars with imperialist powers of Europe, the Russians imposed a series of "unequal 
treaties" on Manchu China. They seized a territory of »ore than 600,000 sq km north of the 
Heilong River (Amur River) and south of the Outer Hinggan Mountains (Stanovoi Mts.) in 
1858, another territory of about 400,000 sq ki east of the Ussuri River (including the
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doctrinal primacy w ithin  Communism, more recent 
perceptions of Soviet policy  as inherently  expansionist  
and as engaged in superpower collusion  with the United 
S tates , and the presence of large and technologically  
better-equipped Soviet armed forces along the Sino-Soviet 
border, in  Mongolia and in Vietnam are the substance of 
Chinese perception  of a Soviet threat . From the Soviet 
s id e , the remoteness of the Soviet Far East from main 
Soviet centres , C h in a 's  proximity to i t ,  the paucity  and 
v u ln e r a b il ity  of its  l ines  of communication, border 
disputes in which China often displayed  m ilitancy , Maoist 
challenges to Soviet doctrinal  hegemony w ithin  
international  communism and tendencies in late  Maoist and 
post-Mao periods  towards what was seen in  Moscow as a d e  
f a c t o  a l l ia n c e  with the United States and Japan make up 
the essence of the Soviet perception  of a threat from 
China. In the post-Vladivostok period , many of these 
factors have dim inished in importance, so that each 
country 's  perception  of threat posed by the other is  now 
much less  acute than it  was in  the early  1980s . However, 
each remains capable of damaging the interests  of the 
other. That mutual threat perception  has dim inished does 
not therefore  mean that it  has ceased to e x is t ,  or that 
its  reduction  has become ir r e v e r s ib le .
Kurile Islands) in 1860, and yet another territory of more than 440,000 sq kn in western 
China in 1864, totalling about 1.5 lillion sq ki of China's territory under the Treaty of 
Aigun and the Treaty of Peking. For further details see Shi Da, A Short History of Tsarist 
Russia Against China, Beijing Zhouhua Shuju, China, 1976, pp.23-53. See also Qi Hen, 
China: A General Survey, Beijing Foreign Languages Press, 1979, p.32
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Even after  the completion of the current troop reductions 
in the Far East, in the Chinese view , the Soviets s t i l l  
have overwhelming superiority  over China in strategic  
nuclear  forces, and the quality  of their  conventional 
forces is higher than that of the Chinese , although China 
retains  overwhelming superiority  in force s i z e .  Despite  
the Soviet leadership  stress  on the non-aggressive 
m ilitary  posture of its  forces along the Sino-Soviet 
border, analysts in B e i j in g  tend to b eliev e  that while 
the intentions  of restructuring  may be genuine , Soviet 
forces s t i l l  have a formidable o ffe n s iv e  c a p a b il it y .  
Nevertheless , China believes  that the Soviet m ilitary  
forces now opposite China are not s u f f ic ie n t  to undertake 
a medium-to-large level conventional war without 
substantial  reinforcements from the European USSR, 
reinforcements which are most u nlik ely  to be ava ilab le  in 
a worst-case scenario  of a two-front war. A full- scale  
m ilitary  invasion  and occupation of China , as Paul Dibb 
argued, is  far beyond Soviet m ilitary  c a p a b i l i t ie s ,  even 
if  the Soviet Union were to devote most of its  m ilitary  
assets to such a v e n t u r e . ^
During the 1989 summit meeting, both sides  agreed to 
"take measures to reduce the m ilitary  forces deployed 
along the Sino-Soviet border ,  to the lowest level 
appropriate to the normal good-neighbourly relations
10. Paul Dibb, The Soviet Onion: The Incoiplete Superpower, The Nacnillan Press Ltd, 1986, 
pp.165-166
between the two countries".-^1 Diplomatic and m ilitary  
experts from B e ij in g  and Moscow have met and held two 
rounds of talks  concerning the p rinc ip les  of mutually 
reducing the level of m ilitary  presence along the Sino- 
Soviet border and e stab lish in g  confidence- building  
measures in the m ilitary  s p h e r e . ^  It  is  most l ik e ly  that 
an agreement w ill  be reached on the p r in c ip le s  governing 
force reductions  along both sides  of the Sino-Soviet 
border. I f  this  takes place , the level of m ilitary  
confrontation  between the two countries  w ill  be further 
decreased . However, Given Moscow's current internal 
preoccupations, there is  l i t t l e  prospect of large Soviet 
force reductions  in the near future . Soviet superiority  
over China w il l  remain in m ilitary  equipment and 
technological le v e l .  U ntil  there is a s ig n if ic a n t  Soviet 
force reduction  along the border, that i s ,  scaling  back 
to the force level before  1964 , the Soviet m ilitary  
threat to China remains a real one.
Prospects
Within  a period  of four decades starting  from 1949 , Sino- 
Soviet re lat io n s  have evolved from a state  of a l l ia n c e ,  
through h o s t i l i t y ,  to a state of good-neighbourliness. 
Obviously , the B e ij in g  summit meeting of May 1989 led to 
fu ll  norm alization  of Sino-Soviet r e la t io n s ,  including
11. People's Daily, Nay 19, 1989
12. People's Daily, Noveiber 28, 1989 and February 23, 1990
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party-to-party r e la t io n s .  Both B e ij in g  and Moscow showed 
w illin gn ess  to end tree decades of Sino-Soviet 
estrangement by "looking  forward and doing more p ractical  
work to expand b i la t e r a l  Sino-Soviet r e l a t i o n s " .  Without 
B e i j i n g 's  new viewpoints on the international  p o l i t ic a l  
order and Moscow's new p rinc ip les  of p o l i t ic a l  th inking , 
China and the Soviet Union could hardly  have moved close 
to each other in  their  common interests  of reform as said  
in China or perestroika  in the Soviet Union. However, 
neither  B e i j in g  nor Moscow is  l ik e ly  to duplicate  the 
m ilitary - p olit ical  a ll ia n c e  re latio n s  of the 1950s , and 
the confrontation  re latio n s  of the 1960s and 1970s . Both 
sides stated that the development of their  state-to-state 
relations  w ill  be based on "the general p rinc ip les  of 
respect for sovereignty and t e r r it o r ia l  in t e g r it y , non­
aggression , non-interference in each o t h e r 's  internal 
a f f a i r s ,  equality  and mutual b e n e f it ,  and peaceful 
c o e x i s t e n c e " .1^ C learly , a so lid  foundation for relations  
between the two countries is peaceful coexistence  in the 
p o l i t ic a l  f ie l d  and equality  and mutual b en efit  in  the 
f ie l d  of economy and cooperation .
The norm alisation  of re lat io n s  between China and the 
Soviet Union in 1989 indeed offered  grounds for hope that 
"a  brand new stage" would be opened up in  Sino-Soviet 
r e la t io n s ,  including  party-to-party r e la t io n s .  But, the 
brand new stage in Sino-Soviet r e la t io n s ,  as Chinese and
13. People's Daily, May 19, 1989
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Soviet leaders ant ic ipa ted , was soon overshadowed by the 
subsequent "B e ij in g  Event" and drastic  East European 
changes in the latter  part of 1989 . The reasons for all  
these happenings are beyond the scope of this  sub-thesis 
which notes merely that they w ill  have an adverse e ffect  
on the extent of improved Sino-Soviet r e la t io n s .
There are signs of increasing  divergence between the two 
countries  in  the fundamental attitudes  towards questions 
of in te rn al  p o l it ic a l  order, p a r t ic u la r ly  over the role 
to be played by the Communist Party . While  each asserts 
its  in ten tio n  not to in ter fere  in the o t h e r 's  internal 
a f f a i r s ,  it  is not p ossible  for e ither  to prevent 
p art ic ip a n ts  in internal  power struggles  c it in g  the 
example of the other as a model to be followed or 
avoided , br inging  about a kind of interference  by proxy. 
In the immediate aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown, 
Gorbachev reacted very cau tio u sly . However, he made it  
clear at the session  of the Supreme Soviet in  September 
1989 that he did  not see use of m ilitary  force as a 
v iab le  a ltern ative  to p o l i t ic a l  r e fo rm .14 The Chinese 
lead ersh ip  has quietly  voiced concern over the recent 
p o l i t i c a l  changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 
and apparently  found the renunciation  of the leading  role 
of the Communist Party in some countries to be 
id e o lo g ic a l ly  unacceptable . In  December 1989 , General
14. See "Gorbachev's Opening Speech at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, September 25 
1989", Pravda, September 26, 1989
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Secretary J iang  Zemin stated in a meeting with a high- 
level Soviet delegation  that B e i j in g  had to express 
concern over developments in other s o c ia l is t  countries , 
but that it  would not in te r fe re  in their  internal 
a f f a i r s .  With regard to C h in a 's  reform, he asserted that 
while  aiming at improving socialism , it  must adhere to 
the leadership  of the Communist Party of C h i n a .15 By 
encouraging p o l i t ic a l  p luralism  and greater public  
accountability  for communist leaders in some East 
European countries , a Chinese scholar of international  
relations  warned that Gorbachev might clash  head-on with 
the Chinese leadership  on ideo lo g ica l  g r o u n d s ,1 ^ thereby 
ra is in g  a danger of a new r i f t  opening up. But so far 
there is no reason to expect that the divergence between 
B e ijin g  and Moscow would be transformed into an open 
polemical dispute  as happened in  the early  1960s .  Neither 
B e ij in g  nor Moscow has showed any sign of a lter in g  the 
fundamental basis  of Sino-Soviet r e la t io n s , although they 
appear to be careful not to move too close to each other. 
How far fu l l  norm alisation  of relations  w ill  go for the 
foreseeable  future appears to depend to a large extent on 
the convergence between B e i j i n g 's  new international  
p o l i t ic a l  order and Moscow's new p o l i t ic a l  th inking .
There can be no doubt that both China and the Soviet 
Union have a strong in terest  in better b i la t e r a l
15. People's Daily, December 29, 1989
16. Shao Henguang, "China's Relations with the Superpowers", Survival, Volume XXXII, No.2, 
IISS, March/April 1990, p.165
107
r e la t io n s . Both sides  stand to gain  from a reduction  of 
tension along their  common border and from increased 
trade . Against  this  background, Sino-Soviet re lat io n s  can 
be expected to develop s te ad ily  in the f ie ld s  of economic 
cooperation , cultural exchanges and other contacts , 
including  low-level m ilitary  contacts . Soviet border 
trade and technical assistance  are l ik e ly  to be enhanced 
in coming years . This w il l  be a useful Soviet complement 
to Western contributions  to C h in a 's  m odernization . But 
given the economic and technological gap between the USSR 
and the West, as Ross Babbage noted, they are unlik ely  to 
approach the scale  of Chinese-Western economic 
c o o p e r a t io n .17 Relying  on the Soviet economy, in  the 
Chinese view , may slow down C h in a 's  m odernisation , and 
may well deprive it  of other b e n e fits  that it  stands to 
gain  from economic cooperation  with the West. B e ij in g  
w ill  have to balance improved relatio ns  with Moscow 
against  C h in a 's  other p o l i t i c a l  and strategic  in te re sts .
4 . 2  Japan
Japanese-Soviet re latio n s  have been generally  cool and 
lacking  in harmony since the end of World War I I .  Due to 
Moscow's openly contemptuous and tough p o lic ie s  towards 
Japan , according to Kazuo Ogawa, contacts have never been 
marked by genuine f r ie n d l in e s s  although diplomatic
17. Ross Babbage, "Soviet Strategic Dileuaas in the North Pacific in the 1990s", (A paper for 
the Conference on the Soviets in the Pacific in the 1990s, Canberra, Kay 1988), p.11
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relations  were restored between the two countries  in
1 ft
1956 . ° Indeed , the view of many Western s p e c ia l is t s  is 
that Moscow's diplom atic  approach in its  dealings  with 
Japan has been " l i t t l e  short of a d i s a s t e r " . 1^
Since Gorbachev took o f f ic e  in 1985 , there have appeared 
some developments in Japanese-Soviet relatio ns  
in d ic a t in g , as Gorbachev noted in  his  Vladivostok  speech, 
"a turn for the b e t t e r " .  The most s ig n if ic a n t  was the 
reciprocal v is i t s  of both countries ' foreign  m inisters  in 
1986 . Eduard Shevardnadze 's  v i s i t  to Tokyo was the f ir s t  
by a Soviet foreign  m inister  since  Andrey Gromyko went to 
Japan in 19 76 .  This c learly  was a major step towards 
improved Soviet-Japanese r e la t io n s .  Further, Gorbachev 
announced on A pril  7 1988 that he would consider a v is i t  
to Japan. I f  this  takes p lace , it  w il l  be an
unprecedented gesture , by the Soviet U n io n 's  highest
o o
leader, to post-war Soviet-Japanese r e la t io n s .  u
There can be l i t t l e  doubt that , seen from both Tokyo and 
Moscow, closer  Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation 
proposed by Gorbachev in h is  Vladivostok speech is of 
mutual in t e r e s t .  The Soviets need sophisticated  economic
18. Razuo Ogava, "[Soviet] Economic Relations with Japan", in Rodger Svearingen, Siberia and 
the Soviet Far East, Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, 1987, p.158
19. See, for example, Ross Babbage, "Soviet Strategic Dilemmas in the North Pacific in the 
1990s", (A paper for the Conference on the Soviets in the Pacific in the 1990s, Canberra, 
Nay 1988), p.6
20. »hat is worth noting is that over the past four decades, Japanese Prime Ministers have 
visited the Soviet Union on four occasions (among these, the funerals of Soviet leaders), 
but not one Soviet top leader had expressed a desire to visit Japan despite repeated 
invitations from Japan. Although Gorbachev's proposed visit to Tokyo had not materialised 
by 1990, Moscow has not cancelled the visit.
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management and technical know-how from Japan more than 
ever before  for economic r e v i t a l iz a t io n  at home. For the 
Japanese, development of economic relatio ns  with the 
Soviet Union also  has a strong a ttra ctio n . Kazuo Ogawa 
argues that economic and trade relations  are at the base 
of Japanese-Soviet r e la t io n s ;  Japanese-Soviet relations
without economic and trade lin k s  would be very fr a g ile
p  -l
indeed . x It  is  c lear  that Japan hopes to use economic 
leverage as a p o l i t i c a l  means to cool off  ra ised  tensions 
in Soviet-Japanese r e la t io n s ,  and to continue talks with 
the Soviets  on the return of the northern is lands  to 
Japanese sovereignty . A new Soviet-Japanese trade 
agreement for 1986-90 was signed in 1986 , including  
provisions  for talks on further  S iberian  development. A 
jo int  Japanese-Soviet commission on science and 
technology, in a ctive  since  the Soviet invasion  of
9 9
A fghanistan , was revived  m  the same year. *
The T e r r it o r ia l  Issue
The Japanese must have paused for thought over 
Gorbachev 's  remarks about promoting economic cooperation 
" in  a quiet  atmosphere free from problems of the p a s t " .  
The remark suggested that there was l i t t l e  change in the
substance of Soviet policy  towards Japan over the pending
t
21. Kazuo Ogava, "[Soviet] Economic Relations with Japan", in Rodger Svearingen, Siberia and 
the Soviet Far Bast, Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, 1987, p.159
22. For further details, see Hiroshi Kiaura, "Soviet Focus on the Pacific", Probleis of 
Coiiunis«, Vol.XXXVI, Nay-June 1987, p.7
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t e r r it o r ia l  issue  despite  a d is t in c t  change in the tone. 
Gorbachev s t i l l  wanted to obtain  what Moscow needed from 
Japan, without making any p o l i t ic a l  concessions in 
r e t u r n .
There are a number of major impediments to improved 
Japanese-Soviet r e la t io n s , such as the Northern 
T e r r it o r ia l  iss u e , J a p a n 's  close defence a ll ian c e  with 
the United States and the presence of US forces and 
bases , some with nuclear-capable a ir c r a ft  or submarines, 
in Japan. However, none is more fundamental and 
intractable  than the t e r r it o r ia l  issue , which Japan 
considers  to be the most important obstacle  to the 
norm alization  of Japanese-Soviet r e la t io n s .
When the Soviet Union and Japan re- established  diplom atic  
re latio n s  in 1 9 56 ,  the Soviets agreed "to  transfer  to 
Japan the Habomai is land s  and the island  of Shikotan, the 
actual transfer  of these islands  to take place a fter  the 
conclusion  of a peace t r e a t y " . ^  in 1960 , when the 
revised  US-Japan Security  Treaty was concluded, however, 
the Soviets claimed that no te r r ito r ie s  would be returned 
u ntil  a ll  US troops had been withdrawn from Japan. Since 
then, l i t t l e  progress has been made towards a settlem ent, 
due to Soviet re fusa l  to consider any Japanese claim on 
the return of a ll  four islands  (see Figure 4 . 1 ) .  Nor has 
a formal peace treaty  ever been signed .
23. Quoted in Brian Cloughley, "Bring the boys hoae froi the Kuriles, too", Far Eastern 
Econoiic Review, July 7 1988, p.28
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Like his  predecessors , Gorbachev also faces a serious 
dilemma in Soviet policy  towards Japan. Gorbachev's  
unw illingness  to make a major concession on the 
te r r it o r ia l  issue  suggests that the Soviets  may have the 
following  concerns.
In view of J a p a n 's  geographic location  and the US 
m ilitary  presence on Ja p a n 's  te rr ito ry , the Soviets 
clearly  appreciate  the p otential  role  Japan could play in 
the event of a US-Soviet co n flic t  as "a  springboard from 
which the United States can launch attacks against  the 
Soviet homeland [ a n d ] . . . a  sh ield  behind which the United 
States navy can fig h t  P a c if ic  b a t t l e s " . V l a d i v o s t o k  is 
a major port for the deployment of surface  ships and 
nuclear-armed submarines, yet is  only a 30-minute f l ig h t  
from American and Japanese a ir  bases .
As long as the Soviets  believe  that Japan might i t s e l f  
use or allow the United States to use the northern 
is land s  for m ilitary  purposes, it  is  very u nlikely  that 
they would return them to Japan. This  much was stated by 
Khrushchev as long ago as 1964 :
. . . w e  would give these island s  to Japan only 
a fter  we had signed a peace treaty with you. 
B esides , the U . S . A .  has its  m ilitary  bases in 
J a p a n , . . . i t  regards Japan i t s e l f  as a strategic
24. 9.M. Arkin and D. Chappell, "Forward Offensive Strategy: Raising the Stakes in the 
Pacific", World Policy Journal, Vol.11, No.3, Sunier 1985, p.482
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base in its struggle against the Soviet 
Union... If we gave you Habomai and Shikotan in 
such a situation, your fishermen would be 
pleased... But the American imperialists ... have 
the opportunity to build on your islands military 
bases aimed against the Soviet Union. We do not 
want to strengthen American imperialism through 
our concessions to Japan".
Secondly, the Soviets do not see Japan as a direct
military threat at present, but they are concerned about
the future. According to one Soviet argument, Japan has
"a powerful military-industrial potential, which makes it
possible for Japanese ruling circles to build up a
multimillion-man army and equip it with advanced military
technology".26 Taking into account J a p a n ’s economic
capabilities, Soviet officials alleged in private
discussion that as an immediate neighbour of the Soviet
0 7Union, Japan could be a threat "in the long t e rm". ' 
Japan's adoption of a more active and forward defence 
posture, seen from Moscow, is also one of the most 
worrying trends, although it is the US-Japan security 
relationship, rather than Japan's military buildup, that 
is of most current concern.
25. Quoted in Young C. Kin, "Japanese-Soviet Relations: Interaction of Politics, Economics and 
National Security", The lashington Papers, Vol.2, No.21, Beverly Hills and London: Sage 
Publications, 1974, p.35
26. LI. lvkov, "Japanese Militarism Rears Its Head", Par Eastern Affairs, No.3, 1978, p.46
27. This point is argued by Paul Dibb, The Soviet Onion: The Incoiplete Superpower, The 
Macmillan Press Ltd, 1986, p.119
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Thirdly and the most importantly in the short term, the 
disputed islands are also part of the Kurile island 
chain, separating the Sea of Okhotsk from the Pacific. 
Geographically, the Kuriles constitute a protective 
shield for the Soviet Far East. The islands, while of 
small economic value, are of great strategic and defence 
importance to the Soviet Union. They command important 
straits connecting the Soviet SSBN "bastion" in the Sea 
of Okhotsk with the Pacific Ocean. The Soviets are not 
unmindful that in the event of war, the northwestern 
Pacific, particularly the Sea of Okhotsk, the Sea of 
Japan and the western Bering Sea, would be the scene of 
strategic importance. The Soviet naval forces have to 
keep the US Seventh Fleet and its allied naval forces 
from approaching Soviet territory, and protect Soviet 
ballistic-missile submarine forces in the Sea of Okhotsk 
primarily targeted on the United States. Increases in US 
naval forces under the Reagan Administration, the 
adoption of a forward naval policy which includes attacks 
on the "mutually assured destruction" force represented 
by the Soviet SSBNs in the Sea of Okhotsk, and deployment 
of US Trident SSBNs in the Pacific all increased the 
Soviet perception of a US-Japan threat from the Pacific. 
Continued Soviet control of these straits, according to 
Ross Babbage, provides important protection for the 
bastion and, in particular, inhibits Western naval and
114
air access.2 ® The Soviet Navy's sensitivity to these 
strategic passages can be readily understood.
Finally, a genuine breakthrough in bilateral Japanese- 
Soviet relations depends on a mutually acceptable 
solution to the territorial issue. Even if the Japanese 
might be prepared to compromise in a relaxed 
international climate for the Soviets to return some or 
all of the disputed islands to Japan this move could open 
a Pandora's box of claims to be laid for the return of 
other Soviet-occupied territories. Until Gorbachev, the 
Soviets stuck rigidly to the "principle of frontier 
unchangeability" as stated in a 1983 article by the 
editor of Pravda:
Since the end of the war, our country has held to 
the p r i n c i p l e  o f  f r o n t i e r  u n c h a n g e a b i l i t y . . .if 
this principle of unchangeability collapses, 
there will be disputes all over the world and 
those disputes may even escalate into a world 
war. [emphasis added] 29
This rigidity was undoubtedly prompted in part by Chinese 
government statements during the 1960s which made it 
clear that Beijing considered the seizure of hundreds of 
thousands of square kilometres of Chinese territory by 
Czarist Russia, including the region encompassing 
Vladivostok, as imposed on China by "unequal treaties".
28. Ross Babbage, "Soviet Strategic Dilemmas in the North Pacific in the 1990s", (A paper for 
the Conference on the Soviets in the Pacific in the 1990s, Canberra, May 1988), p.8
29. Quoted in Paul Dibb, The Soviet Onion: The Incomplete Superpoier, The Macmillan Press Ltd, 
1986, p.119. For more details see Asahi Shiibun, Tokyo, May 11, 1983, p.4.
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It was probably motivated even more by the possibility 
that a concession to Japan could lead to claims by 
Germany, Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania to 
territories which they too had been forced to cede to the 
Soviet Union in 1940-45, and which, unlike the Chinese 
territories, could not be settled by a mere formal 
acknowledgment that they were regrettable acquisitions by 
a preceding, "imperialist", regime of the Tsars which 
passage of time had made irreversible.
By early 1990, this principle of unchangeability was 
under strong challenge in Eastern Europe, with moves 
towards German reunification, and in the Soviet Union 
itself, where nationalist movements were pressing in the 
Baltic States for independence, and in Moldavia for 
reunification with Romania, while legislation to provide 
a procedure for secession was being considered by the 
Supreme Soviet. The Japanese Northern Territories issue 
had therefore already begun to lose its significance as a 
"Pandora's Box", and, dependent on how the situation 
developed in Europe, a solution was becoming politically 
more feasible, probably on a basis of Soviet agreement to 
return the most southerly islands in exchange for 
Japanese agreement neither to place nor to allow other 
nations (i.e. the US) to locate military or intelligence 
installations of any kind on them.
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Japanese Perceptions of Soviet Threat
There is, nevertheless, a strong perception of a Soviet 
threat among the Japanese, derived mainly from the Soviet 
Union's increasing military presence in its environment. 
In 1978, when Moscow accused Tokyo of having joined a 
"Washington-Tokyo-Beijing axis" against the Soviet Union 
through signing the Peace and Friendship Treaty with 
China, the Soviets began to deploy troops to the islands 
of Kunashiri, Etorofu and Shikotan off Hokkaido.^0 Soviet 
military presence in the vicinity of Japan no doubt 
fuelled traditional Japanese concern over the Soviet 
threat, which goes back to the last century, when the 
Japanese and the Russians competed for control of 
Manchuria and Korea. The current Soviet military presence 
in the Japanese-claimed northern territories, according 
to Japan's Defence Agency, is the equivalent of a ground
•11force division with air support of 40 Mig-23 fighters. x
Soviet military deployment there, its military flights 
and warship passages close to and through Japan's air and 
sea space hundreds of times each year and the 1983 Korean 
Airlines incident, in conjunction with its invasion of 
Afghanistan and support for Vietnamese invasion of 
Kampuchea had an adverse effect on Japan's security 
perceptions. Since 1978 Japan's Defence Agency White
30. See Hiroshi Kiaura, "The Soviet Military Buildup: Its Impact on Japan and Its Aims", in 
Soloaon and Kosaka (ed.), The Soviet Far Bast Military Buildup, Sydney: Crooi Helm Ltd.,
1986, p.108
31. Defence of Japan, Japan’s Defence Agency, Tokyo, 1989, p.45
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Papers on defence have become increasingly specific about 
the Soviet Union as posing a main threat to Japan's 
security. Despite Gorbachev's unilateral reduction 
programme, in the Japanese view, the Soviet Union still 
keeps a large military presence in the Far East. 60 per 
cent of Soviet Far Eastern ground force divisions and air 
force fighters, 80 per cent of its bombers and the 
Pacific Fleet are now deployed in areas close to Japan, 
including the Far Eastern coastal area, the Kuriles, the 
Sea of Okhotsk and the Kamchatka Peninsula.*32 This is not 
only a potential threat to Japan, but an important factor 
in raising tensions in the region. Moreover, Soviet 
military activities in the region also encouraged 
domestic pressure for increasing defence spending to a 
level greater than one per cent of Japan's G N P . Between 
1 9 8 0  and 1 98 8  Japan recorded a 65 percent increase in 
military spending, ranking Japan's defence outlay the 
sixth highest in the world. ^ 3 japan's 1 9 8 6  White Paper 
indicated that Tokyo would upgrade weapons-procurement 
goals to cope with "limited and small-scale aggression".
Officially, Japan regards the Soviet military buildup in 
the Far East in general and on the northern islands in
32. See Defence of Japan, Japan's Defence Agency, Tokyo, 1989, pp.44-57. See also Defence of 
Japan 1982, (Defence Agency, Tokyo, 1982). The Japan's White Paper on defence not only 
lists possible scenarios for a Soviet attack, but it states unequivocally that the 
Japanese Self-Defence Forces (SDF) are to have the capability of blockading the four 
strategically iiportant straits in the seas around Japan for the purpose of denying the 
Soviet Pacific Fleet access to the Pacific in the event of hostilities.
33. See Ron liattheus and Joanne Bartlett, "The Stirring of Japan's Military Sluiber", The 
lorld Today, London, Vol.44, No.5, May 1988
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particular as a main but not an immediate threat to 
Japan. There is little doubt that Soviet forces across 
the Sea of Japan, including those in the Far East 
Military District and the Soviet Pacific Fleet, are 
powerful and capable of undertaking a major military 
operation against Japan. Against this contingency, Japan 
can, according to the Military Balance, muster 13 
divisions (one of them armoured) and 10 brigades, 15 
submarines, 6 destroyers, 57 frigates and about 510 
combat aircraft.^4 Nevertheless, there is no evidence 
that the Soviet Union has any intention to risk a limited 
or localized attack on Japan which, according to Paul 
Keal, would at least in theory invite a counter attack, 
backed by the threat of nuclear weapons, from the United 
States under the treaty of alliance.'35 For as long as 
there is a US military commitment to defend Japan, such 
an event is therefore only likely to occur in a major 
international conflict, including an armed clash between 
the United States and the Soviet Union.
Prospects
In recent years, there have been some changes in Soviet 
policy towards Japan. Gorbachev appears to have abandoned 
the position of his predecessors that there was no
34. The Military Balance 1989-1990, IISS, London, 1989, pp.162-164
35. Paul Keal, "Japan's Security Policy", (A paper for the Conference on Security and Aris 
Control in the North Pacific, Canberra, August 1987), p.8
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territorial issue between the Soviet Union and Japan. 
Moscow has showed willingness to discuss the northern 
territory issue with Tokyo. Given the current drastic 
changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe already 
mentioned, it seems unwise that the Japanese still refuse 
to consider Gorbachev's initiatives for improved Soviet- 
Japanese relations. Japan may propose that the two 
countries hold talks on such issues as the reduction of 
Soviet forces in the Far East, including a withdrawal of 
Soviet forces from the four northern islands. The 
prospects for a breakthrough in Japanese-Soviet relations 
depend largely on developments in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union. A more flexible and open Soviet diplomacy 
towards Tokyo, however, is unlikely to dissolve the deep 
suspicions and distrust held by the Japanese.
Clearly, joint development of Siberia and the Soviet Far 
East will be one of the important dimensions in expanding 
Japanese-Soviet economic cooperation. Gorbachev's call 
for accelerated economic development of Siberia and the 
Soviet Far East will conceivably create a massive demand 
for Japanese machinery, technology and investment, 
thereby raising the expectation in Japan that the Soviet 
Union will become a large long-term export market, and at 
the same time, a significant source of raw materials 
essential to Japan's economy. However, since the early 
1980s, when Japan opted for stable economic growth, its 
interest in Siberia's natural resources has decreased
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compared with the period of Japan's high economic growth 
in the 1960s and early 1970s.
Until Moscow makes a major concession on the territorial 
issue, Tokyo is not likely to change its basic policy 
towards the Soviet Union. It is almost certain that for 
the Soviets, as Hiroshi Kimura argued, Japan is currently 
much harder to deal with than China. ^  The fact that 
Japan's ultimate security depends on the United States 
also sets a limit to the extent of improved Soviet- 
Japanese relations. As a US ally, Japan could not avoid 
being involved in a US-Soviet conflict. Japan's policy 
towards the Soviet Union therefore depends to a large 
extent on the trends in US-Soviet relations, and improved 
US-Soviet relations are one of the keys to expansion of 
Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation. Japan is likely to 
remain cautious about Gorbachev's economic diplomacy and, 
where possible, invest jointly with strong American 
interests.
4.3 The United States
The essence of the post-World War II rivalry between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, according Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, a former US Assistant to the President for
36. For a discussion, see Razuo Ogata, '[Soviet] Economic Relations with Japan", in Rodger 
Svearingen, Siberia and the Soviet Far East, Stanford University, Hoover Institution 
Press, 1987
37. Hiroshi Kimura, "Soviet Focus on the Pacific", Probleis of Couunisi, Vol.XXXVI, Hay-June
1987, p.10
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National Security Affairs, revolved around the issue as 
to whether the Soviet Union would have a free hand to 
dominate Eurasia or whether that opportunity would be 
denied to it.38 It may be argued that Northeast Asia and 
the adjacent areas of the Pacific are now a region as 
important to the United States geopolitically and 
economically as Western Europe. This geopolitical "co­
importance", as Brzezinski put it, was because in his 
view Soviet domination over Eurasia could be prevented 
only if the Far West and the Far East of the Eurasian 
continent did not fall under Soviet s w a y . ^  In the light 
of subsequent events it is arguable that Brzezinski's 
picture of Soviet capabilities was considerably 
overdrawn, but it is not necessary to accept it in order 
to acknowledge the importance of Asia to the United 
States. Economically, Asia is where the United States has 
its largest and fastest-growing overseas commerce. 
Broadly speaking, the region today is more important in 
terms of trade than Western Europe. As the former US 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said in 1975, that is 
why the United States will not turn away from Asia or 
focus its attention on Europe to the detriment of Asia.4^ 
Clearly, the Pacific region represents one of the 
greatest concerns to the United States, and it is at
38. Zbignie* Brzezinski, A presentation at the Seiinar on Soviet Military Presence in East 
Asia and the Pacific: Iiplication for lestern Policy, Siithsonian Institution, Washington 
D.C., Karch 21, 1985, p.4
39. Ibid., p.4
40. Quoted in "Rival in the Pacific", Tiie, Noveiber 24, 1986, p.12
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least on a par with the Atlantic region. The United 
States certainly wants to see that "no single power can 
dominate the area and exclude or threaten the United 
States".
Impact of Soviet-American Detente on Regional Stability
It is clear that the continuing growth of Soviet military 
power after the mid-1970s, particularly its increase and 
upgrading of the Pacific Fleet and its access to bases in 
Vietnam, represented a considerable challenge to the 
United States. The Soviet Pacific Fleet's active area of 
blue-water operations extended throughout the 
northwestern Pacific, as far north as the Bering Sea and 
as far south as the South China Sea. From the American 
view, this was a political, economic and security risk in 
the Pacific because of the geographic proximity of the 
Soviet threat to the United States and its allies.
In response, the United States qualitatively improved its 
force capabilities without measurably increasing its size 
since 1981. (See Table 4.1) The US Pacific Fleet's 
strength was augmented by the USS Varl Vinson (CVN-70), 
Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class SSNs, Spruance (DD-963)-class 
destroyers, Oliver Hazard Perry (F FG-7)-class frigates, 
and by four new Ohio (SSBN-726)-class SSBNs. It is
41. Richard L. Sneider, "United States Security Interests", in Jates V. Norley, The Pacific 
Basin: lev Challenges for the United States, Proceedings of the Acadeny of Political 
Science, Vol.36, No.l, 1986, p.76
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possible that with the implementation of the Reagan 
Administration's US naval building plan more ships will 
be deployed to the US Pacific Fleet. In addition, more 
modern aircraft, including F-15s and F-16s, have been 
deployed to the Pacific region. Now nearly 70 per cent of 
US Pacific forces' aircraft are considered advanced, 
whereas, in 1980, the figure was only 20 per cent.42 In 
Northeast Asia, while pressing Japan and South Korea to 
modernize their defence forces, the United States also 
strengthened its force presence there. In Japan, the US 
Air Force (USAF) replaced F-4s with F-15s, and some 48 F- 
16s were deployed at Misawa Air Base in northern Japan 
from 1985. In South Korea, the USAF replaced F-4Ds with 
36 F-4Es, and deployed 48 F-16s and 18 A-lOAs.4^
The expansion of Soviet military power resulted in 
intensified competition between the United States and the 
Soviet Union in the Pacific. Although it had begun to 
become another arena of increasing strategic importance 
for superpower rivalry, the region as a whole, as 
Gorbachev acknowledged in his Vladivostok speech, has not 
as yet been militarised to the extent Europe has.
However, this process has been slowed by Soviet cuts and 
by President Bush's reductions in US defence allocations. 
Unlike Europe, the groundwork for major shifts in
42. David H. Fitzgerald, "The Soviets in Southeast Asia", Proceedings, February 1986, p.56
43. For a discussion, see Young-Sun Ha, "The Soviet Military Buildup in the Far East: 
Implications for the Security of South Korea", in Soloaon and Kosaka (ed.), The Soviet Far 
East Military Buildup, Sydney: Crooi Helm Ltd., 1986, p.149
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military balance in Northeast Asia is less developed. 
States there do not have such key European experiences as 
the Helsinki peace process to build upon. Nevertheless, 
there are important, if gradual, developments in the 
military equation that may open the way for more dramatic 
breakthroughs in Northeast Asia. The most significant of 
these are the Soviet force reductions and withdrawal in 
the region mentioned earlier, and the gradual reduction 
of the US forces in South Korea. According to the recent 
agreement reached in principle between the US and South 
Korea, the US would reduce its forces in South Korea in 
three stages. The first stage, covering 1991-1993, would 
see the withdrawal of 7000 troops, including 5000 non- 
combatant ground force personnel and 2000 airmen. The 
reduction in the second (1994-95) and third stages (after 
1996) would be decided upon the completion of the fist 
stage and on the evaluation of the military situation 
then prevailing on the Korean Peninsula.44
The process of dialogues between US and Soviet leaders 
has already led to a shift from sharp confrontation, as 
seen in the 1980s, to a certain degree of detente. 
Improved US-Soviet relations will contribute to global 
and regional detente. Such an improvement will not
44. lorea Daily, April 5, 1989. According to the same source, under the US-South Korean 
agreement, the combined US-South Korean field army now stationed at Uijongbu would be 
dissolved by 1993. The Combined Forces Command in Seoul now headed by top US army general 
and which controls the frontline US and South Korean troops would be commanded in the 
future by a four-star South Korean army general. The hand over of supreme operational 
control would take place during the second stage.
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necessarily change the basic pattern of rivalry in the 
US-Soviet relations, but it will reduce its intensity. 
Security and stability in Northeast Asia will continue to 
depend to a great extent on the global balance between 
the United States and the Soviet Union, even at lower 
levels of armaments. Constrained by their own econdmic 
difficulties and political pressures from regional 
states, the United States and the Soviet Union appear 
likely to soften their hard-line policies towards each 
other, and respond to detente by compromises designed to 
reduce the tensions in their relationship and maintain 
the global and regional balance between them.
Prospects for US Regional Position
The Soviet military buildup over the past two decades 
failed to reduce the US influence and decouple the United 
States from its regional allies. Rather, it led to closer 
ties between the United States and its regional allies 
and friends. The balance of forces is heavily weighed in 
favour of the US. General Yazov also admitted that 
"although we have a two to one superiority in tanks, the 
US and Japan have a two to one superiority in warships 
(although not in submarines) , and a two to one advantage 
in tactical and naval aviation".45 Clearly, the Soviets 
do not possess regional superiority, but they do possess
45. Quoted in "Asia: a shift in balance?", Jane’s Defence leekly, March 3 1990, p.391
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a formidable military force that will most likely 
continue to be modernized even though reduced in size.
The overall balance in Northeast Asia favours the United 
States, perhaps more than at any time since the end of 
World War II, largely as a result of the American 
initiative in 1972 to improve relations with China. Prior 
to the "Beijing Event" in 1989, the US and China shared a 
common interest in preserving a balanced strategic and 
economic environment in the Asian-Pacific region, vis-a- 
vis both Soviet power expansion and regional conflicts in 
the Korean peninsula, Afghanistan, and Kampuchea in 
particular. The US perception of China was as "an 
increasingly important factor in efforts to maintain or 
improve the US military position vis-a-vis the Soviet 
Union",46 and the Chinese perception of the United States 
was as an effective counterweight to Soviet power 
expansion in both global and regional terms. As a result, 
they managed to change the global strategic balance vis- 
a-vis their common adversary, the Soviet Union. When 
viewed in broad perspective, Sino-US relations, including 
military ties, developed steadily. Each found ways to 
promote its own interests through cooperative ties, while 
neither was ready to compromise on key issues without 
conditions. The US has since 1985 moved to sell to China 
a package of avionics to upgrade the Chinese air force's
46. Banning S. Garrett, "The United States and the Great Power Triangle", in Gerald Segal 
(ed.), The China Factor, Holies 4 Meier Publishers, Inc., 1982, p.85
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J-8 fighter for air defence, a large-calibre ammunition 
facility programme, anti-submarine torpedoes and 
artillery locating radars. In addition to transfers of 
hardware technology, US warships visited China's ports of 
Qingdao in 1986 and Shanghai in 1989, and a Chinese naval 
ship sailed to Hawaii in 1989. US sources also revealed 
intelligence-sharing arrangements with China, consisting 
US listening posts in Xinjing in northwest China 
(replacing those lost in Iran in 1980), and Chinese 
seismographic stations to monitor Soviet nuclear tests.4^ 
These are, as Shao Wenguang said, typical cases of 
r e a l p o l i t i k  prevailing over bitter memories and 
inflammable ideology.48 As for the US, a defence 
relationship with the PRC would primarily increase the 
latter's credibility as a strategic counterweight to 
Soviet power, just as economic and technological links 
would fit in with a global American strategy to build an 
enduring relationship between China and the West.49
In stern reaction to the military intervention in 
Tiananmen Square on June 4 1989, the US government took a 
series of steps designed to impose sanctions on China, 
including the suspension of all US military exchanges and 
arms deals with China, and of US participation in high-
47. George Lardner, Jr and R. Jeffrey Saith, "US Maintains Covert China Partnership", 
International Herald Tribune, June 26, 1989
48. Shao Venguang, "China's Relations with the Superpowers", Survival, Voluie XXXII, No.2, 
IISS, March/April 1990, p.158
49. Gordon Jacobs, "US Aid Focus on Asia and the Pacific", Jane's Defence Meekly, September
30, 1989, p.657
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level exchanges of government officials with Beijing, 
thereby causing a serious political rupture in China's 
relations with the US. Although a hostile US would not be 
expected to have much impact on the leadership debate in 
China, a complete reversal of Beijing's policy of 
cooperation with the US would negate the achievements in 
Sino-US relations since Nixon's visit in 1972, and would 
represent the single most dramatic shift in China's grand 
strategy of the past two decades, which has been to 
minimize ideological rectitude for the sake of global 
geopolitical balance and economic modernisation. In spite 
of public criticism of Western attempts to pressure China 
for its internal policies, Beijing has kept open the 
major channels of contact with Washington. China does not 
intend to close the doors to the outside world, for fear 
of reducing its economically important access to the much 
larger flows of Western investment and the West's more 
advanced technology. China, as General Secretary Jiang 
Zemin noted, will go ahead with its reform and open-door 
policy and will not turn back to its old t r a c k . I n  this 
respect, at least, the official tone is very much a 
conciliatory one.
Despite the current rupture in Sino-US relations, Beijing 
appreciated the remark made by US President Bush that 
there were "enormous geopolitical reasons for the US to 
maintain relations with China", and hoped that its ties
50. People's Daily, April 6, 1990
with the US would "return to a normal track". ^ In this 
regard, long-term trends in the regional balance will 
probably continue to favour the United States, unless 
Gorbachev's proposals on arms reduction and mutual 
security are accepted. If they are, a situation of 
approximate parity in security will prevail. 
Strategically, the primary mission of Soviet military 
deployments in the Far East are to deter attack and 
facilitate the opening of a second front from forward- 
deployed US, Japanese and Chinese forces in the event of 
a European War. US defence strategy in Asia in this 
global war scenario is, the Pentagon says, "to conduct 
offensive actions against Soviet Forces in order to 
neutralise Soviet military capability and inhibit Soviet 
transfer of Far Eastern forces to the European 
theatre."^2 It remains to be seen how bilateral Sino-US 
relations will continue to develop under a reduced 
perception of a Soviet threat. It is extremely unlikely 
that an interdependent triple security alliance--what 
Zbigniew Brzezinski called an "iron triangle" involving 
formal relationship in the security area between the 
United States, Japan and China— will e m e r g e , ^  though all 
three can be expected to collaborate where they judge it 
necessary to contain Soviet influence.
51. These reiarks »ere made by Chinese Foreign Minister at a press conference in Beijing. 
People's Daily, March 29, 1990
52. See Jane's Defence Meekly, March 3 1990, p.391
53. Zbigniev Brzezinski, A presentation at the Seiinar on Soviet Military Presence in Hast 
Asia and the Pacific: Iiplication for lestern Policy, Siithsonian Institution, Washington 
D.C., March 21, 1985, p.9
130
US-Japan and US-South Korea security relations will 
remain strong. For example, Japan will most likely 
increase its contribution to the implementation of a US- 
Japan defence strategy for the region because of the 
current trade frictions in the US-Japanese relations. 
According to Japan's 1987 White Paper on defence, the so- 
called "sympathetic budget" which provides stationing 
costs of US troops in Japan has been increased by 9.3 per 
cent for the financial year 1988 from 119.83 billion Yen 
in 1987.^4 But it seems very unlikely that an "Eastern 
N A T O ' , made up of the United States, Japan and South 
Korea, will emerge. There will continue to be two 
bilateral treaties; one between the United States and 
Japan and the second between the United States and South 
K o r e a .
54. See Rod ffattheas and JoaDDe Bartlett, "The Stirring of Japan's Military Slumber", The 
World Today, London, Vol.44, No.5, May 1988
55. Quoted in Hiroshi Kiaura, "Soviet Focus on the Pacific", Probleis of Couunisi, Vol.XXXVI, 
May-June 1987, p.13. This remark was made by Gorbachev during a dinner for Rim Il-song in 
October 1986.
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Conclusion
Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech showed his recognition and 
determination to tackle the "many tangled knots" of 
external tensions and economic "pre-crisis" situations 
left behind by his predecessors due to their over­
emphasis on military power. His proposals for "building 
together new, fair relations in Asia and the Pacific" 
signalled his intention to gain for the Soviet Union 
recognition as an Asian-Pacific power, and were followed 
by a number of steps designed to improve relations with 
Pacific rim countries.
The series of initiatives and diplomatic gestures made by 
Gorbachev in his Vladivostok speech clearly reflected his 
awareness that the Soviet military buildup and 
accompanying developments in Afghanistan and Kampuchea 
had severely undermined Soviet political and economic 
interests in the Asian-Pacific region at a time when this 
region was acquiring a new level of global significance.
Essentially, Gorbachev's strategic objectives are to 
cultivate relations with all neighbouring states, so as 
to create a favourable environment for pursuing economic 
modernisation at home while retaining superpower status 
abroad. In the long run, only improved economic 
conditions at home can halt the decline of the USSR as a 
world power. Gorbachev does not wish to see the Soviet 
Union as "the odd man out" in the Asian-Pacific region
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when his country's economy urgently needs reinvigoration; 
a reinvigoration which would be more easily affected by 
integrating into the most dynamic region of the world 
ec o n o m y .
This pragmatic adjustment is most evident in Gorbachev's 
search for an easier relationship with China and Japan, 
the principal targets of his initiatives. The former, 
through its long contiguous border, poses the greatest 
security problem to the USSR and the latter is now a 
valuable potential source of technological know-how and 
investment funds, even though Japan's security treaty 
with the United States adds an additional element to 
Soviet security concerns. Since Gorbachev's Vladivostok 
speech in 1986, there have been positive developments in 
Soviet relations with countries in the region, largely 
because of the changes in Soviet political thinking and 
foreign policy (although not exclusively). The most 
significant of these is the normalisation of relations 
with China, which has ended 30 years of estrangement in 
Sino-Soviet relations. Moreover, better relations have 
already enabled the Soviet Union to reduce military 
forces and defence costs in the Soviet eastern frontiers 
and should help to secure inward investment in the 
economic development of the Soviet Far East and Siberia.
However, mutual distrust and suspicion still remain deep- 
seated and strong in China, notwithstanding the
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normalization of relations. In the short and longer 
terms, both sides will continue to expand their bilateral 
relations, but progress will be slow especially in light 
of their divergence in the policies and attitudes towards 
internal political order and developments in the East 
European situation. Further, ties with the United States 
are clearly an important factor for China in its 
bilateral relations with the Soviet Union, a situation 
the United States is in a position to capitalize on.
In the coming decade, the Soviet Union's most serious 
difficulties in the region seem likely to lie more in its 
relations with Japan than with China. Moscow clearly 
needs to secure Japanese assistance for economic 
revitalization, especially in Siberia and the Soviet Far 
East. Gorbachev's motive for seeking more conciliatory 
relations with Japan is largely economic and technical. 
Yet unless Moscow can make concessions over the 
territorial issue, Tokyo is not likely to change its 
policy. Consequently, the prospects for a breakthrough in 
Japanese-Soviet relations depends on developments in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, which may lessen the 
rigidity of Soviet insistence on the "frontier 
unchangeability".
The Soviet force buildup in past years led to closer ties 
between the United States, China and Japan. US-China 
relations will continue to develop in spite of the
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current chill after the "Beijing Event" in 1989. Both 
Beijing and Washington evidently share a desire to end 
the political rupture in their bilateral relations 
although the pace of progress may well be constrained by 
internal politics in each country. The US-Japan and US- 
South Korea security relationships will remain strong. A 
significant shift in the regional balance of power 
between the United States and the Soviet Union seems less 
likely to occur than a continuation of the present status 
quo relationships, at lower levels of armaments on both 
s i d e s .
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Appendix:
Soviet Forces in the Far East Theatre
Strategic  F o rces  (under central command):  
S L B M : 385: Pacific Fleet: 32 subs: 9 D-I 
(108), 7 D-III( 112). 9 r - / (1 44 ) ,  7 (7 - / / (2 1 ) .  
ICBM: (?387): S S -1 1 (4 fields. ?260 msls, could 
have theatre role), SS -18(4 fields, ? 120 msls). 
IRBM: 171: SS-20  (4 fields. 19 sites).
Bbrs: 1 Air Army (HQ Irkutsk): perhaps 170: 
4 0  Tu-26  Backfire, (?30) Tu-22 Blinder, 100 
T u-16  Badger.
Spt: perhaps 64 recce/ECM: ?4 Tu-95 Bear E,
15 T u -1 6 Badger F: 45 T u - 16 Badger H/J/K.  
Tkrs: som e 9 T u-16  Badger A.
Air D e fen c e  Forces:
EW ng systems: 40  in areas: Kamchatka, 
N ikolayev-na-A m ur. Mishelevka, 
Abalakova, Sary-shagan.
A D  areas: 3: 1 in Transbaykal. 2 in Far East 
MDs ( s e e  MD Air Forces, be low) .  
Interceptors: 550.
SA M : 215 SA-2/-3/-5 , 10 SA-10 com plexes  
and sites.
Ground Forces:  4 m d s .  1 Unified Army Corps  
HQ:
56  d i v s  (7 tk. 48  m o t o r  rifle.  1 coas ta l  
defence) pl us  5 arty divs; 2 air assaul t  bdes.  
Central A s i a n  MD (HQ A l m a  Ata):
1 tk. 7 motor rifle, plus 1 arty divs, 1 air 
assault bde; 145 hel incl 70* Mi-8, Mi-24.
Siberian MD (HQ Novosibirsk):
6 motor rifle plus 1 arty divs.
Transbaykal MD (HQ Chita):
2 tk, 11 motor rifle, plus 1 arty divs; 225  
hel incl Mi-8 Hip, Mi-24 Ilind.
Far Eastern MD (HQ Khaba ro vs k) :
2 tk, 22 motor rifle, 1 coastal defence,  
plus 2 artv divs, 1 air assault bde; som e  
67 0  hel.
M ongolia  (HQ Ulan Bator):
I A rm y HQ, 2 tk. 2 motor rifle divs. All are 
at Cat 1. (See also Forces Abroad, below.)  
M obilizat ion  could pul 4 Fronts, perhaps 12 
Armies (4  tk), into the field.
Equipment', perhaps 14.900 MBT; 13.200 arty, 
MRL. mor larger than 120mm; 225 FROG , 
80+ Scud . 40  SS-12 (mod) SSM; 1,200 SAM,  
som e 1,100 hel.
Tactical Aviation (HQ Irkutsk): (150,000): som e  
1,390 com bat ac.
Central Asian MD Air Force (HQ Novosibirsk,  
incl Siberian MD): 4 1 0  combat ac.
FGA: 225: 90 M iG -27  Flogger D/J, 135 
Su-24 Fencer.
Ftrs: 135: 90  M iG -2 !  Fishbed. 45 M iG -23  
Flogger.
Recce: 50 M iG -25  Foxbat B/D.
Tpt: 1 0 0  ac.
Transbaykal MD Air Force (HQ Chita, incl 
Mongolia): 390  co m b a t  ac.
FGA: 270: 2 divs,  M iG -2 7  Flogger D/J .
Ftrs: 90: 2 regts: M iG -2 5  Foxbat A/E, 
M iG -23  Flogger.
Recce: 30: Su-17 Finer H. Yak-28 Brewer 
D, M iG -2 5  Foxbat.
Far-Eastern MD Air Force (HQ Khabarovsk):  
control centres: Petropavlovsk ,  
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk; som e 590 com bat ac. 
FGA: 360: 8 regts: M iG -21 Fishbed L, 
M iG -27  Flogger D/J. Su-25 Frogfoot,
Su-7 Fitter A, Su-1 7 Filter D /H /K .
Ftrs: 180: M iG -2 3  Flogger, M iG -25 Foxbat 
A, Mig-29 Fulcrum , MiG-31 Foxhound. 
Recce: 40: Y ak-28 Brewer D. MiG-21  
Fishbed  H. M iG -2 5  Foxhat B/'D.
EC.M: 10 Yak-28 Brewer E.
Navy (Pacific Fleet) ( h q  Vladivostok):
(159.000).
Bases: V ladivostok. Petropavlovsk, Sovyets-  
kava Gavan.
Subs: 76: 26 SSGN/SSG.  50 SSN/SS.
Principal surface combatants:  82: 2 carriers,
14 cruisers incl 1 Kirov . 13 destroyers incl 
1 Sovrem ennyy , 1 L'daloy. 22 frigates, 31 
corvettes.
Minor surface combatants:  140.
M C M V : 96.
Amph: 21 ships (incl 2 Rogov LPD).  
Auxiliaries: 135 principal.
Regular deploym ents:
To the Indian Ocean and South Y em en  
(Aden, Socotra) and Ethiopia  (D ahlak  Is. 
Asmara): average 0 -1  subs. 1 -2  principal.  
1-2 m inor surface com batants.  I am ph,  
6 - 8  spt ships.
To V ietnam  (Cam Ranh Bay) and the South  
China Sea: average 2 - 4  subs. 3 - 4  principal  
surface com batants ,  3 - 4  minor surface  
com batants,  0 -1  am p h. 9 - 1 2  spt vessels.  
Naval Air (Pacific Fleet Air Force) (HQ 
Sovetskaya Gavan): combat: som e 3 20  ac, 
som e 110 hel.
Bbrs: 110: 1 regt T u -26  Backfire, 3 regts 
T u -16  Badger A /C /G .
FGA: 70: (afloat): 4 bns Yak-38 Forger A/B;
(ashore): Su-17 Fitter C.
ASW : 170: ac: 80: T u -1 4 2  Bear, 11-38 M ay, 
Be-12 Mail.
hel: 90  (afloat): 2 bns Ka-25 Hormone A; 
(ashore): 1 bn K a-27  Helix, 2 bns M i - 14 
Haze.
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M R /recce /EW : ac: 60: Tu-16 Badger, Tu-95  
Bear, A n-12 Cub B; 
hel: 10: Ka-25 Hormone B.
Tkr: 15 T u - 16 Badger.
M C M  hel: 5 M i-14 H aze  B.
Attack hel: 5 Ka-27 Helix B.
Tpt/trg: 65 ac, 20 hel.
N aval Infantry: 1 D iv  HQ, 3 inf, 1 tk and 1 
regts: 7,000.
F O R C E S A B R O A D :
Afghanistan (Southern GTVD):  1 16,000 (som e  
10,000 MVD,  KGB).
M ongolia (Far Eastern GTVD):  e 55 .000  
(reducing).
Vietnam: (2 ,500);  naval base (as above);
co m p o s ite  air unit: 6 T u -9 5 / - 142 Bear, 16 
, T u -16  Badger D /K  M R  or A S W , 1 sqn o f  
^ M iG -23  Flogger ftr ac, a a , Sa m , e lectron ic  
m on itor ing  station.
(Source: IISS, The Military Balance 1987-88)
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Figure 1.1 The Relief of the Soviet Union
(Source: Georges Jorre, (Translated by E.D. Laborde), The soviet Union: The 
Land and Its People, Longmans, Green & Co Ltd, 1961, p.3)
Figure 1.2 Russian Expansion in Asia
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(Source: R.E.H. Mellor, Geography of the U.S.S.R., Macmillan and Company 
Limited, London, 1964, p.87)
Figure 2.1 Soviet Regional Theatres and Military Districts
(Source: IISS, The Military Balance 1987-88, p.40)
Figure 2.2 Soviet Trans-Siberian Railroad
(Source: Rodger Swearingen (ed.), Siberia and the Soviet Far East, Stanford 
University, Hoover Institution Press, 1987, p.43)
Figure 2.3 Soviet Siberian Riches
£jJl3£FJlt\J£ niOsiÉÎj
(Source: Asia Yearbook 1986, Far East Economic Review)
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(Source; Jane’ s Defence Weekly, August 20 1988)
Table 1.1 Soviet Territory in Asia
Land Area Population
('000 sq km) (Million, '8 6)
Central Asia 3, 994 . 4 4 6.5
Kazakhstan 2, 717 .3 16.0
Kirghizia 198 .5 4 .1
Tajikstan 143 . 1 4 . 6
Turkmenia 488 . 1 3.3
Uzbekistan 447 . 4 18.5
Siberia 6, 400 17 .5
Western Siberia 2, 300 10
Eastern Siberia 4/ 100 7 . 5
Far East 6, 200 6
(Source: Asia Yearbook 1987, Far East Economic Review, pp.239-243)
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Table 2.1 Soviet Ground Force Divisions in the Far East Theatre
(1965-87)
Military Districts 1965 1970 1975 1980 1983 1987
Far East 7 15 16 18 24* 26*
Transbaikal 5 8 10 8 10 11
(Mongolia) - 2 2 5 5 5
Siberia 3 4 5 5 6 7
Central Asia 2 5 7 6 7 8
TOTAL 17 34 40 42 52 57**
Source: US Department 
Institute for
of Defence 
Strategic
and The 
Studies
Int ernational
Includes divisions on Kamchatka and Sakhalin
Seven of these divisions are tank divisions (2 each in 
the Far East and Transbaikal Military Districts,and in 
Mongolia, 1 in Central Asia Military District). In 
addition, there are 4 artillery divisions (1 each in 
the Far East, Transbaikal, Siberia and Central Asia 
Military Districts).
Table 2.2 Soviet Nuclear Force Buildup in the Far East Theatre
(1965-85)
1965 1970 197 5 1980 1985
MR/IRBM Launchers
SS-4/SS-5 100 100 100 100 0
S S - 2 0 - 0 ___ 0 0 40 135-171
Total 100 100 100 140 135-171
Medium-Range Bombers 
Strategic Air Armies
B adger! B lin d er C 175 160 145 80
B ackfire 0 0 0 15 40
Total c 175 160 160 120
Soviet Naval Aviation
B a d g er /B lin d er 55 70 85 95 90
B ackfire 0 0 0 5 40
Total 55 70 85 100 130
Submarine-Launched Ballistic 
Missiles (SLBMs)d
Submarines (SSBN/SSB) c C C C 31
SLBM Launchers c c C c 405
Sources D e p artm en t of D efense. Soviet M ilitary Power, The In ternationa] Institu te  for 
S trategic  Studies (IISS), The M ilitary Balance.
•Forces deployed in the  S iberian, Transbaykal, and Far East m ilitary districts, and at sea 
bEach SS-20 m issile is M IRVed with th ree  w arheads. Each launcher is assessed to have one 
missile on launcher, plus one refire missile. T he up per range of num bers for 1985 includes 
launchers that can target both E urope and Asia. 
cData not available.
dSS-11 ICBM s deployed  north  of C hina could also be used to attack U .S ., allied, and 
C h inese  targets in the  Asia-Pacific region.
(Source: Solomon and Kosaka (eds.), The Soviet Far East Military Buildup, 
Sydney: Croom Helm Limited, 1986, p.272)
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Table 2.3 Average Annual Growth of Soviet Real GNP (1961-85)
(percent )
1 961 -65 1 966 - 70  1 971- 75  .1 9 7 6 - 00 1981-85
USSR 5.0 5.3 3.4 2.3 1.9
USA 4.7 3 .0  2.5 3.4 2.4
Japan 10.0 1 1.0 4.3 4.0 3.9
Growth rates are measured in national currencies. Data are actually for Gross
Domestic Product, but differences between GDP and GNP are considered small. 
Sources: 'Gorbachev's Modernization Program: A Status Report'. Submission of the
CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency to the Subcommittee on National Security 
Economics of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 19 
March 1987, p. 2.
(Source: R. F. Miller, and T. H. Rigby, "Domestic Determinants of Soviet Foreign 
Policy: Prospects for Change in the 1990s", A paper for the 
Conference on the Soviets in the Pacific in the 1990s, Canberra, May
1988, p.15)
Table 4.1 Major US Pacific Forces (1958-85)
1958 1963 1968 19/3 i y /» 19U0 I'JUI 1982 1983 1984-85
G ro u n d  d iv is io n  to ta l 5 5 12 4 4 4 4 4 4* 4*
A r m y 3 3 9 2 2 2 ( - ) 2 I! - )  2 ( -  ) 2 ( - ) 2 ( - )
M a r in e 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
S h ips  to tal 347 432 427 277 220 221 217 223 21 2 - 206”
Carr ie rs 12 13 11 8 6 7 7 6 6 6
Surfaco  c o m b a ta n ts 107 142 140 104 85 89 90 92 92 87
S u b m a r in e s  (General Purpose) 43 55 59 47 33 42 48 51 40 41
S u b m a r in e s  (SSBN) 0 0 7 9 10 8 3 1 2 2
A m p h ib io u s 82 72 97 41 31 33 31 31 32 32
M in e  W ar 39 42 42 8 0 0 0 0 0 0
M is c e l la n e o u s 64 108 78 72 55 42 38 42 40 36
Figh ter /a t tack  to tal 2001 1210 1828 1994 836 838 932 982 990 1157-*
A ir  Force 443 426 846 1386 192 180 192 242 279 " 285"
N a v y /M a r in e 1558 784 982 608 644 658 740 740 711* 872*
B o m b e rs  (SAC-TAC) 132 92 114 56 14 14 18 14 12' 16'
A S W  patro l 253 144 144 108 168 188 190 190 250» 237»
Personnel to ta l  ( th ousa nds) 385 445 1042 438 299 315 316 321 351 ” 331”
A r m y 72 101 459 79 51 50 48 47 47 52
Navy 184 203 284 205 148 151 158 159 180 158
A ir  Force 67 66 171 88 30 42 41 43 45 46
M a r in e 62 75 128 66 70 72 69 72 79 75
SOURCE: C om piled  from  sources cleared by OASD/PA. Security Review (or use in Public D om ain, February 25, 1985. 
•25 th  In fan try  D iv is ion  has tw o  active brigades "Data ob ta ined  Irom  UNITREP DATABASE/ALOC.
'In c lud e s  NON OPCON aircraft. rtlnc ludos 44 N O N -O f’CON aircraft
•Inc ludes 150 NON OPCON aircraft. 'N O N  OF’CON aircraft
"In c lu ilo s  50 NON OPCON aircraft. '’ Data ob ta ined  lio m  J13
(Source: Rodger Swearingen (ed.), Siberia and the Soviet Far East, Stanford 
University, Hoover Institution Press, 1987, p.262)
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